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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the impact of capital structure and financial media on Mergers and 
Acquisitions. The empirical evidence on this thesis demonstrates that firm’s capital 
structure and financial media are both significantly related to the M&A success and M&A 
performances. Chapter 3 empirically investigates the interaction between a bidder’s 
capital structure and the probability of M&A success. It suggests that bidders with great 
leverage deficit are less likely to be successful in M&A. The potential explanation is that 
overleveraged bidders are unable to provide attractive takeover offers with high 
premiums and thus reducing the probability of success. Chapter 4 further studies the 
implications of capital structure theory for M&A. The empirical evidence shows that 
bidder’s leverage deficit is negatively related to the probability of using pure cash 
payment. This implies that firms may actively rebalance their financial leverage to 
optimal level through M&A. Overleveraged bidders are less likely to use cash payment 
since they are willing to reduce their deficit level by acquiring targets with equity. By 
contrast, underleveraged bidders have more incentive to use cash payment because they 
tend to increase their debt level. Chapter 4 also shows that bidder’s capital structure has 
large impact on the merging firms’ stock performances in both short term and long term. 
Therefore bidder’s capital structure is considered as an important determinant for M&A 
performance. In addition, Chapter 5 further examines the relation between M&A 
performance and financial media. It reports that bidders with positive media attitude in 
pre-merger period are significantly outperformance than those with negative media 
attitude. It concludes that the pre-merger news released by influential financial media has 
large impact on market reactions to M&A announcements. Furthermore, the empirical 
evidence suggests that financial media is able to partially predict merging firm’s long 
term stock performance. Overall, our research in this thesis contributes to the literature 
with conclusive evidence that the considerations of capital structure and financial media 
provide further understandings with M&A performances.  
 
 
Contents 
 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 
2. Literature Review ................................................................................................................... 8 
2.1 M&A motivations ......................................................................................................... 8 
2.1.1 Synergies ........................................................................................................... 8 
2.1.2 Good bidders acquire bad targets ..................................................................... 9 
2.1.3 Agency costs .................................................................................................... 11 
2.1.4 The hubris hypothesis ..................................................................................... 15 
2.1.5 Managerial timing ........................................................................................... 18 
2.2 The M&A process ....................................................................................................... 20 
2.2.1 Target choice ................................................................................................... 20 
2.2.2 Deal payments ................................................................................................. 22 
2.2.3 Advisor selection ............................................................................................. 24 
2.2.4 Takeover defence............................................................................................. 28 
2.3 M&A stakeholders ...................................................................................................... 30 
2.3.1 Managers ......................................................................................................... 30 
2.3.2 Creditors .......................................................................................................... 34 
2.3.3 Suppliers .......................................................................................................... 36 
2.3.4 Competitors ..................................................................................................... 38 
2.3.5 Arbitrageurs ..................................................................................................... 39 
2.4 Factors affecting M&A performance .......................................................................... 41 
2.4.1 Method of payment ........................................................................................ 41 
2.4.2 Transaction attitude ........................................................................................ 44 
2.4.3 Type of target and acquirer ............................................................................. 45 
2.5 Merger waves ............................................................................................................. 49 
2.5.1 Economic efficiency ......................................................................................... 51 
2.5.2 Market misvaluation ........................................................................................ 53 
 
 
3. Does Bidder Leverage Affect M&A Success? ........................................................................ 55 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 55 
3.2 Literature review ........................................................................................................ 60 
3.2.1 Capital structure and M&A .............................................................................. 60 
3.2.2 Factors affecting takeover success .................................................................. 63 
3.2.2.1 Toeholds ............................................................................................... 63 
3.2.2.2 Managerial resistance .......................................................................... 64 
3.2.2.3 Other factors ........................................................................................ 65 
3.3 Data and methodology ............................................................................................... 66 
3.3.1 Sample selection ............................................................................................. 66 
3.3.2 Sample description .......................................................................................... 67 
3.3.3 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics ................................................. 68 
3.3.4 Methodology ................................................................................................... 73 
3.3.4.1 Capital structure measures .................................................................. 73 
3.3.4.2 Logistic analysis .................................................................................... 75 
3.4 Empirical results ......................................................................................................... 76 
3.4.1 Estimation of leverage deficit .......................................................................... 76 
3.4.2 General logistic analysis .................................................................................. 79 
3.4.3 Interaction analysis .......................................................................................... 81 
3.4.4 Payment analysis ............................................................................................. 82 
3.4.5 Bid premium analysis ...................................................................................... 85 
3.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 88 
4. Leverage-Motivated M&As and Their Stock Performance ................................................. 112 
4.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 112 
4.2 Literature review ...................................................................................................... 117 
4.2.1 Capital structure theory ................................................................................ 117 
4.2.2 Target capital structure theory ...................................................................... 120 
4.3 Sample and methodology ........................................................................................ 125 
4.3.1 Sample selection ........................................................................................... 125 
 
 
4.3.2 Variable definition ......................................................................................... 126 
4.3.2.1 Firm size .............................................................................................. 126 
4.3.2.2 Profitability ......................................................................................... 126 
4.3.2.3 Tangibility ........................................................................................... 128 
4.3.2.4 Product uniqueness ............................................................................ 128 
4.3.2.5 Growth opportunity ........................................................................... 128 
4.3.2.6 Cash reserves ...................................................................................... 129 
4.3.2.7 Industry and market conditions ......................................................... 130 
4.3.3 Descriptive statistics ...................................................................................... 130 
4.3.4 Methodology ................................................................................................. 131 
4.4 Empirical results ....................................................................................................... 132 
4.4.1 Estimation of target capital structure ............................................................ 132 
4.4.2 Payment choice analysis ................................................................................ 134 
4.4.3 Univariate analysis for announcement CARs ................................................. 136 
4.4.3.1 Bidder and target capital structure status classifications ................... 136 
4.4.3.2 Classification by deal type .................................................................. 138 
4.4.4 Multivariate regression analysis for announcement CARs ............................ 140 
4.4.4.1 Leverage deficit .................................................................................. 140 
4.4.4.2 Deal type ............................................................................................ 142 
4.4.5 Univariate analysis of the BHARs .................................................................. 143 
4.5 Summary and conclusions ........................................................................................ 145 
5. M&As and Financial Media ................................................................................................ 164 
5.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 164 
5.2 Literature review ...................................................................................................... 167 
5.2.1 Media content and the financial market ....................................................... 167 
5.2.2 Media coverage and the financial market ..................................................... 170 
5.2.3 The media and corporate events................................................................... 172 
5.3 Hypothesis ................................................................................................................ 175 
5.4 Data and Methodology............................................................................................. 177 
 
 
5.4.1 Sample selection criteria ............................................................................... 177 
5.4.2 Media Construction Methodology ................................................................ 178 
5.4.3 Sample description ........................................................................................ 180 
5.5 Empirical results ....................................................................................................... 182 
5.5.1 Univariate analysis for short-term announcement returns........................... 182 
5.5.2 Regression analysis ........................................................................................ 185 
5.5.3 Univariate analysis for long-term post-merger performance ....................... 188 
5.5.4 Regression analysis for long-term BHARs ...................................................... 190 
5.5.5 Premium analysis .......................................................................................... 192 
5.6 Summary and conclusion ......................................................................................... 194 
6. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 212 
6.1 Summary and conclusion ......................................................................................... 212 
6.2 Potential implications ............................................................................................... 215 
References .............................................................................................................................. 219 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 3.1 Sample Selection ............................................................................................... 91 
Table 3.2 Yearly M&A Deals ............................................................................................ 92 
Table 3.3 Year Target Type ................................................................................................ 94 
Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics for Acquirers ................................................................... 95 
Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics for Deal ........................................................................... 96 
Table 3.6 Tobit Model for Target Leverage Estimation .................................................... 97 
Table 3.7 Descriptive Statistics for Leverage Deficit Trisections ..................................... 98 
Table 3.8 Logistic Model for Takeover Success ............................................................. 100 
Table 3.9 Interaction Analysis ......................................................................................... 102 
Table 3.10 Payment Analysis .......................................................................................... 104 
Table 3.11 Bid Premium Analysis ................................................................................... 108 
Table 3.12 Bid Premium Analysis based on Different Mediums of Payment ................. 110 
Table 4.1 Sample Selection ............................................................................................. 148 
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics ....................................................................................... 149 
Table 4.3 Target Capital Structure Estimation ................................................................ 151 
Table 4.4 Payment Choice Analysis ................................................................................ 152 
Table 4.5 Bidder’s Announcement Returns Classified by Firm Capital Structure Status 154 
Table 4.6 Bidder’s Announcement Returns Classified by Deal Type ............................. 155 
Table 4.7 Cross-sectional Regression for CARs based on Leverage Deficit .................. 156 
Table 4.8 Cross-sectional Regression for CARs based on Leverage Deficit Dummy .... 158 
Table 4.9 Cross-sectional Regression for CARs based on Deal Type ............................. 160 
Table 4.10 Bidder’s 12-month Post-Merger BHARs Classified by Firm Capital Structure 
Status ............................................................................................................................... 162 
Table 4.11 Bidder’s 12-month Post-Merger BHARs Classified by Deal Type ............... 163 
Table 5.1 Sample Selection ............................................................................................. 196 
Table 5.2 Yearly M&A Deals .......................................................................................... 197 
Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics for Media Data .............................................................. 198 
 
 
Table 5.4 Descriptive Statistics of Deal and Acquirers characteristics ........................... 199 
Table 5.5 Cumulative Abnormal Returns ........................................................................ 202 
Table 5.6 Cross-sectional regression analysis of announcement abnormal returns ........ 204 
Table 5.7 Buy-Hold Abnormal Returns .......................................................................... 206 
Table 5.8 Cross-sectional regression analysis of BHAR ................................................ 208 
Table 5.9 Cross-sectional regression analysis for bid premium ...................................... 210 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
It is impossible to name everybody who has helped me during the preparation of this 
thesis. Firstly, I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize my sincere appreciation 
of my supervisor, Dr. Michael Guo, who encouraged and supervised me through all 
difficulties in the progress of Ph.D. Study as well as offered me many valuable 
opportunities in the academic life. I am also heartily grateful to my supervisor, Professor 
Rob Dixon, who inspired me to initiate my Ph. D. study and helped me to shape research 
ideas. Secondly, I would like to thank Dr Li Ding, Professor John Doukas, Professor 
Dimitris Petmezas and Dr Evangelos Vagenas-Nanos for their valuable comments and 
suggestions. 
 
Further, I owe my deepest gratitude to my wife Ji Sun who cared me during the whole Ph. 
D. studies. Without your encouragements and supports, the thesis will never be finished. 
In addition, I wish to thank all friends in Durham and faculty staffs of Durham University 
Business School for their supports. 
 
Finally, I would like to deeply thank my father and my mother for their unconditional 
love and great supports. I would not have come this far without their unwavering support 
and motivation over the years. 
 
Thank you all. 
 
Tuo Lin 
March 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statement of Copyright 
 
The material contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted for a degree in 
this or any other university. 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be 
published without prior consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are considered the most important aspect of corporate 
finance. They play a crucial role in financial markets. The beginnings and endings of 
merger waves are considered a reliable indicator of economic conditions. Historical data 
show that there have been six merger waves. The first merger wave can be traced back to 
the beginning of the 20th century. The sixth merger wave, the most recent, started in 2003 
and ended with the financial crisis in 2008. During the emergence of each of these six 
merger waves, M&A activities continued to experience dramatic growth in either trading 
values or trading volumes. Therefore, research on M&A also developed rapidly. Most 
aspects of M&A activity are well explored in the literature. However, several unfathomed 
questions remain, since M&As have been undergoing innovations in the corporate control 
market. The major purpose of this thesis is to explore unexplained aspects of M&As and 
to fill gaps in the literature. This research covers mainly two aspects of M&As: their 
probability of success and the performance of takeover deals. Based on previous studies, 
this thesis seeks to identify new factors that affect the probability of successful M&A 
completions and the M&A performances. 
 
The M&A literature mainly focus on the following aspects of M&As: their motivation, 
their process, their stakeholders, their performance, and merger waves. Chapter 2 
systematically reviews the most well-known and seminal papers in M&A research. This 
literature review reveals that the current general understanding of M&As in regards to the 
development of M&A research is impressive.  
 
Several developments in M&A research have taken place in recent years. For instance, 
the connection between a firm’s capital structure and M&A deals has attracted great 
attention, especially during the sixth merger wave. Increasing numbers of papers are 
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focusing on this relation, examining the motivation of M&A activity with traditional 
capital structure constructs such as tax shielding, financial slack, and wealth transfer. A 
few studies associate firm capital structure with takeover success. Morellec and Zhdanov 
(2008) developed a dynamic model relating a bidder’s capital structure to takeover 
success. Their theoretical model predicts that bidders with a low leverage ratio can have 
substantial advantages in takeover contests. However, to our best knowledge, no study 
empirically examines the potential interaction between the bidder’s leverage ratio and the 
takeover outcome. To fill this gap, the Chapter 3 of this thesis sheds light on this relation. 
The main research question of this chapter is that whether bidder’s capital structure has 
potential effect on the takeover success. It is expected that bidder’s different capital 
structures may have diversified impacts on the takeover success in the future. It is 
essential to explore how the under-leveraged capital structure generates advantages for 
bidding firm. Based on this consideration, firm managers may have incentive to actively 
manage their leverage ratios and obtain these advantages. Furthermore, it is important to 
investigate the potential explanation for this relation. We suppose that under-leveraged 
bidders have strong ability to propose high bid premiums for target shareholders. 
Therefore target shareholders and managers are more likely to accept the offer from these 
bidders.  
 
To answer these questions, Chapter 3 of this thesis empirically investigates the interaction 
between a bidder’s capital structure and the probability of success of M&As by using a 
large sample of 19,203 US takeover deals during the period 1980–2009. To more 
accurately proxy for a firm’s capital structure status, we use the concept of leverage 
deficit, which is based on the target capital structure theory. In line with typical capital 
structure research, we adopt a Tobit regression model to estimate each bidder's target 
leverage ratio. Then the leverage deficit is calculated as the difference between the firm’s 
actual financial leverage and the target level. The Tobit regression results suggest that a 
firm’s target capital structure relies on numerous factors. Both firm size and asset 
tangibility increase with the firm’s target leverage ratio. In contrast, firm profitability, 
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research and development (R&D) expenses, selling expenses, the market-to-book ratio, 
and cash reserves all have a significantly negative impact on the target leverage ratio. 
These findings are mainly consistent with the framework of dynamic trade-off theory. In 
the following, the results from a logistic regression model strongly suggest that a bidder’s 
leverage deficit has a significant and negative impact on the probability of M&A success. 
This implies that bidders with higher levels of pre-merger debt are less likely to be 
successful in a takeover. More specifically, we use three dummy variables to indicate the 
level of bidder leverage deficit. The empirical evidence shows that overleveraged bidders 
have the lowest rate of success, while target-leveraged bidders have the highest. 
 
We also categorize the full sample into three subsamples according to the medium of 
payment. As expected, the interaction between leverage deficit and M&A success differs 
dramatically between these subsamples. For deals with pure cash payments, this relation 
is statistically insignificant. However, in deals with pure stock or mixed payments, the 
relation becomes much stronger. The estimates for other control variables are also 
significantly different in these regressions. Moreover, Chapter 3 explores potential 
explanations for the effect of leverage deficit by analysing the relation between a bidder’s 
leverage ratio and bid premiums. Consistent with our prediction, the bidder’s leverage 
deficit has a strongly negative impact on the premiums offered. Overleveraged bidders 
are unable to provide attractive takeover offers with high premiums and are thus more 
likely to fail in takeover contests. By contrast, target-leveraged bidders are able to provide 
more attractive offers which ensure their successes in M&As. The findings on bid 
premiums could be potentially explain the effect of bidder leverage deficit on M&As. 
 
Following the studies in Chapter 3, it is believed that the M&A activities could be 
considered as an important and effective way for capital structure rebalancing. Consistent 
with previous argument, we predict that a large proportion of M&A deals are motivated 
by the consideration of firm’s capital structure. In Chapter 4, we plan to find more 
evidence to prove this argument that capital structure adjustment is an essential 
4 
 
motivation for M&A activity. Moreover, it is also necessary to identify and examine how 
the stock markets react to these deals. Therefore, based on these motivations and research 
questions, Chapter 4 further investigates the implications of target capital structure theory 
for M&As. The research sample contains 537 large M&A deals with a value of more than 
20% of the bidder’s firm size. Chapter 4 empirically explores how the bidder’s capital 
structure affects payment choices in M&A deals. We apply a logistic regression model to 
investigate the interaction between bidder leverage deficit and the probability of a pure 
cash payment. The results indicate that overleveraged bidders are less likely to use cash 
payments because they are not willing to issue more new debt. In contrast, 
underleveraged bidders are more likely to use debt financing and pure cash payments. 
These findings are consistent with our prediction that M&A deals are considered as an 
important approach for capital structure adjustment. The empirical evidence suggests that 
the choice of the M&A payment depends on the status of bidder’s capital structure and 
the motivation of making takeover deals. These results provide further support for the 
target capital structure theory. It also strongly confirms the argument that firms may 
actively rebalance their capital structure to target levels through M&A activity (Harford, 
Klasa, and Walcott, 2009). 
 
Furthermore, to examine how the financial market reacts to such leverage-motivated 
deals, Chapter 4 investigate the short-run stock performance of deals around the 
announcement period. In univariate analysis, the full sample is categorized by both the 
bidder’s and the target’s leverage deficits. The empirical evidence suggests that bidder’s 
leverage deficit has significantly large impacts on market reactions to a takeover 
announcement, while the target firm’s leverage deficit has none. More specifically, the 
stock market responds more favourably to deals made by overleveraged bidders than to 
those made by target-leveraged bidders. The results from cross-sectional multivariate 
regressions consistently lead to the same conclusions as with univariate analysis. The 
potential explanation is that in the deals made by target-leveraged bidders, the stock 
market may worry about the results that bidder’s leverage ratio will deviate from the 
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optimal level, which has negative impact on the long term performance. Therefore, the 
market reactions to these deals are highly negative. By contrast, investors believe that 
deals made by over-leveraged bidders help to reduce the debt ratio and consequently the 
firm’s financial distress. Thus we argue that the bidder’s capital structure strongly affects 
short-term announcement returns. 
 
To conclude, Chapter 4 strongly supports the argument that capital structure rebalancing 
is an important motivation for M&A activities. Firms present a strong incentive to adjust 
their financial leverage towards optimal levels by acquiring other appropriate targets. 
However, financial markets provide differential reactions to these takeover attempts. 
Either in the short term or in the long term, deal performance is influenced by bidder and 
target capital structures. Therefore, firm managers should carefully consider decisions 
involving capital structure and M&As. 
 
After controlling for several well-known factors, Chapter 4 proves that bidder leverage 
deficit can affect M&A performance. However, studies on stock returns continue to 
proliferate. In recent years, several studies have focused on the influence of financial 
media on stock prices. A series of papers – for example, those of Tetlock (2007, 2010) 
and Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008) – prove that financial news content 
can predict the future movements of the financial market. This finding could partially 
resolve the problem of information asymmetry between different groups of investors. On 
the other hand, Fang and Peress (2009) find a significantly negative relation between a 
firm’s stock returns and media coverage. Following such media research, this thesis starts 
to pay attention to the interaction between the news released by the financial media and 
M&A activities. The basic motivation of this research is to investigate whether financial 
media can affect and predict M&A performance, in either short run or long run. In line 
with previous studies, it is believed that financial media is able to magnify or weaken the 
financial market reactions to the takeover announcements. Therefore, it is necessary to 
examine the bidder’s announcement returns and the news released in pre-merger period. 
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Moreover, since financial media may contain firm’s unreleased fundamental information, 
it is reasonable to believe that the news relating to M&A deals is able to predict the future 
prospect of new merging firms. To answer these questions, we provide a comprehensive 
research for the interaction between financial media and M&A deals in Chapter 5 
 
To conduct this research, we construct a large media data set that contains 478,830 
financial news items relating to 288 M&A deals. The empirical evidence from both 
univariate and multivariate analyses suggests that the pre-merger media attitude has a 
strong impact on the bidder’s stock returns in the announcement period. The market's 
reactions to deals announced by bidders with positive media attitude are significantly 
better than those to deals announced by bidders with negative media attitude. After 
controlling for several determinant variables, the impact of pre-merger media remains 
strong. However, pre-merger media coverage does not have a significant influence on 
bidder announcement returns. 
 
For long-term stock performance, merging a firm’s 12-month BHARs is also significantly 
associated with the content of financial news. In our analysis, media attitude has strong 
explanatory power on a firm’s long-term performance. This finding implies that financial 
media can partially predict a firm’s post-merger performance. In addition, Chapter 5 
explores the potential relations between bid premiums and the pre-merger financial media. 
The results suggest that the premiums paid by bidding firms to target shareholders are 
also affected by both attitude and pre-merger media coverage. We argue that the positive 
media reports received before an M&A can help bidders avoid the overpaying. Thus these 
deals are significantly outperformed in both the short and long run. 
 
In general, the major contributions of this thesis are as follows: First, this thesis provides 
a robust and comprehensive analysis of the interaction between bidder capital structure 
and takeover success. Our study's large M&A sample and carefully constructed 
methodology could effectively avoid both the selection bias and endogeneity problems. 
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This research helps us significantly improve our understanding of the relation between 
capital structure theory and M&As. Second, the analysis of firm capital structure and deal 
performance provides strong support for the concept of target capital structure. In line 
with previous literature, we find supplementary evidence from M&A deals to support the 
notions of trade-off theory. It also helps to increase the explanatory power of firm capital 
structure for bidder announcement returns. Besides other well-known factors, our 
research demonstrates that variable leverage deficit should also be considered an 
important determinant of M&A performance. Third, the study on financial media and 
M&As establishes a general framework to explain how media news affects merging firms’ 
stock performance in both the short and long run. This framework is an important 
supplement to financial media research, which has recently been experiencing rapid 
growth. The financial media should be identified as a potential determinant or predictor 
of M&A performance. 
 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a general review 
of the M&A literature. Chapter 3 empirically examines the interaction between bidder 
capital structure and M&A success. Chapter 4 mainly explores the impact of firm capital 
structure on M&A performance, while Chapter 5 focuses on the interaction between 
financial media and M&A activities. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by summarizing its 
main findings and discusses potential implications of this research. It also briefly 
proposes avenues of future investigation. Each chapter includes a literature review of the 
most critical pertinent papers. The figures and tables are at the end of each chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 M&A motivations 
2.1.1 Synergies 
Prior research indicates that the value and performance of the new combined firm after a 
merger will be greater than the sum of the separate individual parts of the acquirer and 
target firms, a phenomenon called synergy. Therefore, synergy is considered a general 
motive for M&A activity. 
 
Bradley, et al. (1983) points out that the synergy hypothesis is more consistent with 
previous evidence than the information hypothesis to explain gains from M&As. To 
further support their argument, Bradley, et al. (1988) evaluates the performances of 236 
takeover deals during 1963–1984 and suggest a 7.4% increase in new combined firms’ 
market equity value, on average. Houston, et al. (2001) analyses the synergistic gains of 
large bank mergers over a period of 12 years. They estimate that the average increase in 
the market value of combined firms is 13%. Their study further suggests that merger 
gains in synergy are attributed to management cost savings rather than revenue 
enhancement. 
 
The more recent studies of Devos, et al. (2009) and Hoberg and Phillips (2010) both 
concern the economic efficiency of synergy. Devos, et al. (2009) examines three potential 
sources of synergies from M&A activities: productive efficiency, tax payment reduction, 
and market power increase. Relying on Value Line forecasts, they find an average value 
enhancement in combined equity value of 10.03%. Further analysis shows that operating 
synergies account for the main portion of the additional value, 8.38%, while financial 
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synergies comprise the remainder. As Houston, et al. (2001), the authors also conclude 
that operating synergies are primarily generated by investment expenditures. This finding 
suggests that M&A activities create value by advancing resource allocation rather than 
tax savings or improving market power. Hoberg and Phillips (2010) provide further 
evidence of product market synergies, using a new text-based method. This method is 
based on a textual analysis of the content of a firm’s 10-K report, mainly the product 
descriptions, and interestingly reveals levels of product similarity and differentiation 
between acquiring firms and their rivals. The results show that M&A deals are more 
likely between firms with high product similarity. Such deals will have better long-term 
performance, which the authors called the asset complementarily effect. Moreover, this 
competitive effect shows that a high level of product differentiation between a target firm 
and its acquirer’s rivals improves the combined firm’s future performance. Finally the 
authors argue that these two effects help merging firms exploit product synergies. 
 
2.1.2 Good bidders acquire bad targets 
Besides synergies, differences in the performance of managers between the acquirer and 
target are also an important source of M&A gains. Lang, et al. (1989) examines the 
relation between Tobin’s Q and the abnormal returns of firms involved in M&A activities. 
Tobin’s Q ratio is a measure of managerial performance. A well-managed firm will have a 
high Tobin’s Q ratio and will be rewarded by financial markets. If a well-managed firm 
takes over a poorly managed firm, it will create value through relocation and better usage 
of poorly managed resources. The authors generally conclude that the shareholders of 
both high-Tobin Q bidders and low-Tobin Q targets gain significantly more than others. 
Servaes (1991) re-examines the relation between a firm’s Tobin’s Q and takeover gains by 
using a longer period and larger M&A sample. The author’s results are consistent with 
those of Lang, et al. (1989) and show that high-Q ratio bidders and low-Q ratio targets 
outperform other firms. The main differences between the two studies are as follows: (1) 
the sample of Lang, et al. (1989) consists only of deals with tender offers, whereas 
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Servaes (1991) examines both mergers and tender offers. (2) The multivariate analysis of 
Servaes (1991) includes more control variables, such as the hostility and payment of deals 
and the relative sizes of the bidder and target. (3) While Lang, et al. (1989) use a specific 
cut-off point to classify high- and low-Q ratio categories, Servaes (1991) chooses the 
industry average Q ratio and provides additional evidence of the validity of the relation 
between Q ratio and takeover gains. 
 
Choosing a different measure of managerial performance, Martin and McConnell (1991) 
investigate the disciplinary role of M&A activities. They classify a takeover as 
disciplinary by the turnover rate of the target firm’s top managers. In the first part of a 
series of empirical tests, they examine the market- and industry-adjusted abnormal returns 
of target firms in samples of disciplinary and non-disciplinary takeovers. Consistent with 
previous studies, the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for both bidders and targets are 
positive and significantly greater than zero, which indicates that takeovers generate gains 
for shareholders. In the second part of the authors’ tests, comparison studies show that 
both the market- and industry-adjusted returns of disciplinary takeover targets are 
significantly lower than those of non-disciplinary takeover targets. These results suggest 
that the targets of disciplinary takeovers underperformed in the pre-takeover period. In 
announcement period, however, the CARs of both bidders and targets are not 
significantly different between the disciplinary and non-disciplinary samples. Finally, 
Martin and McConnell (1991) conclude that takeovers play a crucial role in disciplining 
top firm managers for non–value-maximizing decisions. 
 
Previous studies argue that one of the M&A motivations is to improve poorly managed 
firms. Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) examine this argument with empirical works on a large 
scale. They determine the following three major findings: (1) most previous studies focus 
on examining short-term stock returns around takeover announcements and pay much less 
attention to long-term stock performance for. (2) The development of current popular 
methodologies for evaluating long-term stock performance appears later than previous 
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studies. Thus Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) believe that earlier empirical evidence of 
long-term stock returns is suspect. (3) The measures of firm operating performance are 
questionable, leading to ambiguous empirical evidence. Therefore, it is necessary to 
conduct a comprehensive investigation of firm-inefficient management. To reclaim 
previous studies, Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) examine a large sample of target firm stocks 
and operating performances prior to takeover announcements during 1926–1996. They 
control for industry, firm size, and previous performance when measuring operating 
performance. The authors use a calendar time portfolio approach to measure long-term 
stock returns after controlling for firm size, the book-to-market ratio, and previous stock 
returns. Surprisingly, the results indicate no significant difference between target firms 
and others in terms of either operating or stock return performance. Thus the empirical 
evidence does not support the disciplinary effect of takeovers on poorly managed firms. 
 
2.1.3 Agency costs 
As stated in the literature, M&As can create additional value for both acquirer and target 
shareholders. However, value-destroying M&A deals abound. It is hard to find potential 
motivations for these bad deals. Since the agency costs problem was noted by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), corporate finance papers have often used it to study the relation 
between corporate management and shareholders. In M&A research, there are two major 
views of how agency problems lead to systematic overpayments. One view is that firm 
managers tend to pursue personal objectives rather than maximizing shareholder values. 
Another view is that the hubris of managers of bidders will cause them to overpay for 
their targets. Such managers falsely believe that target firms are poorly managed and 
overestimate their own ability to improve them. 
 
Morck, et al. (1990) firstly relates agency problems with the rationale of value-destroying 
acquisitions. They argue that though M&As may fulfil both personal objectives and 
shareholder interests, personal benefits are still the managers’ primary consideration. A 
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takeover deal that provides substantial managerial benefits can bias the valuation of target 
firms. Bidder’s managers present incentive to engage in M&A activities which may 
sacrifice shareholder’s interests. After an examination of 326 US takeover deals between 
1975 and 1987, Morck, et al. (1990) identify three kinds of value-destroying deals caused 
by agency problems. The first such deal is the diversification takeover. To ensure the 
safety of their jobs and reduce the risk of bankruptcy, managers have a strong incentive to 
enter new industries to increase diversification. The second is the deal with a high-growth 
target. In this case the growth of sales is an important factor in the structure of 
management compensation. Thus firms in a mature industry are willing to acquire 
growing firms to increase personal incomes. Such acquisitions will also provide more top 
positions, reducing the risk of competition from young managers. The last deal type 
involves bidders with poor past performance. Bad managers have a higher probability of 
involvement in value-destroying takeovers. For the survival of the firm and their jobs, 
poor managers show a high inclination toward M&A activities. Morck, et al. (1990) finds 
empirical evidence that these three types of takeover deals present the highest possibility 
of making a bad acquisition. Similar to Lang, et al. (1989), they use Tobin’s Q to evaluate 
a firm’s quality of management. They prove that deals made by low-Tobin Q bidders have 
significantly lower stock returns. In contrast, deals with low-Tobin Q targets have higher 
announcement returns. 
 
Conflicts of interest exist not only in bidding firms, but also between target shareholders 
and managers. Hartzell, et al. (2004) provides evidence that target chief executive officers 
(CEOs) pursue personal benefits through M&As. Since only 3% of M&A deals are 
unsolicited, target CEOs are expected to have sufficient bargaining power to require 
personal benefits in M&A negotiations. These benefits are considered compensation for 
their job positions, salaries, and so on. However, shareholder interests may be 
compromised. To address these issues, Hartzell, et al. (2004) investigate the relation 
between M&A features and personal benefits received by target CEOs, asking two major 
research questions: (1) What degree of compensation can induce target managers to 
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relinquish their control power? (2) How much shareholder interest can target manager 
sacrifice in return for personal benefits? Both golden parachutes and special cash bonuses 
proxy for compensations paid to target managers. The regression results show that the 
probability of target managers remaining in new combined firms is inversely correlated to 
the amount of their negotiated payments, accepting an average of $5 million in excess 
payments to abandon their positions. If target CEOs enjoy excess incomes prior to 
acquisitions, they will certainly negotiate for higher payments. Similarly, the regression 
results suggest that target managers accept lower bid premiums in pursuit of their own 
extraordinary interests. Target CEOs tend to seek managerial positions and directorships 
on the boards of the acquiring firms or simply additional cash payments. 
 
Following previous studies, Mitchell and Lehn (1990) predict that firms with substantial 
free cash flow are more likely to be involved in value-destroying deals and these bad 
bidders are easy targets for future takeovers. Thus, the conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and managers relate not only to poor operating performance, but also to 
value-reducing acquisitions. Consistent with predictions, the authors’ empirical results 
suggest that firms previously involved in value-reducing acquisitions are more likely to 
become targets of takeovers, especially hostile ones. Conversely, a good bidder is less 
likely to receive a takeover offers in the following years. These findings are consistent 
with Jensen’s (1986) argument that M&A activities can discipline firm managers who 
participate in value-destroying takeovers and damage shareholder interests. 
 
Unlike previous studies, which focus on examining free cash flows, Harford (1999) sheds 
light on the conflicts of interest in cash-rich firms. The author confirms that cash-rich 
firms are likely to make value-destroying acquisitions. Using actual cash reserves to 
classify bidding firms into different groups, Harford (1999) briefly introduces how 
cash-rich firms are identified from a sample of US corporations covering a long period 
(1950–1994). The author develops a baseline model to predict each firm’s normal cash 
reserve level. Firms with cash reserves greater than predicted are considered cash rich. 
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The rest of the paper examines how manager’s decisions are affected by different cash 
positions. The author’s major findings are consistent with the predictions of free cash 
flow hypothesis. Cash-rich firms are more likely to become a bidder, if one controls for 
other factors. Further, acquisitions made by cash-rich firms receive significantly negative 
market responses. This finding displays a converse correlation between announcement 
abnormal returns and bidders’ excess cash holdings. Examinations based on deal 
characteristics show that cash-rich firms make more diversification acquisitions and 
attract fewer competing bidders. Cash-rich firms have a strong incentive to overpay to 
prohibit potential competing bids. Since a negative market response is predicted, the 
operating performance of cash-rich firms drops significantly after a takeover. 
 
As Mitchell and Lehn (1990) prove, the corporate control market is an effective external 
mechanism to discipline firm managers who participated in value-reducing takeovers. 
Lehn and Zhao (2006) focus on the disciplinary role of corporate governance and ask 
several questions: (1) how often is acquirer CEOs replaced after takeovers? What are the 
frequencies of replacement according to internal or external mechanisms? (2) Is there an 
inverse relation between value created by an acquisition and the probability of CEO 
replacement? (3) What role do corporate governance and ownership structure play in the 
disciplinary process? 
 
To answer these questions, Lehn and Zhao (2006) collect a large sample of 714 bidding 
firms during the entire period of the 1990s. They examine the relation between the 
announcement abnormal returns of takeovers and subsequent CEO replacements for each 
bidding firm. The results show that 57% of firm CEOs are replaced for disciplinary 
reasons, 31.5% by internal governance, 20% by the corporate control market, and 5.5% 
through bankruptcy. Logistic analysis of Lehn and Zhao (2006) reiterates that firm 
managers are less likely to be replaced if they cancel value-destroying takeovers. 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence from both the logistic and hazard models reveals 
significant differences in announcement returns between firms that subsequently replace 
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their CEOs and those that do not. The CEO-replacing acquirers’ announcement returns 
are highly negative and significantly lower than for non–CEO-replacing acquirers. These 
findings suggest that firm managers who made value-reducing acquisitions should pay the 
price. They also indicate that both internal corporate governance and the external 
takeover market are effective mechanisms to solve agency problems. 
 
2.1.4 The hubris hypothesis 
Roll (1986) introduced a new motivation for M&A activities, especially value-reducing 
deals, arguing that, rather than being in pursuit of personal benefits, managers are 
sometimes overconfident and overestimate the gains from takeovers. The author calls 
such managers hubris managers. In the process of takeover valuation, hubris managers 
believe in potential synergies or gains from a takeover that do not exist. This belief boosts 
their valuations of the target and leads them to acquire bad targets or pay higher 
premiums. The hubris hypothesis is necessary to explain why firm managers engage in 
value-reducing acquisitions. It predicts that, around takeover announcements, the stock 
prices of bidders will decrease and target price should increase. His empirical evidence is 
consistent with above predictions. 
 
Contrary to the hubris hypothesis, several studies conclude that M&As create additional 
value for shareholders in short-run abnormal returns. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) examine 
two important issues: whether acquirers underperform in the long run and the major 
determinants of this underperformance. The authors choose a reliable model, adjusting for 
both firm size and book-to-market variables to estimate long-term acquirer performance. 
They also use a bootstrapping approach (Ikenberry, et al., 1995) to test the statistical 
significance of the results. As Kothari and Warner (1997) show, the bootstrapping 
procedure can effectively adjust for systematic biases in assessing statistical significance. 
Their sample includes 3169 mergers and 348 tender offers during 1980–1991. Controlling 
for firm size and the book-to-market ratio, the authors determine that the long-term 
16 
 
performance of acquirers in mergers is significantly worse than the benchmarks. On the 
other hand, acquirers in tender offers gain an average of 9% in positive abnormal returns.  
 
To explain these findings, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) propose a performance 
extrapolation hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that both the financial market and 
managers over extrapolate past acquirer performance, especially for firms with low 
book-to-market ratios (glamour bidders). Consistent with the hubris hypothesis, decision 
makers are more likely to be overconfident about their abilities to pursue M&As. Thus 
firms with overconfident managers have a higher possibility of making value-destroying 
acquisitions. The performance extrapolation hypothesis also explains the difference 
between acquirers’ short- and long-run returns. It assumes that the financial market 
reassesses acquirer performance gradually. Hence, the financial market responds better to 
deals announced by glamour bidders in the short run. As the quality of takeovers is 
realized, acquirer long-term performance is reversed.  
 
The empirical evidence in this paper is more consistent with the performance 
extrapolation hypothesis than with the means of payment hypothesis or the earnings per 
share myopia hypothesis. The long-run performance of glamour bidders is highly 
negative and statistically significant. Conversely, value bidders present positive and 
significant abnormal returns. The comparison tests show that the differences between the 
two groups of bidders are remarkable and robust. Moreover, the results also partially 
support the mean of payment hypothesis. The negative performance of acquirers in 
mergers can be attributed to the frequent usage of stock payments. Due to cash payments, 
acquirers in tender offers present much better performance. 
 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) also use managerial overconfidence to explain corporate 
investment distortions. The traditional literature proposes two hypotheses – the agency 
problem hypothesis and the asymmetric information hypothesis – to explain the issue of 
investment distortions. Malmendier and Tate (2005) indicate an alternative hypothesis to 
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investigate the relation between a manager’s personal characteristics and suboptimal 
investment decisions. The authors argue that overconfident managers overestimate their 
firms’ future returns and ongoing investments. If firms have substantial free cash flow, 
overconfident managers tend to use internal funds for investment financing. On the other 
hand, when facing internal financial constraints, they prefer to curb investments rather 
than choose external financing. 
 
To find empirical evidence supporting their hypothesis, Malmendier and Tate (2005) 
construct overconfidence measures relating to the options hold by CEOs. They identify a 
benchmark for the exercise of managerial options. If CEOs keep holding options and 
exercise them later than the benchmark, these CEOs are identified as overconfident. 
Another measure for overconfidence is CEO stock holdings. The authors obtain a sample 
of 477 US firms during 1980–1994. The results show that firms with overconfident 
managers have significantly higher investment-free cash flow sensitivity ratios. As the 
new hypothesis predicts, overconfident managers will adopt distorted investment 
behaviours when they have sufficient internal funds.  
 
In addition to overconfidence, this study examines other personal characteristics. CEO 
education and employment background are important factors in decision making. 
Comparison tests show that managers with an engineering background have higher 
investment-free cash flow sensitivity than financial managers. Moreover, managers born 
in the 1930s or who have multiple job positions display greater sensitivity than others. 
These findings all support the argument that research on managers’ personal 
characteristics can provide better insight into decision making processes. Another crucial 
issue is the endogeneity problem. Personal characteristics can also be selection criteria for 
managers. To partially alleviate endogeneity concerns, we add more control variables to 
our tests. The additional tests show that the major conclusions are not affected by 
endogeneity. 
 
18 
 
2.1.5 Managerial timing 
As the hubris hypothesis indicates, the financial markets are assumed to be completely 
efficient but with irrational firm managers. It is hard, however, to explain certain 
historical evidence. To address this issue, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) developed a new 
theory of market-driven acquisitions. The theory’s basic assumption is that the financial 
markets are not efficient. Thus there is firm mispricing. However, firm managers are 
assumed to be completely rational: They know the true value of their firms and perceive 
the inefficiencies of financial markets. Furthermore, managers have the incentive and 
ability to take advantage of misvaluations through M&A activities. This new theory 
contributes to a better interpretation of several M&A issues, such as the choice of target, 
the medium of payment, target valuation, and merger waves. The theory’s key measure is 
relative valuations between acquirers and targets. The theory generates several 
predictions: (1) Bidding firms tend to use stock payments when market valuations are 
high and cash payments when they are low. When valuations across firms are widely 
dispersed, the financial market uses more stock payments. (2) Bidders using stock 
payments in acquisitions display significant signs of overvaluation. Thus they have 
negative long-term performance. Generally, market-driven acquisition theory argues that 
overvalued firms have a strong incentive to take over undervalued or relatively less 
overvalued firms by using stocks. 
 
Following this theoretical work, Dong et al. (2006) empirically examine the relation 
between the market valuation of firms and takeover motivations. Two alternative 
hypotheses are indicated to explain the empirical findings: the misvaluation hypothesis 
and Tobin’s Q hypothesis. As argued by Shleifer and Vishny (2003), misvaluation by 
inefficient financial markets is the major motivation for M&A activities. Firm managers 
have a strong incentive to take over undervalued or less overvalued targets by using 
overvalued stocks. Therefore financial markets should negatively react to such takeover 
announcements. On the other hand, Tobin’s Q hypothesis suggests that high market 
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valuation is an indicator of great growth opportunities. Thus takeovers are an approach to 
improving economic efficiency, with good bidders buying bad targets, and financial 
markets will respond more favourably. Dong et al. use market-to-fundamental ratios to 
proxy for stock misvaluations and growth opportunities, specifically, the ratios of the 
market price to the book value of equity (P/B) and of the market price to the residual 
income value (P/V), respectively. Deal characteristics, such as the medium of payment, 
bid premiums, probability of success, and announcement returns, are supposedly affected 
by market valuation measures. 
 
To provide comprehensive coverage, Dong et al. (2006) collects a large sample of deals 
covering the period 1978–2000. Their univariate tests divide the entire sample into 
quintiles ranked separately by bidder and target valuation measures. It is easy to observe 
trends in deal characteristics among the different quintiles. The multivariate analyses use 
both logistic and ordinary least squares regressions to investigate the interaction between 
takeovers and market valuations. Due to the long sample period, we research the two 
subperiods 1978–1989 and 1990–2000 separately. Consistent with predictions, the 
bidding firms have significantly higher P/B and P/V ratios than the targets. 
High-valuation targets are more likely to receive stock offers than cash offers. 
High-valuation bidders are more likely to use stock payments than cash payments. They 
also tend to pay higher bid premiums and to have significantly lower announcement 
returns. Overall, both the misvaluation and Q hypotheses are supported by empirical 
evidence. The evidence from the subperiod 1978–1989 is more consistent with the Q 
hypothesis and the evidence from the 1990s is stronger for the misvaluation hypothesis. 
 
Massa and Zhang (2009) investigate the impact of style investing on M&As. Rather than 
using market valuation to classify different groups of bidders and targets, the authors use 
firm popularity as the benchmark. Their main argument is that highly popular firms are 
more likely to be targets and buying a more popular target can increase bidder value. The 
measure of popularity is innovative and not directly related to firm stock price. Massa and 
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Zhang (2009) use mutual fund stock holding data as the measure of popularity for each 
firm. They show that the differences in popularity between targets and bidders are 
unrelated to takeover synergies. Bidding firm managers are more likely to choose highly 
popular targets. A potential reason is that investor demands and market reactions to M&A 
announcements are both better for the acquisition of highly popular firms. If the 
difference in popularity rises by one standard deviation, bidder market value increases by 
about 10%. Furthermore, the empirical results show that the boost in bidder asset value is 
focused on the short and medium term rather than the long term. The main contribution of 
Massa and Zhang (2009)’s paper is that it sheds new light on the motivation of M&A 
activities. It indicates that bidders’ managers increase firm asset value by buying more 
popular targets. These transactions can improve the bidding firm’s popularity and investor 
demand for their stocks, called the halo effect by the authors. Importantly, the halo effect 
is unrelated to either synergy or misvaluation. 
 
2.2 The M&A process  
2.2.1 Target choice 
This section reviews the literature relating to the M&A process. Choosing a target is the 
starting point. The choice of target firms will affect many aspects of the takeover, 
including the form of acquisition, the medium of payment, market reactions, and the 
probability of deal success. Previous studies are generally separated into two groups. One 
group attempts to use a statistical model to predict takeover targets. These predictive 
models are generally constructed from firm financial information. As Dietrich and 
Sorensen (1984) report, predictions made by statistical models are extraordinary accurate, 
ranging from 60% to 90%. On other hand, the other research group investigates whether 
financial markets can predict takeover targets. Asquith (1983) and Jensen and Ruback 
(1983) indicate that it is very difficult to predict future takeover targets by using firms’ 
pre-announcement stock price movements. According to the above, inconsistent 
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arguments, Palepu (1986) re-examines the predictive power of previous models and 
indicates that their accuracy may be unreliable, since the methodology used has principal 
flaws. The non-random and equal-share samples used by previous studies would 
particularly bias the estimations for takeover probabilities. Palepu (1986) carefully 
constructs the statistical model and selection criteria for his sample to avoid these 
problems. The empirical results show significant differences from earlier studies. 
Although the variables in the predictive model are statistically significant, the model’s 
explanatory power is too low. The validating tests show that, while the model 
successfully distinguishes most future targets, a large number of non-target firms are 
falsely identified as takeover targets. Thus the prediction of all the models is questionable 
and impossible to implement in realistic applications. Palepu (1986) further notes that the 
methodological problems mentioned in the study are also relevant to any other research 
that involves binary condition models. 
 
Extending Palepu’s work, Ambrose and Megginson (1992) investigate the issue of target 
prediction by incorporating ownership structure and capital structure variables. They 
believe that a firm’s ownership structure, especially involving insider and institutional 
shareholdings, affects a firm’s probability of becoming a takeover target. As Stulz, et al. 
(1990) show, a target firm’s insider ownership level is significantly lower than that of 
non-target firms. Similarly, the authors discuss the effects of institutional shareholdings. 
In addition to ownership variables, they investigate the impact of capital structure on 
predicting future targets, including the market-to-book ratio, growth opportunities, and 
asset tangibility variables. They also examine whether takeover defences can protect 
firms from becoming takeover targets. 
 
The sample used in Ambrose and Megginson’s paper contains 475 random selected listed 
firms, which is more general than the sample used by Palepu (1986). In univariate tests, 
three variables differ significantly between targets and non-targets: firm size, asset 
tangibility, and changes in institutional shareholdings. Multivariate examinations 
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consistently find evidence that firm asset tangibility affects the probability of becoming a 
takeover target. Firms with higher fractions of fixed assets are more likely to receive a 
takeover bid. The correlation between takeover probability and net percentage changes in 
institutional ownerships is significantly negative. Moreover, tests of takeover defence 
policy show that only blank check preferred stock authorizations can effectively prevent a 
takeover. Contrarily, even a voting rights defence is positively related to receiving 
takeover bids and a poison pill defence has no impact on deterring takeover bids. 
 
2.2.2 Deal payments 
Financing decisions for deal payments is a very popular M&A research area. The 
previous literature does not strictly distinguish between the medium of payment and 
sources of takeover financing. Recent papers focus on examining bidder financing 
decisions and one of the most representative works is that of Martynova and Renneboog 
(2009). Theirs is the first study to empirically examine sources of financing along with 
payment media. The most limiting part of this study is the lack of reliable data for bidder 
financing decisions. Martynova and Renneboog (2009) use a unique hand-collected data 
set of European M&As from 1993 to 2001. Their findings indicate that bidder choice 
between cash, debt, and equity financing generally follows pecking order theory. After 
controlling for the payment method, the bidder’s financing decision is mainly influenced 
by concerns about the cost of capital. Cash-rich bidders tend to use internal funds, the 
cheapest source of financing. Bidders with insufficient internal funds must finance 
takeovers by issuing equity or debt. Debt financing is more favourable for bidders with a 
high debt capacity and outstanding creditor protection. Similarly, firms with strong 
growth opportunity and shareholder protection are more likely to choose equity financing. 
There is evidence that the medium of payment affects bidder financing decisions. In 
contrast, there is no evidence that conflicts of interest between managers, shareholders, 
and creditors have any impact on bidder financing decisions. Furthermore, Martynova 
and Renneboog (2009) show that a deal’s payment method depends on the attitudes of the 
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bidder’s shareholders, especially large shareholders. Comparison analysis shows that the 
main determinants of financing choice and medium of payment are significantly different, 
which is the primary motivation for this research. 
 
Moreover, market reaction analysis by Martynova and Renneboog (2009) shows that not 
only the deal’s payment method, but also the choice of the bidder’s financing sources 
affects investor responses to takeover announcements. As for pure stock payments, 
bidding firms choosing external equity financing receive non-favourable responses from 
the financial market. Their abnormal stock returns around takeover announcements are 
significantly negative because the financial market believes this to be a signal of bidder 
stock overvaluation. On the other hand, market responses to debt-financing takeovers are 
highly positive, even outperforming internal financing bidders. Financial markets 
consider debt financing a favourable choice with various benefits for bidding firms. 
 
Similarly, Harford, et al. (2009) examines bidder financing decisions from the view of 
capital structure. They study whether bidding firms have target capital structures and how 
financial deviations affect acquisition financing choices, where a financial deviation is the 
difference between the actual and target leverage ratios. Previous literature presents 
conflicting findings about the existence of target capital structure. Thus Harford, et al. 
(2009) use new evidence from M&As to further support the concept of target leverage. To 
construct the sample, they collect 1188 large US takeover deals from 1981 to 2000. A 
large deal is defined as a deal in which the relative size of the target to the bidder’s 
market value is more than 20%. The empirical evidence generally indicates that bidding 
firms do have their target capital structure. Bidding firm managers are concerned about 
target capital structures when they make financing decisions for takeovers. The results 
show that a bidding firm’s financial deviation is negatively correlated to the percentage of 
cash payment in M&As. Overleveraged bidders are less likely to finance a takeover by 
issuing new debt and more likely to choose equity financing.  
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Harford, et al. (2009) further shows that bidder’s financing decisions also consider the 
target capital structure of new combined firms. If the target leverage ratio of the merging 
firm increases, bidders are more likely to use debt financing. To further support target 
capital structure theory, Harford, et al. (2009) also investigates how combining firms 
adjust their leverage ratio following takeovers. In debt-financing deals, most combining 
firms become overleveraged, but in next five years they stably reduce their debt ratio 
towards target levels. In sum, the authors’ findings suggest that acquirers have a target 
leverage ratio and M&As are a way to move a firm’s actual leverage forwards to target 
levels. Based on this argument, the empirical evidence further suggests that a bidder’s 
financial deviation before acquisition is a major determinant in the choice of payment and 
financing methods. 
 
2.2.3 Advisor selection 
Financial advisors play an important role in M&As. Both bidder and target hire 
investment banks to be their takeover advisors. M&A advising is one of the most 
important businesses for investment banks. Rau (2000) examines which factors affect 
investment bank market shares in M&As and proposes two opposite hypotheses: The 
superior deal hypothesis predicts that the acquirer’s performance in M&As is the main 
determinant of the advisor’s market share. Thus deals advised by top-rated investment 
banks will receive much more favourable market reactions. On the contrary, the deal 
completion hypothesis argues that financial advisors only care about whether deals are 
successfully completed. There is no significant relation between the acquirer’s 
performance and the advisor’s market share.  
 
Rau (2000) ranks all investment banks into three groups, depending on their average 
market shares from 1980 to 1994. The univariate results show that an investment bank’s 
market shares have a significant impact on its advisory fee structure. The contingent fee 
of top-rated advisors constitutes a much higher fraction of their total fees, from 55% to 
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73%. Rau uses multivariate tests to examine the main determinants of market share. The 
results indicate that the percentage of completed deals advised by investment banks in 
previous years is positively related to their market shares in following years. Comparison 
analysis further shows that top-ranked investment banks complete a significantly higher 
fraction of deals than the other two ranks of banks. This finding strongly supports the deal 
completion hypothesis. However, there is no consistent relation between the acquirer’s 
post-merger performance and the advisor’s market share. In mergers, bidders advised by 
top-rated banks significantly underperform other bidders. In tender offers, such bidders 
gain higher announcement abnormal returns. The empirical evidence is inconsistent with 
the superior deal hypothesis. To explain the findings, Rau (2000) further studies the role 
of bid premiums. Consistent with the author’s prediction, the premiums paid by acquirers 
advised by top-rated investment banks are significantly higher than for acquirers advised 
by low-ranking advisors. This result implies that top-rated advisors may encourage 
bidders to make higher bids to improve the probability of deal completion. The higher the 
premium bidders pay, the worse market reactions they receive. To summarize, Rau’s 
paper provides a comprehensive examination of the financial advisor’s role in M&As. 
 
Motivated by conflicting findings on financial advisors, Golubov, et al. (2012) provide 
new evidence on the role of financial advisors in M&As. Using a comprehensive sample 
of US takeovers during the period 1996–2009, they examine the correlation between 
investment bank reputation and the cost and quality of advisory services. The authors 
argue that top-tier investment banks have great incentive to be in line with their clients’ 
best interests to keep their reputational capital. Financial advisors play a more important 
role in public acquisitions than in other types of deals. 
 
The empirical evidence of Golubov, et al. (2012) shows that deals advising by top-tier 
investment banks are related to significantly higher announcement returns, especially in 
public acquisitions. Acquirers obtain an average increase of 1.01% in announcement 
abnormal returns. Assorting with the better performance, top-tier investment banks also 
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charge more fees, on average. However, in the takeover of unlisted targets, there is no 
significant relation between a financial advisor’s reputation and bidder announcement 
abnormal returns. Golubov, et al. (2012) further investigate the main sources of top-tier 
investment banks’ advantages. They show that top-tier banks have greater ability to 
identify synergistic targets. Such banks can find the most valuable and suitable targets for 
their clients. Importantly, top-tier advisors also help bidding firms secure synergy gains 
and take less time for completion. However, if a target firm’s financial advisor is also a 
top-tier bank, such advantages will be limited. In a robustness check, they use a Heckman 
(1979) two-stage procedure to control for the endogeneity problem of bidder–advisor 
matching. All findings continue to hold. 
 
Using fixed effects analysis, Bao and Edmans (2011) obtain a similar conclusion that 
investment banks care about M&A performance in the deals they advise. Unlike previous 
studies (Rau, 2000; Golubov, et al., 2012) using market share or reputation to measure 
advisory quality, the authors employ a fixed effects approach to better exhibit differential 
performances. Examining all investment banks during 1980–2007 and controlling for 
time effects, the authors find empirical evidence to support the fixed effects to three-day 
CARs around deal announcements. The difference between the 25th and 75th percentiles 
is 1.26% and statistically significant. Their study shares two major challenges: The first is 
the attribution of performance, whether the CAR is the responsibility of the advisor or the 
bidder. Thus both the component of abnormal returns that could be explained by acquirer 
characteristics and their fixed effects should be controlled for. After these effects are 
controlled for, the interquartile difference is still statistically significant. The second 
challenge concerns the effect of the investment bank’s size. The limited capacity 
hypothesis suggests that large investment banks will also consider accepting small but 
positive deals, which can lower average performance. However, the authors’ results reject 
this hypothesis that advisors’ performances are most frequently in the middle of the 
distribution rather than towards the bottom. The authors investigate whether the time 
effects of different performances can be predicted based on historic performance. Their 
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empirical results show that investment bank performance is persistent. This implies that 
the previous performance of advisors is an effective instrument in predicting future 
returns for bidding firms. This approach should be better than using market shares or 
reputation measures. 
 
Besides advisory services, investment banks have many other divisions. Haushalter and 
Lowry (2011) investigate the activities of investment bank analysts and asset 
management divisions when the bank is employed as a bidder’s financial advisor in a deal. 
The authors focus on the interactions between analyst recommendations and the 
stockholdings of the asset management division around merger announcements. Owing to 
conflicts of interest between different divisions, divisional activities may not be 
synchronous. The results from 1197 mergers show no significant relation between 
changes in analyst recommendations and changes in stockholdings prior to takeover 
announcements. However, following takeover announcements, changes in the advising 
bank’s stockholdings correspond highly with analyst recommendations. Additional tests 
on division information flow indicate that the stronger relation between analyst 
recommendations and stockholdings is primarily induced by the improvement of 
information flow between the different divisions. The recommendations made by an 
advising bank’s high-quality analysts will have a more significant impact on stockholding 
adjustments. Such analysts are expected to give more reliable information about the 
mergers. Haushalter and Lowry (2011)’s detailed study of the recommendations shows 
that the asset management divisions of advising banks do not respond to analysts’ 
upgrade recommendations. In contrast, investment banks have strong responses when 
their analysts downgrade acquirer ratings. These findings support the hypothesis that 
information is shared across different divisions of advising banks. The extent of 
information dissemination is affected by conflicts of interest among divisions. 
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2.2.4 Takeover defence 
Takeover defence, that is, an effective approach for firms to deter potential takeover bids, 
is an important component of M&As. Since 1980, there have been great developments in 
corporate anti-takeover approaches. The appearance of poison pills induced a 
dramatically fall in takeover activities since the late 1980s. Comment and Schwert (1995) 
examine whether anti-takeover methods can effectively prevent firms from being 
acquired. They find no evidence that either control share law or business combination law 
can deter takeover bids. The empirical evidence of a poison pill’s deterrence effect is also 
weak. It is more likely that managers adopt poison pills when takeover bids are imminent. 
The examinations of stock returns also find poison pill adoption to have an insignificant 
deterrence effect. Market reactions to poison pill announcements are significant and 
negative. However, there is a positive relation between takeover premiums and the 
strength of protection of state laws or poison pills. This finding suggests that the adoption 
of anti-takeover methods improves the relative bargaining power of target firms. Thus 
Comment and Schwert (1995) argue that financial markets can misestimate the eventual 
effect of takeover protection; the costs of deterrence are overestimated and the benefits 
are underestimated. Moreover, it is generally believed that the widespread adoption of 
modern anti-takeover methods is the major explanation for the collapse of the corporate 
control market at the end of the 1980s. Comment and Schwert (1995) determine that 87% 
of public firms are covered by at least one form of takeover protection since 1980, 
partially supporting this explanation, but they find no direct evidence to support the 
deterrence effect of anti-takeover methods. Thus they conclude that the downturns of 
M&A activities are mainly caused by the recession of the macro economy and credit 
markets rather than the introduction of takeover protection. 
 
Similarly, Heron and Lie (2006) examine the determinants and effects of two major 
takeover protections: poison pills and defensive payouts. To mitigate the endogeneity 
problem pointed out by Comment and Schwert (1995), the authors carefully construct a 
29 
 
sample of 526 unsolicited takeover bids, including both successful and failed bids. Their 
analysis considers all factors that could affect the takeover defence decision: for instance, 
capital structure, ownership structure, corporate governance, and deal characteristics. The 
authors investigate the determinants and effects of the choice to adopt a defensive 
approach in response to takeover bids. The empirical evidence shows that the probability 
of poison pill adoption is inversely related to the degree of insider ownership. This 
finding suggests that managers tend to increase their bargaining power through an 
anti-takeover mechanism in the sense that their ownerships are too low. As for Comment 
and Schwert (1995), Heron and Lie (2006) shows that the adoption of a poison pill does 
not reduce the probability of receiving takeover bids but it benefits target shareholders. 
That is because poison pills promote higher bid premiums and shareholder gains. Target 
managers can obtain greater bargaining power to protect shareholder interest. On the 
other hand, they also find that firms are more likely to undertake a defensive repurchase 
when they have a high level of insider ownership. The mechanism of defensive 
repurchases is found to effectively deter takeover success, yet defensive payouts do not 
harm target shareholder gains. 
 
However, Jiraporn (2005) explores the relation between corporate takeover protection and 
earnings management. The author’s investigation of whether takeover defences mitigate 
or exacerbate earnings management could contribute to ascertaining the correlation 
between takeover defences and the shareholder wealth effect. The presence of a takeover 
defence promoting firms to manage earnings is detrimental to shareholder interest. 
Jiraporn (2005) examines four specific anti-takeover approaches: blank check preferred 
stock, poison pills, classified boards, and dual class stock. The empirical evidence 
suggests that relations between takeover protection and earnings management vary by 
type. The presence of poison pills and classified boards can effectively mitigate earnings 
management, which is favourable for shareholder wealth. In contrast, firms with dual 
class stock present more earnings management. The impact of blank check preferred 
stock on earnings management is insignificant. For firms with multiple takeover defences, 
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the collective influence of earnings management is insignificant. The potential reason is 
that different types of takeover protection affect earnings management differently, 
cancelling each other out. 
 
2.3 M&A stakeholders 
2.3.1 Managers 
Previous research shows a significant misalignment between manager compensation and 
takeover performance. CEOs who engage in takeovers receive higher compensations than 
others. However, their shareholders do not gain from these deals. To gain further insight 
into this issue, Grinstein and Hribar (2004) investigate the determinants of compensation 
relating to M&As. Their sample is composed of 327 large US deals during 1993–1999. 
The authors find that 39% of bidding firms reward their CEOs when the deal is 
successfully completed. Variations in the M&A bonus can be partially explained by 
managerial skill and effort in deal completion. The M&A bonus is positively related to 
deal size, duration until completion, and the number of board meetings during the M&A. 
Similarly, managerial power is also considered to contribute to a better understanding of 
the M&A bonus. CEOs with greater control power receive significantly more bonuses in 
takeovers. In contrast, the authors argue that the measures of takeover performance do not 
explain the deviations in M&A bonus. The empirical results even suggest that 
performance measures, such as announcement abnormal returns or bid premiums, are 
negatively related to the bonuses CEOs receive. Moreover, to support these findings, 
Grinstein and Hribar (2004) study compensation committee reports in detail, but these 
reports do not interpret the particular reason for rewarding bonuses. Only 125 acquirers 
mention the completion of takeover and 64 of them provide more detailed information. 
More than half of these acquirers indicate that the increase in firm size is the reason for 
the M&A bonus. The second most frequent explanation for the bonus is CEO effort and 
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skills. Therefore, the findings from compensation committee reports further support the 
authors’ arguments. 
 
While Grinstein and Hribar (2004) examine the relation between CEO compensation 
structure and M&As, Harford and Li (2007) explore how compensation policy affects 
managerial M&A incentives. It is generally believed that managers with higher ownership 
or more equity-based bonuses are less likely to make value-destroying acquisitions. 
However, this study shows that this incentive effect can be weakened by the presence of a 
dynamic compensation structure. The authors focus on examining whether a manager’s 
compensation policy becomes more or less sensitive to firm performance after an M&A. 
Harford and Li (2007) find that managers of bidding firms receive substantial bonuses 
with stocks and options, the reward for deal completion and growth in firm size or sales. 
Furthermore, manager compensation structure becomes completely insensitive to poor 
stock performance following mergers. But a manager’s personal wealth is still related to 
good stock performance. These findings question that whether the effectiveness of 
equity-based incentives is still sufficient. The empirical evidence also suggests that 
acquirers with strong boards could preserve the relativity of manager compensation and 
post-merger performance. 
 
Compared with other large capital expenditure decisions, M&A activities have the largest 
impact on manager compensation structures. This finding indicates that the firm board 
and managers treat takeover decisions differently from other internal investment 
decisions. An M&A is considered a natural point of restructuring compensation policies 
for managers. The short-run superior performance around takeovers also strengthens 
bargaining powers for managers. To ensure the robustness of previous findings, Harford 
and Li (2007) carefully construct the control samples matched on firm size, industry, and 
previous performance. Their results are also robust after controlling for various deal 
characteristics, such as the method of payment, merger diversification, and announcement 
abnormal returns. 
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Following previous papers, Minnick, et al. (2011) investigates the relation between 
managerial incentive structure and M&As. Unlike Harford and Li (2007), the authors 
limit themselves to the banking industry owing to both the importance and advantage of 
compensation research in the banking industry. It is now easier to find cross-sectional 
relations in the banking industry since it went through rapid consolidation in the 1990s. 
The banking industry business is homogeneous, which can avoid some of the challenges 
in multi-industry research. Since banks are crucial to economic development and growth, 
a corporate governance study is also very important. The authors’ sample contains 159 
M&As between public banks during 1991–2005. To proxy for managerial incentives, the 
authors calculate the CEOs’ pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) ratios. The univariate 
tests show a positive correlation between the bidding bank’s announcement returns and its 
CEO’s PPS ratio. Banks with higher PPS outperform their counterparts by 1.43% in 
three-day cumulative announcement returns. Furthermore, logistic analysis shows that 
bank CEOs with higher PPS ratios are less likely to make value-destroying acquisitions 
and more likely to engage in value-enhancing acquisitions. This finding indicates that 
incentive-based compensation structure effectively aligns the interests of CEOs with 
those of shareholders. Taking into account the size effect, this approach shows that the 
motivating effect of PPS is much stronger for CEOs of small banks than for those of large 
banks. Since the compensation policies of large banks relate more to size growth, the 
effect of takeover performance is insignificant. 
 
Fich, et al. (2011) also pay attention to target CEO’s incentives. The historical evidence 
suggests that a large fraction of target CEOs receive unscheduled stock options during 
private deal negotiations. To investigate the questions related to the objectives and effects 
of unscheduled options, Fich, et al. use a sample of 920 deals from 1999 to 2007. They 
find an inverse relation between unscheduled rewards and golden parachute payments. 
This finding supports the hypothesis that unscheduled stock options are a substitute for 
golden parachutes. It also suggests that unscheduled options are considered compensation 
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for the target CEO’s future loss. Logistic analysis shows that unscheduled stock options 
induce target CEOs to accept takeover bids, since target CEOs receiving unscheduled 
grants are more likely to sell their firms. Moreover, the bid premiums paid to target 
shareholders are 4.4% lower, on average, if their CEOs receive unscheduled options 
during the merger negotiation. These findings indicate that unscheduled stock options 
benefit only CEOs but harm target shareholder interests. Interestingly, bidder returns are 
positively related to whether target CEOs receive unscheduled stock options. This implies 
that unscheduled grants received by target CEOs will lead to wealth transfer from target 
shareholders to bidding firm shareholders. 
 
On the other hand, researchers also assume that experienced managers are able to learn 
from the market reactions to M&A announcements and make further decisions on merger 
outcomes according to the market’s initial reactions. Good responses from the financial 
market give bidder managers incentive to go through a deal. On the contrary, bidder 
managers can cancel takeover deals if the market has bad reactions. Jennings and Mazzeo 
(1991) examine the relation between bidder stock performances around M&A 
announcements and the final outcome of deals but find no significant empirical evidence 
to support the argument that bidder managers learn from financial markets during the 
M&A process. Luo (2005) re-examines this issue by using a larger sample and tighter 
testing specifications. The author finds empirical evidence to suggest that the initial 
reactions of the financial market to M&A announcements can predict a deal’s final 
outcome. When managers of bidding firms make further decisions on M&A activities, 
they take into account the information learned from previous market reactions.  
 
The basic incentive of learning is based on cost–benefit analysis. Bidding firms decide to 
learn only if the expected gains exceed the costs. They are more likely to decide to learn 
from the financial market when more information is expected from the market or it is 
easy to cancel announced takeover bids. The relative informational advantage of the 
market over the bidder increases the probability of learning by managers. Researchers 
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believe that market reactions are helpful since investors have more access to important 
information about target valuations. Unlike Jennings and Mazzeo (1991), Luo (2005) 
develops a new approach for the investigation. To obtain robust empirical evidence, the 
authors further control for two important effects that can influence the relation between 
market responses to M&A announcements and the final deal status. First, when the 
acquisition is announced, market responses will be affected by investor expectations of 
the completion probability. Second, cross-sectional differences in deal quality must be 
considered. A value-enhancing deal is more likely to receive greater market response and 
to be consummated by the bidding firm. Thus there appears to be a natural link between 
market announcement returns and completion probability of deals rather than a learning 
process. After controlling for these two effects, the results are still consistent with the 
learning argument. 
 
2.3.2 Creditors 
The M&A research literature focuses on examining the wealth effects of acquirer and 
target shareholders, with limited evidence on bondholders. To fill this gap, Billett, et al. 
(2004) investigates the effects of M&As on the value of relative bonds. First, they explore 
the potential reasons that research fails to find significant evidence of the bondholder’s 
wealth effect. The main reason is the difficulty of obtaining bond price data. The quality 
of the bond data is also very poor. Therefore previous papers' samples are too small to 
have sufficient statistical power. To solve this problem, Billett, et (2004) al. constructs a 
large sample for the period 1979–1997 that includes 940 M&A deals and 3901 bonds. 
The empirical evidence suggests that target bondholders gain significantly positive 
abnormal returns around takeover announcements. The risk of target bonds also has a 
large impact on announcement returns. Target bonds above investment grade present with 
-0.8% announcement returns, while bonds below investment grade achieve 4.3% 
abnormal returns. However, the announcement abnormal returns for acquirer bonds are 
only -0.17%. 
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To further investigate the determinants of bond performance, the entire sample is divided 
into several groups. The results show that target bonds present significantly positive 
abnormal returns if target’s credit ratings are lower than acquirer’s. In contrast, target 
bondholders earn significantly negative returns if target’s credit ratings are over the 
acquirer’s. Similarly, target bonds will achieve better performance if the leverage ratio of 
new merged firms is lower than that of target firms. Moreover, consistent with maturity 
predictions, the empirical results suggest that target bonds that have a shorter maturity 
than the acquirer’s bonds significantly outperform those with longer maturities. Relative 
size also has an impact on bond returns. When the target is relatively smaller than the 
acquirer, target bondholders achieve much higher abnormal returns. The performance of 
acquirer bonds is remarkably differed from that of target bonds. There are no significant 
differences between the abnormal returns of the subsamples determined by credit rating, 
relative maturity, or relative leverage ratio. However, acquirer bonds present significantly 
negative returns when the relative target size is large or the deal is a hostile takeover. The 
empirical evidence also indicates that the sample period has a large impact on bond 
performance. Around the 1980s, the average performance of acquirer and target bonds 
was distinctly worse than in the 1990s. The results from multivariate regression strongly 
support the arguments from the univariate grouping analysis. They also suggest that 
bondholder interests are positively correlated with shareholder interests. 
 
Following previous studies, Mehrotra et al. (2011) analyse the role of creditors in M&As 
in Japan. Unlike typical M&A findings, takeovers in Japan do not create additional value 
for merging firms. Both bidder and target shareholders gain insignificant abnormal 
returns around the announcement period. To explore potential explanations, Mehrotra et 
al. (2011) thoroughly investigate the effects of creditors, especially the main bank, on the 
takeover process with a sample of 91 public firm mergers during 1982–2003. In a large 
fraction of these Japanese mergers, the bidder and target firms have a common main bank. 
The target firms are more likely to be in financial distress, while the bidding firms’ 
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financial status is relatively healthy. Consistent with the ‘bank power hypothesis’, this 
finding implies that these common main banks are primarily motivated to protect their 
interests as creditors. Thus these rescue mergers do not create value for either bidder or 
target shareholders. Since the sample covers a long period, it is divided into three 
subperiods according to macroeconomic conditions. The subperiod analysis shows that, 
unlike the procyclical US merger waves, mergers in Japan are more likely to be 
countercyclical. The merger wave in Japan is inversely related to the general economy 
and stock market valuations, a phenomenon induced by the dominant role of creditors in 
the Japanese corporate control market. 
 
2.3.3 Suppliers 
Previous research shows that horizontal M&As can create additional wealth. 
Improvement in productive efficiency is considered the primary source of these gains. 
Anticompetitive collusion and increased buying power are also potential explanations. 
Fee and Thomas (2004) investigate the major sources of gains in horizontal takeovers. 
Their sample includes bidders and targets in horizontal mergers, as well as their important 
suppliers, customers, and rivals. It is the first study to explore a horizontal merger’s 
impact on related customers and suppliers. The empirical evidence suggests that rival 
firms present positive abnormal returns when a takeover is announced. It also shows that 
both market responses to takeover announcements and post-merger performance are 
insignificant for customer firms. These two findings indicate that anticompetitive 
collusion is not the major source of gains in horizontal mergers.  
 
In contrast, suppliers’ cash flow margins decrease significantly after merger completion, 
which indicates that increased buying power induced by horizontal mergers is a crucial 
source of gains. To explore the underlying rationale of the increasing buying power, Fee 
and Thomas (2004) analyse suppliers differentiated by type. Interestingly, they find that 
the effects of a horizontal merger on a supplier depend on the supplier’s ability to 
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maintain a relationship with the new merged firm. If relations are terminated after a 
merger, the supplier will experience significant and negative announcement returns. 
Suppliers who retain their positions present ascending market shares and insignificant 
announcement returns. This finding implies that merging firms may filter their existing 
suppliers through price competitions. Thus both merging firms and retained suppliers 
could gain from horizontal mergers. The results of multivariate regressions further 
support this argument. They also show that the buying power effects are more significant 
when the horizontal mergers occur in relatively concentrated industries. 
 
Following Fee and Thomas (2004), Shahrur (2005) further tests the efficiency, collusion, 
and buying power theories using a large sample of 463 horizontal mergers during 
1987–1999. The author focuses on examining the wealth effects of merger 
announcements on suppliers, customers, and rivals. Consistent with previous findings, 
both bidders and targets earn positive and significant abnormal returns during the 
announcement period. The wealth effects for their rivals and corporate customers are also 
significantly positive, while suppliers suffer negative abnormal returns. To further support 
previous theories, the entire sample is divided into two subsamples according to the 
combined wealth effect on the bidder and target. The results from the positive subsample 
show that rivals, suppliers, and customers all earn positive abnormal returns. This 
evidence strongly supports the efficiency theory but is inconsistent with the collusion and 
buying power theories. On the other hand, the analysis based on the negative subsample 
shows that rivals, suppliers, and customers all present negative wealth effects. This 
finding implies that value-destroying mergers also have negative impacts on suppliers and 
customers. Moreover, Shahrur (2005) conducts cross-sectional multivariate regressions to 
investigate the main determinants of firm’s stock performance. These show that increased 
industry concentration, induced by horizontal mergers, has negative effects on the stock 
performance of merging firms and their competitors but no impact on supplier or 
customer abnormal returns. 
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Similarly, Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) examine the effects of horizontal mergers on 
suppliers. They mainly compare changes in average product prices and profits in the 
supplier’s industry following the completion of horizontal mergers. Consistent with the 
work of Fee and Thomas (2004), horizontal mergers have significant and negative 
impacts on supplier industries’ cash flow margins. The average profits of supplier 
industries decline after horizontal mergers. Research on product price shows similar 
results. The Producer Price Index is a measure of the average selling prices for specific 
industries. That of supplier industries displays a pronounced declining trend in the three 
years after horizontal mergers. The results from alternative regression and robustness tests 
further support the argument that descending supplier product prices are mainly due to 
downstream consolidations. The findings for supplier product prices and profits are 
highly consistent with the predictions of the buying power hypothesis. To further 
determine support for the buying power hypothesis, Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) 
regress the changes in supplier product prices on the industry competition measures. The 
results show that the price declines after horizontal mergers are inversely related to the 
supplier industry’s Herfindahl index or four-firm concentration ratio. This implies that a 
supplier industry with a high concentration level will suffer much greater price declines 
following downstream consolidations. As buying the power hypothesis predicts, one of 
the basic motivations for horizontal mergers is to countervail upstream market powers. 
 
2.3.4 Competitors 
In addition, M&A activities have an impact on the competitors of both acquirers and 
targets. Eckbo (1983, 1985) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) all find that the 
competitors of target firms present positive and significant abnormal returns around M&A 
announcements. However, there is no reliable theory to explain the target rivals’ gains. To 
resolve this issue, Song and Walkling (2000) develop an acquisition probability 
hypothesis. This hypothesis assumes that a target rival’s positive announcement returns 
can be attributed to the increased probability of being acquired. Specifically, takeover 
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bids lead to a reassessment of the probability of acquisition attempts for the targets’ 
competitors in same industry. The acquisition probability hypothesis has several 
advantages over the previous collusion hypothesis: The acquisition does not have to be 
horizontal or successful. The theory also leads to an understanding of cross-sectional 
variations in the performances of target competitors. Shocks on the perceived probability 
of being acquired vary systematically with the individual firm characteristics of rivals. 
 
To provide empirical evidence of the acquisition probability hypothesis, Song and 
Walkling (2000) construct a sample of 141 takeover deals and 2459 target competitors 
during 1982–1991. Consistent with the predictions of the acquisition probability 
hypothesis, target competitors present positive and significant announcement returns. The 
form (horizontal or non-horizontal) and outcome (successful or failed) of the acquisition 
do not affect competitors’ positive abnormal returns. Moreover, a competitor’s stock 
performance tends to be positively related to the degree of surprise about the acquisitions. 
The cross-sectional differences in competitor performance can be explained by their 
individual characteristics, which can affect the probability of acquisitions. Most 
importantly, the empirical results suggest a significant and positive relation between 
rivals’ abnormal returns and their reassessed probabilities of being acquired. 
 
2.3.5 Arbitrageurs 
The literature finds positive and significant arbitrage returns around M&As. Risk 
arbitrageurs are defined as financial institutions that increase target stockholdings 
following takeover announcements. Dukes, et al. (1992) find consistent empirical 
evidence from a sample of pure cash tender offers to support the argument that risk 
arbitrageurs gain from acquisitions. Baker and Savasoglu (2002) construct a larger and 
more comprehensive sample and use a new method to investigate the abnormal returns 
from risk arbitrages. Their sample includes 1901 M&A deals with both cash and stock 
payments during 1981–1996. They show that abnormal arbitrage returns are positively 
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related to completion risk and the selling pressure of target stocks. When the probability 
of success decreases and approaches 50% and the gap in gains between success and 
failure grows, arbitrageurs obtain substantial positive gains. They use regressions of 
estimations of merger outcome to predict the probability of deal completion and the 
selling pressure of target shares is measured by target firm size. The bid premium is the 
proxy for the difference between the payoffs of success and failure. However, arbitrage 
returns appear to be inversely related to the general size of risk arbitrage capital, as 
limited arbitrage theory predicts. 
 
Evidence of the role of arbitrageurs in takeovers is still contradictory. Larcker and Lys 
(1987) argue that arbitrageurs play a passive role and attribute positive abnormal returns 
to the superior ability of arbitrageurs to predict the outcome of takeover bids. However, 
more recent papers (Cornelli and Li, 2002) suggest that arbitrageurs have an active 
impact on M&As. Changes in arbitrageurs’ stockholdings affect deal characteristics and 
final bid outcomes. To address this issue, Hsieh and Walkling (2005) conduct a 
comprehensive empirical study for the role of arbitrageurs in M&As. They obtain 
empirical evidence from 608 takeover bids to suggest an endogenous relation between 
arbitrage holdings, arbitrage returns, takeover outcomes, and bid premiums. Importantly, 
the authors show that changes in arbitrage stockholdings are positively related to the 
probability of bid success. Growth in arbitrage holdings predicts the future success of 
takeover bids. The authors also indicate that changes in arbitrage stockholdings are 
positively correlated to bid premiums and arbitrage returns. These findings suggest that 
arbitrageurs play both active and passive roles in the takeover process. Moreover, after 
controlling for deal characteristics, Hsieh and Walkling (2005) show that arbitrageurs 
prefer small targets and buy significantly fewer stocks in large deals. Another important 
finding is that large changes in arbitrage holdings also predict bid revisions or the 
appearance of competing bids. This finding is consistent with the predictions of active 
effect theories. 
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2.4 Factors affecting M&A performance 
2.4.1 Method of payment 
Several factors are considered to affect post-merger performance. Travlos (1987) firstly 
explores the impact of payment methods on M&A performance. Although several studies 
indicate the importance of methods of payment in takeovers, there is no study links it 
with stock returns during the announcement period. He examines the role of different 
methods of payment in bidder’s announcement returns, like the stock exchange offers and 
the pure cash offers. The empirical results indicate that the market responses to deals with 
different methods of payment are significantly differed. The bidding firms using pure 
stock exchange suffer large losses when the deals are announced. However, the 
announcement returns for pure cash deals are dramatically better. These findings do not 
varied among different types of M&A. In addition, Loughran and Vijh (1997) examine 
the major determinants of the long-term performance of merging firms using a sample of 
947 takeover deals during 1970–1989. The majority of previous M&A studies adopt a 
calendar time approach with equally weighted, monthly rebalanced portfolios to calculate 
abnormal returns. However, this methodology can cause several statistical problems. 
Therefore Loughran and Vijh (1997) choose a buy-and-hold approach and matching 
samples that control for firm size and book-to-market ratios to obtain more accurate 
empirical results. The entire sample is grouped by form of acquisition (mergers or tender 
offers) and method of payment (cash or stock).  
 
The merger deals show significantly more negative abnormal returns than matching firms, 
while tender offers earn significantly positive abnormal returns. Similarly, deals using 
stock payments present -24.2% negative abnormal returns compared to the matching 
sample. In contrast, cash deals earn 18.5% positive abnormal returns. Combining two 
group benchmarks, Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that stock mergers have highly 
negative abnormal returns and tender offers with cash payments show 61.7% higher 
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excess returns than the matching sample. Moreover, the abnormal returns of stock tender 
offers and cash mergers are both insignificant for matching firms. The investigation on 
market efficiency suggests that market efficiency theory is not supported by acquirers’ 
significant post-merger abnormal returns. It appears that financial markets systematically 
misvaluate takeover gains. Specifically, the financial markets underreact to deal payment 
information. 
 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) further compare the differences of long-term performance 
between stock mergers and stock issues. They show that the performance of stock 
mergers is worse than that of either firm initial public offerings (IPOs) or seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs), but the differences are insignificant. The comparison test between cash 
tender offers and stock repurchases indicates that acquisitions using cash perform much 
better in the long term. 
 
Methods of payment affect not only a merging firm’s long-term performance, but also its 
announcement returns. Chang (1998) finds empirical evidence to support this argument 
after examining the announcement returns of deals acquiring privately held targets. 
Different from previous studies, he argues that bidding firm’s shareholders may 
experience a positive announcement returns when they use pure stock to acquire private 
targets. By contrast, there are significantly negative abnormal returns for deals acquiring 
public firms through stock exchanges. On the other side, for pure cash offers, there is no 
significant wealth effect for bidding firm’s shareholders. Moeller, et al. (2007) further 
confirm this argument. They examine the influence of opinion diversity and information 
asymmetry on acquirer announcement returns. The typical proxy for opinion diversity is 
the standard deviation of analyst forecasts and the authors use firm idiosyncratic volatility 
to proxy for information asymmetry. The results show that, in deals buying public targets 
with pure stocks, bidders with a high standard deviation in analyst forecasts have 
significantly lower announcement returns. However, this underperformance does not exist 
with private takeover targets or pure cash payments. On the other hand, the measure of 
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information asymmetry presents extremely strong explanatory power for acquirer 
announcement returns. As is the case for diversity of opinion, a significantly negative 
relation exists between information asymmetry and abnormal returns in the equity 
acquisitions of public targets. On the contrary, empirical evidence also suggests that 
acquirer abnormal returns are positively related to measures of opinion diversity and 
information asymmetry in pure cash takeovers. In conclusion, the diversity of opinion 
model successfully explains the difference in announcement returns between pure cash 
and pure stock payments used in public target takeovers but it fails to explain the 
differences between the acquisitions of public and private targets. However, the 
information asymmetry model is much better at explaining differences in announcement 
returns in various types of acquisitions using various types of payments. 
 
As historical records show, a great number of firm managers tend to be engaged in M&A 
activities. Firms that make five or more successful takeover deals within three years are 
normally defined as multiple bidders. It is assumed that good managers will get great 
experience from previous successful deals and consequently improve performance in 
subsequent deals. Based on this assumption, Fuller, et al. (2002) designs a study of the 
announcement returns of 3135 takeovers made by multiple bidders from 1990 to 2000. 
They show that acquiring public targets have significantly negative announcement returns, 
but positive abnormal returns when acquiring private or subsidiary targets. The entire 
sample is further grouped by different methods of payment. Consistent with the findings 
of Moeller, et al. (2007), multiple bidders buying public targets using pure stocks have 
significant and negative announcement returns. In addition, the wealth effects on pure 
cash or mixed payment deals are insignificant. However, in deals buying private or 
subsidiary firms, acquirer shareholders earn significantly positive gains, regardless of the 
method of payment.  
 
Furthermore, Fuller, et al. (2002) examine other determinants of the announcement 
returns for multiple bidders. They find that in public acquisitions the dispersion between 
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pure cash and pure stock payments is positively related to the relative size ratio of the 
target and acquiring firms. This finding implies that when relative size increases, deals 
with cash payments realize more positive gains and more negative results for stock 
payment deals. In deals with private or subsidiary targets, relative size also has a positive 
impact on the acquirer’s announcement returns. The empirical findings of Fuller, et al. 
(2002) clearly show that market reactions to acquiring public targets versus private or 
subsidiary targets are distinctly different. This paper suggests that this finding is 
attributable to the liquidity hypothesis. The liquidity of private and subsidiary firms is 
significantly less than for public firms. Thus these firms are priced at a discount. 
Experienced bidders are able to capture this effect to create additional value from buying 
these targets. The liquidity hypothesis can also explain the differences in the abnormal 
returns of deals with various relative size ratios, since large targets are less liquid. In sum, 
M&A performance varies with payment choice and type of target. Their additional 
analysis is constructed based on a sample of bidders acquiring two firms within 90 days. 
Interestingly, the results show that bidders tend to choose different methods of payment in 
clustered deals. Further results suggest that both target and bidder characteristics 
contribute to a better understanding of payment method choices. The public status and 
industry and firm size of the targets are all considered. 
 
2.4.2 Transaction attitude 
Since the performances of hostile and friendly takeovers are significantly differentiated, 
researchers argue that hostile takeovers should be distinguished from non-hostile 
takeovers when examining M&A gains. The potential source of gains from hostile 
takeovers is the replacement of incumbent target managers, while strategic synergies are 
the main source of friendly takeovers. Schwert (2000) examines whether the 
characteristics of hostile takeovers are identifiably different from those of friendly 
takeovers, using the data on 2346 takeover contests for listed target firms during 
1975–1996. The author uses the four most common indicators to identify hostile 
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takeovers: (1) The hostile takeover is noted by The Wall Street Journal or Dow Jones 
News/Retrieval, (2) the hostile takeover is recorded by the Securities Data Company, (3) 
unsolicited tender offers, and (4) pre-bid takeover speculation. The analysis shows that 
the correlations among these four indicators of hostility are significantly positive but not 
extremely high. Therefore Schwert argues that the choice of different indicators should be 
carefully considered in hostile takeover research. His studies based on a takeover sample 
of 22 years show that the frequency of hostile takeovers presents secular variations with 
time. These changes are mainly attributed to innovations in takeover technology and the 
development of anti-takeover approaches.  
 
Two major theories explain the use of hostile takeovers: The management entrenchment 
hypothesis says that target managers resist takeover bids to avoid being acquired. The 
bargaining power hypothesis states the main purpose of target managers is to improve the 
terms of takeover bids. In the probit regression for the choice of hostile takeover, 
variables indicating management entrenchment have little impact on hostility. On the 
other hand, variables that represent the target’s bargaining powers are highly significant 
and contribute the most explanatory power. Furthermore, hostile takeovers are shown to 
have significantly higher bid premiums than friendly takeovers. Both results are 
consistent with the predictions of the bargaining power hypothesis. The empirical 
evidence also suggests that hostile takeovers are more likely to attract competing bidders, 
which further supports the bargaining power hypothesis. 
 
2.4.3 Type of target and acquirer 
In M&As, the choice of target type has a significant impact on stock performance, 
especially the public status of the target firm. It is generally believed that acquiring public 
or private firms incurs different market reactions. Since the competition in acquiring a 
private target is limited, the limited competition hypothesis predicts that bidding firms 
will obtain significant positive abnormal returns with a high probability of underpayment. 
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Furthermore, deals buying private targets with stock payments are more likely to generate 
new outside blockholders. These new blockholders are considered effective monitors to 
improve the managerial performance of merging firms. Therefore bidders obtain 
substantial gains from acquiring private targets. Similarly, investors believe that deals 
acquiring public firms with stock payments are a signal of overvaluation. Thus, the 
financial market will have a negative response to the takeover announcement. However, 
this problem may be mitigated when buying private targets.  
 
To find empirical evidence, Chang (1998) examines bidder’s announcement returns, using 
a sample of 281 M&A deals with privately held targets during 1981–1992. The author’s 
comparison analysis of deal characteristics shows that both the average deal value and 
relative size of private targets are significantly less than those of public targets. On the 
other hand, the probability of creating new blockholders and their stock ownerships in 
private target deals is significantly higher than in other types. This finding is consistent 
with the prediction of the monitoring hypothesis. Furthermore, Chang (1998)’s results 
from univariate tests suggest that abnormal returns of cash offers are statistically 
insignificant, regardless of the target’s public status. This finding is inconsistent with the 
limited competition hypothesis. In stock offers, however, market reactions to 
announcements of acquiring private targets are highly positive and statistically significant, 
while reactions to announcements of acquiring public targets are profoundly negative. 
This result strongly supports the monitoring hypothesis, which argues that the generation 
of new blockholders increases firm value through a more efficient monitoring 
mechanism.  
 
Seeking further support for the monitoring hypothesis, Chang (1998) divides the sample 
into groups according to whether a new blockholder is created in the takeover. Not 
surprisingly, deals creating new blockholders have significantly higher announcement 
returns, whether the target is public or private. Cross-sectional regressions yield results 
that are consistent with previous analysis. The estimation for exchanged share 
47 
 
percentages is significant and positive. Similarly, the dummy variable for new 
blockholders presents significantly positive effects on bidder announcement abnormal 
returns. Finally, the author concludes that the acquisition of private targets using stocks 
earns substantial positive returns, while using cash yields insignificant abnormal returns. 
The evidence of new blockholder creation mainly from targets supports the monitoring 
hypothesis. 
 
Officer (2007) investigates the gains of acquiring unlisted targets, including subsidiaries, 
from another point of view. The author argues that the main source of positive gains is 
attributed to the selling discount of unlisted targets compared to public targets rather than 
improvements in managerial performance. The biggest limitation of that research is in 
measuring the fair prices of unlisted firms and subsidiaries due to the poor availability of 
information on these firms. Officer (2007) conquers this obstacle by adopting a 
comparison analysis approach. The acquisition multiples for unlisted targets are 
compared with industry- and size-matched deals acquiring public targets. The results 
show that bidders acquire unlisted targets at a discount of 15– 30%, on average, 
compared to the control sample of bidders buying public targets. The analysis also shows 
that public parent firms with serious liquidity constraints are more likely to sell their 
unlisted subsidiaries at a discount. Compared with the control sample firms, these parent 
firms have much lower cash flow, cash balances, net working capital, Z-scores, and bond 
ratings. They also have significantly higher debt ratios and negative former stock 
performance. All these differences indicate that the main consideration in selling 
subsidiaries is to mitigate the parent firm’s liquidity constraints. The deal value of selling 
subsidiaries only possesses 4% of the parent firm’s total assets, on average. But it is 
relatively large when comparing with parent firm’s cash balance (105% on average). Thus 
the sale of unlisted subsidiaries significantly improves the financial status of parent firms. 
Moreover, the results suggest that the sales discounts mainly depend on the parent firm’s 
former stock performance and the availability of alternate financing sources. 
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In addition to the target, different types of acquirers also affect takeover performance. As 
Myers and Majluf (1984) and Jensen (1986) argue, firms with great (little) financial slack 
may have overinvestment (underinvestment) problems. Smith and Kim (1994) believe 
that M&As are an effective way to reallocate resources by merging slack-rich firms with 
slack-poor firms. This process increases the value of combined firms. The authors’ 
analysis is based on a sample of 827 tender offers from 1980 to 1986. First, they find that 
takeover deals between slack-rich and slack-poor firms present better stock performance 
than other firms. Bidder announcement abnormal returns are positive and statistically 
significant. Further analysis shows that the market reaction is more positive when a 
slack-poor bidder announces a takeover bid for a cash-rich target than when a cash-rich 
bidder acquires a slack-poor target. This finding is consistent with the prediction of free 
cash flow hypothesis, which suggests that bidders with much free cash flow are more 
likely to overpay for targets. Moreover, if these cash-rich bidders increase leverage ratios 
through acquisitions, their shareholders obtain significantly positive gains. On the other 
hand, slack-poor bidders show significantly positive abnormal returns when the takeover 
deals decrease their leverage ratios. 
 
The acquirer’s firm size also affects takeover performance. An interesting finding noted 
by Moeller, et al. (2004) is that although the equally weighted average announcement 
return for bidding firms is 1.1%, great losses to shareholder wealth are incurred. This 
result is based on a comprehensive sample of 12,023 acquisitions during 1980–2001. A 
potential explanation is that acquisitions made by small firms are more profitable than 
deals made by large firms. Thus they have more positive returns but small wealth effects 
due to the limitation in the acquirer’s firm size. On the other hand, large bidding firms 
make large acquisitions that result in large losses of wealth. To capture this effect, the 
authors’ empirical analysis shows that the value-weighted average announcement return 
for the whole sample is -1.18%. They further investigate possible explanations for the 
bidder size effect.  
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Their descriptive analysis indicates that small deals are more likely in the acquisition of 
private targets than public targets. As both Chang (1998) and Fuller, et al. (2002) suggest, 
the abnormal announcement returns are significantly higher for deals buying private or 
subsidiary firms than for deals buying public firms. Therefore, the high portion of private 
targets in small deals probably explains this size effect. A second potential explanation is 
that small deals are more likely to be paid in cash than in stock. Takeovers using cash 
present significantly positive abnormal returns, whereas stock deals earn significantly 
negative abnormal returns (Loughran and Vijh, 1997). Finally, the different characteristics 
of large and small bidders may also have an impact on announcement returns.  
 
Moeller, et al. (2004) examine whether these hypotheses lead to a better understanding of 
the size effect of bidding firms. They find that the bid premiums are positively related to 
the size of bidding firms after controlling for other variables. This finding implies that 
large firm managers tend to overpay for M&As. Consequently, large bidders are more 
likely to successfully complete deals. Furthermore, the size effect still holds when authors 
use the book value of firm assets as the size measure. This evidence does not support the 
overvaluation hypothesis. The overvaluation hypothesis attributes the negative 
performance of large firms to their overvalued equities. This negative performance should 
disappear when firm size is measured by book value instead of market value. There is 
also little evidence to support the free cash flow hypothesis. In conclusion, Moeller, et al. 
(2004) finds that the size effect is robust and does not reverse over time. The empirical 
evidence main supports the managerial hubris hypothesis. 
 
2.5 Merger waves 
Research extensively indicates that M&As occur in waves. Since M&A activities are a 
combination of financing and investment decisions, Rau and Stouraitis (2011) consider 
analysing merger waves together with other corporate events. Stock repurchases, SEOs, 
and IPOs are all forms of firm financing decisions. The authors collect a large and 
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comprehensive data set over 25 years (1980–2004), with more than 150,000 corporate 
transactions. They show that there are significantly positive correlations between different 
forms of stock issuance activities at the industry level and a negative correlation between 
stock issuance activities and stock repurchases. Furthermore, the results of a vector 
autoregressive model show that there is distinct evidence from lagged corporate events to 
support their arguments. Lagged SEO volume can predict future IPO volume and both 
SEO and IPO volumes are able to predict future stock-financed M&A waves. Similarly, a 
bootstrap simulation approach suggests that, although different corporate event waves 
overlap, each wave has a time pattern. Consistent with vector autoregressive analysis, 
stock issue waves come first, with SEOs preceding IPOs. Waves of M&As with stock 
financing subsequently occur and, finally, stock repurchase waves. 
 
Two major hypotheses explain M&A waves: the efficiency hypothesis and the market 
misvaluation hypothesis. The neoclassical efficiency hypothesis argues that M&A activity 
is motivated by considerations of economic efficiency. Firm managers are expected to 
take advantage of growth opportunities or make investments with positive net present 
value. Good investment opportunities follow business cycles or industry productivity 
shocks. Thus M&A activities occur in waves. Alternatively, the market misvaluation 
hypothesis supposes that firm equities can be misvalued by the market and that rational 
managers will propose stock-financed takeovers to exploit such an advantage. Therefore 
stock-financed M&A waves should occur in the high market valuation period. Rau and 
Stouraitis (2011) argue that the historical evidence is consistent with both theories. In 
explanatory power regressions, they use five sets of variables to proxy for economic 
efficiency and market misvaluation factors, respectively. All variables are statistically 
significant in explaining equity issuance waves, which indicates these waves are 
motivated by either economic efficiency or market misvaluation. The relative importance 
of each theory varies with different time periods, leading to differing conclusions in 
previous studies. 
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2.5.1 Economic efficiency 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) argue that M&A activities are driven by economic shocks 
after examining the fourth takeover wave in the 1980s. The authors first investigate 
industry-level patterns in M&A activity during 1982–1989. The evidence suggests that 
the density and time series of these activities are differentiated by industry and that the 
activities cluster in a few particular industries. Furthermore, most of these industries 
experienced great fundamental shocks during the sample period, which are considered the 
cause of M&A waves. These findings imply that both macroeconomic and industry-level 
factors must be included jointly in research design. They also help explain bidder 
announcement returns from an industry point of view. 
 
Similarly, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) argue that most of the historical merger waves 
can be explained by Q theory. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of a firm’s assets 
to their replacement cost and it is generally a proxy for firm growth opportunity. Because 
of their high fixed costs and low marginal adjustment costs, M&A activities are more 
likely to be in response to acquirers’ Q ratios than to other considerations. As economic 
efficiency theory indicates, bidder managers would take advantage of high Q ratios 
through buying low-Q firms. To validate this explanation, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) 
develop a theoretical model to study historical M&A data. Both their model and empirical 
results indicate that a firm’s Q ratio has strong explanatory power for M&A waves of the 
1900s, 1920s, 1980s, and 1990s, but not the 1960s. 
 
The empirical results presented by Harford (2005) also support the neoclassical 
explanation that merger waves are driven by specific industry shocks. However, this 
author also argues that that industry shocks cannot fully explain the occurrence of merger 
waves. The consideration of asset liquidity is also indispensable. As we know, a merger 
wave is normally a process of asset reallocation that also requires sufficient capital 
liquidity. As previous theory shows, increasing asset liquidity reduces a firm’s financing 
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constraints and transaction costs and improves the valuation of assets. The occurrence of 
merger waves requires two major conditions: the economic motivation for M&A activity 
and relatively low transaction costs to create a considerable trading volume. Therefore 
Harford (2005) argues that the correlation between high market valuation and merger 
waves is actually attributable to an increase in capital liquidity rather than to behavioural 
misvaluation. The author studies a sample of industry-level merger waves covering the 
period of both the 1980s and 1990s to validate this argument. The results show that large 
abnormal changes in most economic characteristics are normally followed by 
industry-level merger waves. The results from logistic analysis confirm that economic 
variables have strong predictive power for the start of industry merger waves. 
Furthermore, they show a strong time-series interaction between the industries involved 
in firm-level mergers and partial-firm acquisitions. These findings strongly support the 
neoclassical explanation of economic efficiency, while inconsistent with the explanation 
of behavioural misvaluation. Finally, Harford concludes that merger waves are not caused 
by managerial timing in market misvaluation. But they are driven by economic shocks 
and sufficient capital liquidity. 
 
Furthermore, Garfinkel and Hankins (2011) attribute the appearance of merger waves to 
considerations of economic efficiency. They improve the understanding of M&A waves 
by studying the role of risk management in M&A activities from 1981 to 2006. Their 
results, based on analysing a large and comprehensive data set, suggest that risk 
management is a crucial component of M&A activities. First, the authors find a positive 
relation between the clustering level of vertical takeovers and the appearance of merger 
waves. A vertical takeover is more likely to occur during a period of merger waves. As 
traditional theory argues, vertical takeovers can be treated as a response to increased 
uncertainty duo to risk management. Vertical takeovers provide substantial benefits from 
operational hedging. Therefore the evidence shows that increases in the firm-level 
uncertainty of cash flow are able to predict the start of merger waves. Risk management 
is important not only at the firm level, but also in industry level analysis. These results 
53 
 
indicate that the causality relation between cash flow uncertainty and vertical takeovers is 
significant and robust. Furthermore, the empirical evidence shows that cash flow 
uncertainty declines significantly after vertical takeovers. Generally, these findings 
suggest that the consideration of risk management significantly influences M&A 
activities. Merger waves are partially driven by firm managers’ willingness to reduce cash 
flow volatility. 
 
2.5.2 Market misvaluation 
Market misvaluation theory is also a common explanation for merger waves. As 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) argue, consideration of economic efficiency fails 
to tell the whole story of merger waves, especially the different choices of payment in 
merger waves. The authors develop a rational framework to show that misvaluation is an 
important determinant of merger waves. Market misvaluation is able to cause merger 
waves on its own and without economic shocks. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)’s 
theoretical model suggests that market misvaluation has a significant impact on merger 
waves. The probability of a bidder making a takeover offer and a target accepting one is 
positively related to the level of market overvaluation. Therefore merger waves are more 
likely to occur when the financial market is significantly overvalued.  
 
On the other hand, market undervaluation is also a potential explanation for why merger 
waves end. Market misvaluation theory can also explain the choices of payment in 
merger waves. As Shleifer and Vishny (2003) indicate, overvalued bidders have strong 
incentive to be engaged in stock mergers acquiring undervalued or relatively less 
overvalued targets. The evidence shows that stock mergers are more popular in merger 
waves caused by an overvalued market. On the contrary, in a period of market 
undervaluation, cash deals are more likely to successfully complete. In conclusion, the 
authors argue that, besides considerations of economic efficiency, merger waves can also 
be driven by market misvaluation, in periods of either overvaluation or undervaluation. 
54 
 
 
As a supplement to above-mentioned study, Rhodes-Kropf, et al. (2005) empirically tests 
market misvaluation theory for merger waves. They decompose the market-to-book ratio 
into three parts to represent the level of misvaluation: firm-specific error, time-series 
sector error, and long-run value to book. They obtain strong evidence to support the 
argument that merger waves are driven by market misvaluation. First, they show that 
acquirers are significantly more overvalued than targets and that acquirers’ average 
market-to-book ratio is higher than the targets’. Further analysis shows that about 60% of 
the acquirers’ market-to-book ratios are attributable to firm-specific error. In contrast, 
almost none of the targets’ market-to-book ratios could be attributed to firm-specific error. 
Consistent with the predictions of Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), the targets in 
cash offers are relatively undervalued, on average, since they have negative firm-specific 
error, while targets in stock offers are slightly overvalued. From an acquirer’s viewpoint, 
acquirers using stock are relatively more overvalued than acquirers using cash. Moreover, 
the increasing firm-specific error is positively related to the probability of firms making 
stock takeovers. Similarly, industry-level M&A activities increase with time-series sector 
error. Second, the authors’ analysis based on a firm’s long-run value suggests that, 
generally, low value-to-book firms acquire high value-to-book firms. This implies that the 
‘high buys low’ effect is mainly caused by a firm’s short-run pricing dynamics, but it will 
reverse direction in the long run. Rhodes-Kropf, et al. (2005) further determines that the 
short-run misvaluation is due to changes in market sentiment or asymmetric information. 
Finally, after controlling for several neoclassical factors, the misvaluation variable 
explains more than 15% of takeover activities at the industry level. The regression results 
indicate that misvaluation is an important factor for explaining the occurrence of merger 
waves, as well as neoclassical economic factors. 
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Chapter 3 
3. Does Bidder Leverage Affect M&A Success? 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the relation between bidders’ capital structure and their probability 
of success in M&A activities. The previous chapter, the literature review, shows that 
M&As are well researched in different aspects, such as merger motivations, merger 
performance, and merger waves. A large proportion of these studies focuses on 
examining firm’s stock returns. However, much less research has been conducted on the 
determinants of bid success, especially with respect to the bidding firm’s characteristics. 
 
Factors reported to affect the success rate of bids include toehold strategies (Bulow, et al., 
1999), the medium of payment (Cornu and Isakov, 2000), managerial resistance 
(Walkling, 1985), bidder size (Moeller, et al., 2004), and the use of poison pills 
(Comment and Schwert, 1995). They all have credible evidence to indicate their 
significant impact on the probability of success in takeovers. On the other hand, other 
papers associate capital structure with the motivations of M&As, based on the theories of 
wealth transfer (Roll, 1986), tax shielding (Renneboog, et al., 2007), and financial slack 
(Kiymaz and Baker, 2008). These studies greatly improve our understanding of why 
M&As occur. 
 
However, only a few studies connect capital structure theory to takeover outcome. Stulz 
(1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988) empirically examine the relation between target firm 
financial leverage and bid success, finding that they are negatively associated, but the 
authors ignore the influence of bidder capital structure. Recently, Morellec and Zhdanov 
(2008) developed a dynamic model relating bidder capital structure with takeover success. 
They predict that the bidding firm with the lowest leverage ratio has the highest 
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probability of winning a takeover contest. In general, to the best of our knowledge, no 
study empirically examines the underlying relation between a bidder’s financial leverage 
and takeover success. To fill this gap, this chapter sheds light on this issue by using a 
comprehensive data set and well-constructed methodologies. It is essential to explore how 
the under-leveraged capital structure generates advantages for bidding firm while the high 
leverage ratio may bring more disadvantages. Based on these considerations, bidder’s 
managers have incentive to actively manage their leverage ratios in order to obtain these 
advantages and avoid potential disadvantages. Therefore, the main research question of 
this chapter is that whether bidder’s capital structure has potential effect on the takeover 
success. Consistent with the prediction of theoretical model, it is expected that bidder’s 
different capital structure s have diversified impacts on the takeover success in the future. 
Furthermore, it is important to investigate the potential explanation for the relation 
between firm’s capital structure and takeover success since it may help us improve the 
understandings for the process and outcome of M&A deals. We suppose that 
under-leveraged bidders have strong ability to propose high bid premiums for target 
shareholders regarding less to different methods of payment. Therefore target 
shareholders and managers are more likely to accept these offers from under-leveraged 
bidders. 
 
Using a large sample of 19,203 US M&A deals during 1980–2009, we empirically 
investigate the relation between a bidder’s financial leverage ratio and the probability of 
M&A success. In contrast to the previous literature, which focuses only on successful 
M&A deals, this study includes both successful and failed deals. To obtain more reliable 
results, a firm’s financial leverage is represented by four different measures. The primary 
measure is the firm’s leverage deficit level, with three dummy variables further specifying 
the status of the firm’s capital structure: an underleveraged dummy, a target-leveraged 
dummy, and an overleveraged dummy. 
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We adopt both the Tobit and logistic models in our empirical studies. First, the firm’s 
target leverage ratio is estimated by a Tobit regression model. Then the financial leverage 
deficit is calculated by the difference between the firm’s actual and target leverage ratios. 
Our logistic regression model’s results strongly suggest that a bidder’s deviation from the 
target leverage ratio has a negative impact on the probability of success in M&As, since 
the estimate for the leverage deficit variable is negative and statistically significant. This 
finding implies that firms with a higher debt level are less likely to successfully complete 
their takeover offers. Furthermore, analysis based on the status of leverage deficit shows 
that overleveraged firms present a lower probability of success while target-leveraged 
firms have a significantly higher probability of success. The dummy variable for an 
underleveraged firm has an insignificant impact on takeover success. The interaction 
analysis between the financial leverage measures and the competing deal dummy 
indicates that the effect of capital structure on takeover success is consistent but not 
enhanced or weakened by competing deals. 
 
To further explore the impact of bidder capital structure on takeover success, we analyse 
the relation using three subsamples with different payment media. We find that in deals 
with pure cash payments, the effect of the leverage deficit is negative but statistically 
insignificant. However, when the leverage deficit is specified by three dummy variables, 
the effects are significantly different. For overleveraged firms, they have no impact on 
takeover success. But the probability of success of target-leveraged bidders is 
significantly higher, while that of underleveraged bidders is significantly lower. In 
contrast, for pure stock deals we find that a bidder’s leverage deficit is negatively related 
to takeover success. The probability of success is insignificantly different between 
overleveraged and target-leveraged bidders. Interestingly, the underleveraged dummy 
variable is positively related to the probability of success and statistically significant. 
Moreover, in the analysis for deals using mixed payments, the effects of leverage deficit 
on takeover success are significantly negative. For the leverage status dummies, the 
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probability of success of overleveraged bidders is significantly lowered, while that of 
target-leveraged bidders is significantly increased. 
 
To explore potential explanations for the effects of leverage deficit, we further analyse the 
determinants of bid premiums. Chowdhry and Nanda (1993) show that in cash deals 
bidders commonly tend to issue additional debt as a form of external financing. High 
credit ratings allow firms with high debt capacity to use additional debt issue with greater 
convenience and at significantly less issuing cost than firms with lower debt capacity. The 
subsequent advantage in takeover financing has a positive impact on the merger valuation, 
thus prompting bidding firms to make considerably higher offers to beat their rivals or 
deter potential competing bidders.  
 
A low debt ratio is an advantage in not only cash takeover deals but also stock mergers. 
As indicated in the literature, overvalued stock prices can also lead to low leverage ratios. 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) propose that firms with overvalued equity have great 
incentive to engage in M&A markets using stocks, an argument supported by 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005). Based on the 
information asymmetry hypothesis, the management of overvalued firms shows a strong 
tendency to use highly valued stock as the medium of payment. Therefore, in bidding 
competitions, acquirers with a low leverage ratio, which can be attributed to overvalued 
stock, would want to tender a stock offer with a high premium to acquire a target and 
dilute the level of overvalued equity. Therefore, we predict an inverse relation between 
the bidder’s leverage deficit and the premiums it offers.  
 
In general analysis, the estimates for leverage deficit on bid premiums are negative but 
statistically insignificant, though the P-value is marginal. When the leverage deficit is 
measured by status dummies, the results are very different and clear. The premiums of 
overleveraged bidders are significant lower, while those of target-leveraged bidders are 
much higher. This finding is much in line with the results on the probability of success in 
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takeovers. It implies that firms with higher levels of debt levels are in an unfavourable 
position because it is harder for them to offer a high premium to compete for a particular 
target, since they face difficulties receiving further leverage to finance a deal. We argue 
that the differences in bid premiums partially explain the high probability of success of 
target-leveraged firms in M&As. 
 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. This is the first study to 
empirically examine the relation between bidder financial leverage and success in 
takeovers and to obtain sufficient evidence to support our argument. Our sample includes 
both successful and failed deals, producing a more comprehensive study and powerful 
results. Second, we examine the interactions of bidder leverage deficit with bid success 
across different payment media. This aspect of our study shows the effect of financial 
leverage more clearly for various statuses of takeover deals. The distinct results between 
pure cash, pure stock, and mixed payment deals remarkably improve our understanding 
of the effect of acquirer capital structure on M&A activities. Furthermore, we use dummy 
variables to differentiate between leverage deficit level statuses. These measures provide 
a more specific approach to investigate the relation between leverage deficit and M&A 
activity. 
 
Our work is related to that of Harris and Raviv (1988), Stulz (1988), Ghosh and Jain 
(2000), Clayton and Ravid (2002), and Morellec and Zhdanov (2008). While Harris and 
Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) examine the relation between target leverage and bid 
success, we examine the relation between bidder leverage and success in M&As. 
Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) develop a theoretical model for bidder leverage and bid 
success, which we empirically investigate. Clayton and Ravid (2002) investigate how 
capital structure affects bidders in typical auctions. This chapter extends their research 
area to M&As. Finally, Ghosh and Jain (2000) show that successful bidders have 
relatively lower debt ratios. This chapter further investigates how the level of debt yields 
advantages and affects bid success. 
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the previous related literature. 
Section 3.3 introduces the sample methodologies used in our study. Section 3.4 presents 
the empirical results. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2 Literature review 
3.2.1 Capital structure and M&A 
Previous papers examine the relation between capital structure and M&A in different 
contexts. As Lewellen (1971) first indicated, M&A activities are probably driven by 
increases in the bidding firm’s debt capacity. The shareholders of merging firms obtain 
benefits from the increased financial leverage following mergers. To demonstrate this 
reasoning, Bruner (1988) explores the hypothesis that changes in capital structure provide 
a motive for M&As. Besides the traditional debt ratio, the author uses a new measure, the 
‘net debt ratio’, which adjusts for cash reserves to better represent the bidding firm’s 
financial slack. Examining the financial leverage of both bidder and target firms of 
takeover deals, Bruner finds that bidder financial slack is significantly higher than in a 
general control sample of firms before mergers. The leverage ratio of target firm is 
significantly higher than for the control sample and for bidding firms. Unlike the previous 
study, Bruner’s investigates the correlation between changes in capital structure and the 
shareholder wealth effect. The author also shows that bidder leverage changes over the 
next two years have a significant impact on the bidder’s stock performance. 
 
Consistent with Bruner’s (1988) argument, Ghosh and Jain (2000) indicate that bidding 
firms have relatively lower debt ratios. They further investigate the leverage movements 
of combined firms after the successful completion of deals. By testing 239 successfully 
completed merger deals, they obtain evidence that suggests the financial leverage of 
merging firm significantly rises following mergers. There are two potential explanations 
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for this increase: the increasing debt capacity hypothesis and the unused debt capacity 
hypothesis. The results of cross-sectional regression reveal a statistically and 
economically significant relation between the announcement returns of acquiring firms 
and changes in the financial leverage ratio. This finding strongly supports the argument 
that increases in financial leverage results from the rising debt capacity of combined 
firms. 
 
Harford, et al. (2009) studies the issue of whether firm target capital structure is based on 
evidence from acquisitions. Using a sample of 1188 large acquisitions during 1981–2000, 
they investigate whether leverage deficit, defined as the deviation from a firm’s target 
capital structure, affects the bidding firm’s financing choices. In general, the evidence 
suggests that bidders consider target capital structure when they anticipate future 
acquisitions. A bidder’s pre-announcement leverage deficit is negatively related to the 
percentage of cash in the M&A payment. Since most cash payments in large deals are 
financed by new debt issues, the leverage deficit will also affect bidder financing 
decisions. Overleveraged bidders tend to choose equity financing over debt financing. 
Therefore the authors conclude that considerations of target capital structure are a crucial 
determinant of both the method of payment and financing decisions of acquisitions. 
 
Using a two-step estimation approach, Uysal (2011) also researches the correlation 
between a firm’s target capital structure and M&A activities, especially the probability of 
the firm making an acquisition, as well as its choices of payment method and bid 
premiums. The empirical evidence suggests that overleveraged firms are less likely to 
make an acquisition. The deals made by overleveraged bidders present significantly 
smaller average values and premiums; they are also less likely to use cash payments. 
These results support the argument that the leverage deficit of firms constrains their 
ability to make acquisitions. Moreover, the impact of leverage deficit on M&A activity 
indicates that firm managers may attempt to mitigate this impact. Uysal (2011) also 
analyses the connection between managerial decisions on capital structure and potential 
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acquisitions and finds that overleveraged firms reduce leverage deficit to move towards 
their target capital structure. This finding implies that managers actively adjust their 
firm’s capital structure when they forecast a high probability of making acquisitions. 
 
On the other hand, a bidder’s capital structure also plays a strategic role in takeover 
contests, since debt is an important source of financing. Chowdhry and Nanda (1993) 
show that the strategic use of debt financing can provide substantial advantages to initial 
bidders over potential competitors. By constructing a five-date model with two potential 
bidders, the authors provide the testable empirical implication that the probability of the 
initial bidder facing no competition is positively related to the bidder’s current debt ratio. 
Consequently, the initial bidder has a higher probability of successfully completing the 
ongoing deal. 
 
Similarly, Clayton and Ravid (2002) explore the effect of capital structure on firm bidding 
behaviour in typical auctions. Unlike previous M&A studies, they focus on two common 
types of Federal Communication Commission spectrum auctions: the English auction and 
the first-price sealed-bid auction. First, the authors present a theoretical model to explain 
how the financial leverage ratio could affect bidding behaviour in auctions. The model 
predicts that both the leverage ratio of the bidding firm and the debt–equity ratio of the 
competition are crucial determinants in the auctions. A firm’s debt level is inversely 
related to the highest bid it is able to give. Empirical evidence from the FCC auction data 
proves that a firm’s financial leverage has a significant impact on its bidding behaviour. 
Clayton and Ravid show that bidding firms with higher leverage levels are less likely to 
win the auctions. 
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3.2.2 Factors affecting takeover success 
3.2.2.1 Toeholds 
Numerous factors affect the probability of takeover success, especially in the presence of 
competing bids for a same target. Burkart (1995) studies how a bidder’s initial 
shareholdings, referred to as toeholds, influence the process of bidding competitions. The 
author argues that in a bidding competition, which is normally modelled as a typical 
English auction or second-price sealed-bid auction, the existence of toeholds can lead to 
inefficient results. In a takeover contest, rational bidders with toeholds can also overbid 
for their targets, falling victim to the winner’s curse. To demonstrate this reasoning, 
Burkart (1995) examines the effect of initial shareholdings from both theoretical and 
empirical points of view. The author shows that the existence of toeholds leads to 
overbidding problems for bidders. Bidders with toeholds have a higher probability of 
success in takeover contests. 
 
Evidence from Bulow, et al. (1999) further confirms the positive impact of a bidder’s 
toehold on takeover success. The authors argue that bidders with toeholds can become 
more aggressive in bidding competitions. Bidders with no toehold become more 
conservative because they are more concerned about the rising winner’s curse. The 
existence of toeholds can also effectively deter competing bids and reduce the probability 
of managerial resistance. Consistent with Burkart (1995), the model of Bulow, et al. 
provides a reliable explanation for the overbidding problem without appealing to the 
hubris hypothesis or agency cost theory. 
 
Ettinger (2009) also examines this issue in a more recent study. Similar to previous 
studies, the author constructs a framework with two potential bidders: one with a toehold 
and one without. The takeover contests are modelled as typical ascending auctions with 
private and independent valuations. Ettinger investigates the effect of toeholds on both 
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bidder participation decisions and bidding strategy. The author shows that even with 
relatively low participating costs, the existence of toeholds is able to effectively deter 
competing bids made by non-toehold bidders. A bidder’s more aggressive bidding 
strategy reduces the expected profit of other potential bidders. Since the expected profit is 
less than the participating costs, potential bidders decide to give up this investment 
opportunity. On the other hand, a toehold also increases the probability of takeover bids 
by firms with toeholds. Furthermore, Ettinger’s theoretical framework takes into account 
the minimum premium. The condition of a minimum premium in this model significantly 
reduces the toehold deterrence phenomenon. 
 
3.2.2.2 Managerial resistance 
Ebeid (1975) uses discriminant analysis to compare the operating, market, and deal 
characteristics of target firms in successful and failed cash tender offers. The comparison 
analysis shows that only a few variables among the 28 selected are statistically significant. 
The most significant and dominant variable is the indicator for target management’s 
reaction. This finding suggests that managerial resistance has a large impact on the 
outcome of cash tender offers. Hoffmeister and Dyl (1981) also investigate factors that 
may affect the outcome of cash tender offers, using discriminant analysis. Their data set is 
constructed from 267 cash tender offers during 1976–1977. Consistent with Ebeid, the 
authors find that managerial resistance is decisive in determining final outcomes. The 
estimates for managerial resistance are statistically and economically significant in all 
models. In addition, target firm size and price-to-earnings ratio also have insignificant 
impact on the success of tender offers. 
 
In contrast, Walkling (1985) uses logistic analysis to explore the main determinants of 
tender offer success. The major motivation of this research is to find evidence on the 
surprising results for bid premiums. Both Ebeid (1975) and Hoffmeister and Dyl (1981) 
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indicate that the scale of bid premiums does not affect the success of cash tender offers. 
Consistent with Walkling’s predictions, empirical evidence from the logistic model 
supports the importance of bid premiums in takeover success. The size of bid premiums is 
positively related to the probability of success in tender offers. The author further points 
out that the insignificant results are mainly attributed to incorrect specifications of bid 
premiums. Consistently, the managerial resistance of target firms appears to have a 
negative impact on takeover success. Both initial shareholdings and solicitation fees also 
have a significant impact. 
 
3.2.2.3 Other factors 
Other factors are also very important. For example, Cornu and Isakov (2000) examine the 
deterring role of the method of payment in takeover contests. They believe that the choice 
of payment method has a significant effect on takeover outcome, whether a success or a 
failure, and the shareholder wealth effect. Their main incentive is to specify the 
equilibrium bidding strategy for initial bidders that deters potential competing bids. Their 
model identifies three alternative methods of payment: cash, equity, and debt offers. 
Following the requirements of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in signalling games, the 
theoretical model generates equilibrium solutions that depend on different target values. It 
further specifies the optimal method of payment for initial bidders launching hostile 
takeovers. The theoretical model suggests that the probability of a competing bid in 
hostile takeovers is lower after a cash offer than after an equity offer. To validate this 
prediction, the authors examine takeover deals in UK from 1995 to 1996. Consistent with 
theoretical suggestions, the empirical evidence shows that cash offers present more of a 
deterrent than equity and debt offers, because cash offers normally signal a high-valuation 
bidder. 
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Since the 1990s, the rapid development of takeover defences shows their increasing 
impact on the offer success of M&As. The most representative and popular takeover 
defence approach is the poison pill. As Ryngaert and Netter (1988) show, the adoption of 
a poison pill is an effective way to deter potential hostile takeovers. The historical records 
show that hostile takeovers are more likely to be defeated when acquiring firms use 
poison pills. Heron and Lie (2006) extend the understanding of the effect of poison pills 
in response to takeover bids. They carefully design the research methodology to mitigate 
potential endogeneity problems. Their sample has 526 unsolicited takeover offers, both 
successful and failed. To obtain more powerful and robust evidence, their regression 
models take into account financial, governance, and ownership characteristics that may 
affect the process and outcome of takeovers. The authors’ study of the adoption of a 
defensive mechanism suggests that the probability of a target firm adopting a poison pill 
in response to a takeover attempt is negatively related to its degree of insider ownership. 
In contrast, the probability of defensive repurchases increases with the extent of insider 
ownership. Moreover, the evidence suggests that target shareholders benefit from poison 
pills, since the adoption of poison pills is associated with higher bid premiums and 
shareholder gains. The results for defensive repurchases indicate that poison pills do not 
harm shareholder wealth. 
 
3.3 Data and methodology 
3.3.1 Sample selection 
Our sample includes all successful and unsuccessful M&As in the US corporate control 
market from January 1980 to December 2009. The source of the M&A data set is the 
Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers & Acquisitions database. The selected period is 
driven by the availability of the SDC data. Table 3.1 shows the selection criteria used in 
this chapter and the number of deals remaining after filtering by each criterion. We 
collect all deals acquired by US public firms that were announced between 1 January 
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1980 and 31 December 2009, for a total of 132,412 deals. To exclude small and noise 
deals, we omit deals of less than US$1 million, which leaves 70,780 deals. Furthermore, 
based on our research design, the sample contains successful and withdraw deals. Deals 
of unknown status or still pending are excluded from the sample, which brings the sample 
size down to 52,266. Following traditional M&A research, we eliminate deals involving 
firms in the financial or utility industry. Deals identified by the SDC as types of 
privatization, acquisitions of remaining interest, spinoffs, recapitalizations, repurchases, 
and self-tenders are also excluded, leaving a sample with 33,319 deals. After matching 
with both the Compustat and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases, 
our final sample contains 19,203 M&A deals. 
 
3.3.2 Sample description 
Table 3.2 presents the description of annual M&A characteristics for the entire sample 
from 1980 to 2009. As discussed in the literature review, M&A activities occur in waves. 
The first merger wave in our sample, the fourth wave on historical record, occurred 
between 1984 and 1989. The second merger wave started in 1992 and ended in 1999 
before the Internet bubble crashed. The latest wave started in the middle of the 2000s, 
with the highest deal value in 2006. This wave was stopped by the financial crisis in 
2008.  
 
An interesting trend in Table 3.2 is the increasing number of foreign deals. A deal with 
both a US acquirer and a US target is defined as a domestic deal, while a deal with a 
non-US target is defined as a foreign deal. Both the total number and percentage of 
foreign deals exhibit a significant upward trend that is attributable to the rapid 
globalization. When we consider the medium of payment, historical evidence suggests 
that the popularity of either cash or stock payments varies with different merger waves. In 
the late-1980s merger wave, the major medium of payment was cash; about 30% of deals 
were paid for with pure cash. In contrast, the percentage of deals paid for with pure stock 
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is significantly lower. After 1990, more stock deals and fewer cash deals were announced 
in the 1990s merger waves. Following the break of the Internet bubble, the frequency of 
cash payment deals fell dramatically, from over 20% to less than 5%; however, the 
percentage of pure cash deals recovered significantly from the large decline during the 
1990s. In the latest 2000s merger wave, over 40% of deals are paid for in cash, on 
average. 
 
Table 3.3 further displays the summary statistics of M&A deals regarding the public 
status of target companies. This result shows that the percentage of public targets in the 
entire sample is only around 20%. The remaining ~80% of targets are either private 
companies or subsidiaries. This finding provides an additional incentive for us to include 
private and subsidiary targets in our research. This inclusion will yield much stronger and 
more robust empirical evidence to support our predictions. 
 
3.3.3 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present descriptive statistics for acquirer and M&A deal characteristics, 
respectively. Since we are examining factors that affect the probability of success in 
M&A offers, our research summarizes the descriptive statistics for the whole sample, as 
well as two subsamples, namely, a successful bidder group (SBG) and a failed bidder 
group (FBG). The tables present not only the mean and median values for each 
accounting variable, but also the T-test results for differences in mean value between the 
two subsamples and the Wilcoxon test results for differences in median value.  
 
Table 3.4 shows that the accounting characteristics of successful and failed bidders are 
distinctly different. Both the average market value and sales of successful bidders 
(US$8.11 trillion and US$3.34 trillion, respectively) are significantly larger than for 
failed bidders (US$4.93 trillion and US$2.57 trillion, respectively). The empirical results 
of both the T-test and Wilcoxon test confirm this large gap, which is statistically 
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significant at the 1% level. In this chapter, we use the natural logarithm of the market 
value and sales to represent firm size. Earlier literature notes that large firms’ cash flows 
are less volatile because they are well diversified. Therefore, large firms should face less 
financial distress and, consequently, their target leverage ratio should be higher (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995). Hence, we predict that firm size will have a positive influence on 
success in M&As. The difference in the mean log market values between the SBG and the 
FBG is positive and significant (0.4543). This implies that the average firm size of 
successful bidders is larger than that of failed bidders. A potential explanation is that the 
board of the target company has more incentive to accept a takeover offer from a larger 
firm (Moeller, et al., 2004). 
 
The proxy for growth opportunity is the market-to-book ratio. As Myers (1977) and 
Goyal, et al. (2002) suggest, growth opportunity is an indispensable indicator of capital 
structure and the authors argue that growth opportunity and financial leverage ratio are 
inversely related. Due to their impact on financial leverage, differences in financial 
leverage ratios between the SBG and the FBG can induce these two groups of firms to 
have diverse market-to-book ratios. The SBG firms should exhibit a higher 
market-to-book ratio than FBG firms. The primary results in Table 3.4 provide evidence 
to support our hypothesis and the mean market-to-book ratios for the SBG and FBG are 
2.9223 and 2.5869, respectively. 
 
Following previous studies, we adopt the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets 
(R&D/Total Assets) as a proxy for a firm’s product uniqueness (Titman and Wessels, 
1988). A firm’s financial distress will be exacerbated by its product uniqueness, so there 
will be a negative relation between a firm’s target capital structure and product 
uniqueness. Table 3.4 shows that the average ratio of R&D expenses to total assets is 
0.0386 for the SBG and 0.0322 for the FBG. Both the T-test and Wilcoxon test indicate 
that the difference between the two subsamples is statistically significant. Another proxy 
for product uniqueness is the ratio of selling expenses to total sales. Firms with higher 
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selling expenses ratios are expected to produce more specialized products. Consistent 
with the findings for R&D expenses, we expect to observe a negative relation between the 
selling expense and financial leverage ratios. 
 
More profitable firms have more free cash flow (Uysal, 2011) and thus prefer to use 
internal financing rather than debt financing. Therefore, firm profitability and financial 
leverage are negatively related. In our research, profitability is represented by the ratio of 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets 
(TA), or EBITDA/TA. On the other hand, in M&As a more profitable bidder also enjoys 
several potential advantages. These advantages are able to help bidders successfully 
acquire their targets at lower prices. Therefore, we expect bidders in the SBG to be more 
profitable than firms in the FBG. The descriptive results confirm our prediction that the 
difference in the mean (median) profitability ratio between the two subsamples is 
statistically significant (P-value 0.0002). 
 
The tangibility of firm assets is another crucial variable for firm capital structure. It is 
believed that more liquid assets are related to lower bankruptcy costs, which results in a 
higher financial leverage ratio (Titman and Wessels, 1988). We measure tangibility with 
the ratio of tangible assets to the value of total assets (Tangible Assets/TA). Table 3.4 
shows that the SBG and FBG firms differ markedly in the tangibility of their assets 
(0.2666 versus 0.3116, respectively). 
 
The variable of interest, the coverage ratio, is used to measure how easily a firm can 
afford its interest payments to existing debt. The interest coverage ratio is calculated by 
dividing a firm’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) 
by the firm’s interest expenses. The interest coverage ratio is also considered an effective 
indicator of firm capital structure. The lower the ratio, the more seriously the firm is 
burdened by outstanding debt expenses. This implies that a firm’s interest coverage ratio 
is positively correlated to its potential debt capacity. Not surprisingly, the average interest 
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coverage ratio for the SBG is 80.099, while that for the FBG is only 22.797. This 
significantly huge gap indicates that the financial status of successful bidders is much 
healthier than of failed bidders. 
 
Table 3.4 also presents the average market leverage and the leverage deficit for bidders. 
We find that the average market leverage of firms in the SBG (0.2863) is significantly 
lower than that of the firms in the FBG (0.3517), which partially suggests that bidders 
with low debt levels have an advantage in M&A offers. Similarly, the firms in the SBG 
seem to have a negative leverage deficit, -0.003 on average, while the FBG firms have a 
positive leverage deficit of 0.0289. The definition of leverage deficit implies that, 
generally, successful bidders are underleveraged but failed bidders are overleveraged. 
Either a T-test or a Wilcoxon test can confirms the significance of the difference between 
market leverage and leverage deficit. 
 
Table 3.5 presents deal characteristics. Deal value is presented in millions of dollars, 
while the relative size is the ratio of the market value of target firms to that of the bidding 
firms. Consistent with the argument of Cosh, et al. (2006), we believe that bidding firms 
can take advantage of larger firm size to convince target shareholders to accept M&A 
offers. Thus we expect a positive relation between bidder size and the possibility of 
success in M&As and a negative relation between relative size and bid success. 
 
Previous M&A research considers the toehold size variable an important factor in bid 
success. As discussed in the literature review, Burkart (1995), Bulow, et al. (1999), and 
Ettinger (2009) show that initial shareholdings help bidding firms dominate in the 
takeover contest. Thus we predict that the probability of M&A offer success will increase 
with the bidder’s toehold size. Omitting bidders without initial shareholdings, Table 3.5 
shows that the average toehold size for successful bidders is 27.27%, while that for failed 
bidders is only 15.15%. The comparison analysis suggests that a successful bidder’s mean 
(median) toehold size is distinctly higher than that of an unsuccessful bidder. 
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Not surprisingly, the percentage of hostile takeovers in the SBG is much less than in the 
FBG, consistent with Hoffmeister and Dyl’s (1981) findings. The hostility of M&A offers 
is used as an indicator of managerial resistance. As Ebeid (1975) and Hoffmeister and Dyl 
(1981) show, managerial resistance is the most important factor in marring the success of 
M&A offers. There should be a negative relation between the hostility of bids and the 
success rate. On the other hand, bidders normally resort to a tender offer if they believe a 
friendly negotiation is not a viable option. Starting in the 1980s, tender offers have been 
frequently used in acquisitions, especially in hostile takeovers. The SDC’s M&A database 
flags tender offer deals and we construct a dummy variable for it. According to Gaughan 
(2007), tender offer deals have a much higher possibility of failure compared to other 
forms of M&As. Consistent with this point of view, our preliminary results show that 
deals in the SBG are less likely to use tender offers than those in the FBG. 
 
Furthermore, the medium of payment in M&A deals plays a crucial role. Cornu and 
Isakov (2000) believe that the medium of payment has strong explanatory power for the 
determinant effects of takeover outcome. Pure cash offers can effectively deter potential 
competing offers and promote the deal’s successful completion. On the contrary, a stock 
exchange offer would have an adverse effect. The descriptive statistics show that 
successful bidders obviously put forth more pure cash offers and fewer pure stock 
exchange offers compared with unsuccessful bidders. The other three variables—one for 
unsolicited deals, one for poison pill adoption, and one for the appearance of competing 
offers—all have negative impacts on the completion of takeover proposals. Consistent 
with our predictions, the differences in all three variables between the two subsamples are 
highly negative and statistically significant. 
 
73 
 
3.3.4 Methodology 
3.3.4.1 Capital structure measures 
As discussed in detail below, we examine how the financial leverage of bidders affects 
the probability of success in M&As. Tests on the hypotheses require precise 
measurements of the bidding firm’s capital structure. Therefore, the first step in our 
methodology is the construction of capital structure measures. This chapter uses the 
firm’s leverage deficit level to measure a firm’s capital structure. This variable is defined 
as the difference between a firm’s actual and target leverage ratios. Capital structure 
theories suggest that the target level of financial leverage varies across firms. As Graham 
and Harvey (2001) report, 81% of firms have their own target debt levels. This finding is 
consistent with that of Fama and French (2002), who also show that firms justify their 
financial leverage ratio as moving towards their target level. To calculate a firm’s target 
leverage ratio, we adopt the Tobit regression model, as in previous studies of target 
capital structure (Kayhan and Titman, 2007; Harford, et al., 2009). Following standard 
procedure, a firm’s actual market leverage ratio is regressed on a group of determinants of 
capital structure using the Tobit model:  
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(3.1)              
 
The predicted value of the regression is considered a firm’s target capital structure, which 
is restricted to between zero and one. 
 
So that we can obtain a more precise estimation of firm target capital structure, the group 
of determinant variables includes numerous firm-level characteristics, as well as industry- 
and market-level explanatory variables. To avoid the potential endogeneity problem, we 
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ensure that the causality runs from the independent variables to the market leverage ratios 
and the control variables are all lagged. 
 
The firm-level explanatory variables include firm size, profitability, tangibility, growth 
opportunities, product uniqueness, and cash reserves. As described in the section on 
variable definitions, the proxy of firm size is the natural logarithm of sales in the prior 
year. The proxy of profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. The firm’s asset 
tangibility is represented by the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets. 
We use the market-to-book assets ratio to proxy for a firm’s growth opportunities. In 
addition, the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets is used as a proxy for product 
uniqueness. Since a large portion of firms do not record R&D expenses in the Compustat 
database, it is necessary to differentiate these observations. As in previous papers, we use 
a dummy variable to indicate if a firm has no R&D expenses. Another proxy for firm 
product uniqueness is the ratio of selling expenses to total sales. Lastly, we use the ratio 
of cash holdings to total assets as a proxy for the corporate status of cash reserves. 
 
To capture the potential impacts of other determinants that are common in a particular 
industry, our estimation model also includes a group of industry dummies. These industry 
dummy variables correspond to the 48 classified industries of Fama and French (1997). 
Moreover, Baker and Wurgler (2002) show that firm managers have potential incentive to 
time the stock market. Therefore, to control for the market timing effect, our analysis 
includes the market’s median leverage ratio in the same time period. 
 
Since the predictive value of this regression is considered a firm’s target leverage ratio, 
the firm’s leverage deficit is calculated as its actual financial leverage minus its target 
leverage ratio in a given year: 
 
_it it itLeverageDeficit Market Leverage TargetLeverage             (3.2) 
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Three more capital structure measures are the dummy variables for the status of the 
bidder’s leverage deficit. The dummy variable Overleveraged is set to one if the bidder is 
overleveraged with a large positive value of leverage deficit and zero otherwise. On the 
contrary, the dummy variable Underleveraged is set to be one if the bidder is 
underleveraged with a substantial negative leverage deficit. The target-leveraged dummy 
is set to be one if the bidder’s leverage deficit is not significantly different from zero, 
which suggests that the firm’s financial leverage level depends on its target capital 
structure. 
 
3.3.4.2 Logistic analysis 
To explore the potential relation between a bidder’s capital structure and probability of 
success in M&A offers, we introduce the logistic regression model. Deal outcome is 
regressed on the leverage measures estimated in the previous step and a group of 
determinant variables is regressed on the probability of success in takeovers iZ : 
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(3.3) 
 
The dependent variable in this logistic model is a binary variable that takes the value of 
one if the deal is successfully completed and zero otherwise. Our main variable of interest 
is the financial leverage measure, determined in two different ways. The independent 
variable iZ  includes a group of explanatory variables that are considered to affect bid 
success: the bidding firm’s market-to-book ratio, managerial resistance, toehold size, 
relative size, bidder size, appearance of poison pill, tender offer, unsolicited deal, stock 
exchange deal, and competing bids. The market-to-book variable is the ratio of the 
bidder’s market value of assets to its book value. Managerial resistance is measured by 
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the hostility of the takeover offer. We construct a dummy variable to indicate whether a 
deal is hostile or not. The variable toehold size is the percentage of shares initially owned 
by the bidding firm before the takeover announcement. Relative size is the ratio of the 
target’s market value to the bidder’s market value. We use the natural logarithm of the 
bidding firm’s market value to proxy for bidder firm size. Five dummy variables are 
added into the regression to indicate whether target managers execute poison pills, 
whether a bidding firm adopts tender offers, whether the offer is an unsolicited deal, 
whether the medium of payment is pure stock, and whether competing deals exist. 
 
As in the previous step, all accounting variables in the logistic model are lagged to avoid 
potential endogeneity problems. Another important issue is that, since our research 
sample covers a long period, from 1980 to 2009, we incorporate a dummy variable for 
each single year in the empirical analysis to control for potential yearly effects. 
 
3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 Estimation of leverage deficit 
This section examines the determinants of target capital structure and determines a firm’s 
deviation from its target level. Table 3.6 presents the coefficient estimates of the target 
leverage ratio from Tobit model regressions. The results are highly consistent with the 
findings of capital structure previous research (Harford, et al. 2009). As we predicted, the 
estimate of log sales is positive (0.0181) and statistically significant (P-value at 0.0001). 
Similarly, the influence of asset tangibility on target leverage ratio is also positive (0.0759) 
and highly significant. Moreover, the coefficient of the market’s median leverage is 
0.3707 and statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies that a firm’s target 
leverage ratio fluctuates with market conditions. In contrast, the estimate of a firm’s 
profitability ratio is -0.3495, with a P-value of 0.0001. More profitable firms are more 
likely to reduce their outstanding debt levels. Consistent with our predictions, the 
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variables for the R&D expense ratio and selling expense ratio are both negative (-0.1819 
and -0.0079, respectively), with a significant impact on target capital structure. The 
estimate of the missing R&D dummy is positive and significant, which further confirms 
the impact of R&D expenses. Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests that a firm’s 
market-to-book and cash reserve ratios are both negatively related to its target leverage 
ratio. 
 
Following the methodology introduced previously, we obtain the leverage deficit of each 
firm in a given year. To further classify a firm as overleveraged, underleveraged, or not 
leveraged, the entire sample is divided into three sections denoting underleveraged firms 
(Q1), target-leveraged firms (Q2), and overleveraged firms (Q3). Table 3.7 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the firm and deal characteristics for each group and the 
comparison results between Q1 and Q3 firms. It clearly shows that the average leverage 
deficit of Q1 is -0.1501 and statistically significant and that of Q3 is 0.1626 and also 
statistically significant. On the contrary, the average leverage deficit of Q2 is only 
-0.0165 and insignificantly different from zero. This finding implies that the firms in Q1 
are generally underleveraged, since their actual financial leverages are significantly under 
their target levels. On the other hand, the firms in Q3 are considered overleveraged, since 
their average leverage deficit is significantly larger than zero. However, this finding 
suggests that firms in Q2 are neither overleveraged nor underleveraged, since their 
leverage deficits are not significantly different from zero.  
 
The variables for market value and total sales in Table 3.7 are a proxy for firm size. The 
table shows that the average size of Q2 firms is larger than that of the firms in the two 
other sections, but the differences are insignificant. The firm sizes of overleveraged and 
underleveraged firms do not differ from each other since the differences between Q1 and 
Q3 are mixed and insignificant. Moreover, the average market-to-book ratio of Q2 firms 
(3.3139) is significantly higher than for the other two sections, whose values are very 
close to each other (2.6974 and 2.7032). As for the market-to-book ratio, both the average 
78 
 
ratio of R&D expenses to total assets and the profitability ratio for Q2 firms are slightly 
higher than for other firms. On the other hand, the mean (median) asset tangibility of Q2 
firms is lower than for both overleveraged and underleveraged firms. The results also 
indicate that Q2 firms hold more cash reserves. Another interesting finding is that the 
average interest coverage ratio of firms decreases dramatically with the order of the 
sections (from 135.31 to 17.539). Consistent with our predictions, underleveraged firms 
should have a higher interest coverage ratio and overleveraged firms will suffer more 
serious financial constraints from outstanding debt levels. To sum up, the accounting 
performance of Q2 firms is generally distinguishable from that of firms in the other two 
sections. However, the differences in variables between the underleveraged and 
overleveraged firms are mostly insignificant, except for the interest coverage ratio. 
 
The deal characteristics in Table 3.7 show that the average value of deals made by Q2 
firms is the largest of the three sections. The differences in deal value between the 
underleveraged and overleveraged bidders are statistically significant for the mean, but 
become insignificant for the median values. However, the average relative size ratio of 
Q2 firms is significantly lower than for the other firms. The toehold sizes of the firms in 
all sections are not remarkably differentiated and are around 25%, on average. 
Interestingly, the probabilities of making hostile, unsolicited offers and using a tender 
offer approach all generally increase with the order of the sections. The evidence suggests 
that underleveraged bidders are less likely to make hostile, unsolicited M&A offers with a 
tender offer approach. It also suggests that the payment media used by bidders in each 
section are not significantly different, whether pure cash or pure stock payments. Another 
important finding is that the occurrence of competing bids is much less likely for 
underleveraged initial bidders than for overleveraged bidders. 
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3.4.2 General logistic analysis 
Table 3.8 reports the results of logistic analysis to investigate the determinants of a 
bidding firm’s capital structure that affect the probability of success in M&As. We use the 
measure for leverage deficit and three dummy variables to represent the status of the 
bidder’s capital structure. In the first column for model 1, we find that the estimate for 
leverage deficit is -1.1076 and the P-value is less than 0.01. This result is strongly 
consistent with our main prediction, which implies that the bidding firm’s capital 
structure should have a great impact on the possibility of offer success. It also provides 
reliable evidence to support the major prediction of Morellec and Zhdanov’s (2008) 
dynamic theoretical model. To further specify the effects of leverage deficit, the results 
for leverage deficit dummies are presented in the remaining columns of Table 3.8. The 
estimates for overleveraged and target-leveraged dummies are -0.3006 and 0.2462, 
respectively, both significant at the 1% confidence level. This suggests that overleveraged 
bidders present a significantly lower probability of takeover success on average, while 
target-leveraged bidders have much better outcomes. However, the estimate for the 
underleveraged dummy is 0.0922 and is statistically insignificant (P-value at 0.2306). 
This empirical finding shows that the inverse relation between leverage deficit and 
takeover success is mainly driven by overleveraged and target-leveraged bidders rather 
than by underleveraged bidders. 
 
The estimates for the control variable market-to-book ratio are consistent across different 
estimation models. In model 1, the coefficient of the market-to-book ratio is positive 
(0.0633) and statistically significant (0.0021). Consistent with our prediction, firms with 
higher growth opportunity are more likely to successfully complete their takeover offers. 
In line with Ebeid (1975) and Hoffmeister and Dyl (1981), we find strong and robust 
evidence to indicate that managerial resistance has a negative effect on takeover success. 
In Table 3.8, the estimates for managerial resistance dummy are conformably negative 
(around -1.6) and statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. This result does not 
80 
 
vary for different regression models. Therefore, we argue that managerial resistance 
should be considered an important explanatory variable for M&A success. 
 
The roles of the dummy variables for unsolicited and stock swap deals are similar to that 
of managerial resistance. The two explanatory variables have a negative influence on the 
probability of success in M&As. The estimates for the unsolicited deal dummy are 
consistently around -2.7, with a P-value less than 0.01 in all models. Normally, bidding 
firms propose unsolicited takeovers if their managers believe that negotiations cannot 
achieve their desired outcomes. Our empirical evidence suggests that this may not be a 
good choice, since it will arouse resistance from target managers and reduce the 
probability of deal completion. Similarly, as Cornu and Isakov (2000) suggest, M&A 
offers using stock swap payments are much more likely to be rejected by target 
shareholders, who have a greater tendency to accept cash offers rather than stock offers. 
Consistent with the authors’ argument, the estimates for stock swap dummies are all 
approximately -1 and statistically significant at the 1% confidence level in Table 3.8. 
Moreover, our finding suggests that the existence of competing bids also has a strongly 
negative impact on the success of M&A offers. It shows that the coefficients of 
competing deal dummies are over -2.76 and statistically significant. Moreover, the 
existence of competing deals will naturally depress a bidder’s probability of success. The 
estimates for the competing deal dummy are consistently negative and significant among 
the four regression models. 
 
On the positive side, the estimates for the variable Log of Market Value are positive, 
around 0.1, and statistically significant. This result holds in all four models. This evidence 
is consistent with our prediction that a larger bidding firm has advantages in M&As. The 
managers and shareholders of target firms have more incentive to agree with an offer 
from a large bidder than from a small bidder. The potential explanation is that large firms 
usually have better reputation and longer history and are able to provide a much brighter 
and more reliable prospect for the new merging firm following the successful completion 
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of takeovers. Another two control variables that have a positive impact on takeover 
success are bidding firm profitability and a tender offer dummy. The coefficient of the 
profitability variable in the model 1 is 0.9013 and statistically significant at the 1% level 
(P-value 0.0001). In the other three models, though the coefficients are slightly lower, 
around 0.8, they are still statistically significant. These results indicate that profitable 
bidders are more likely to be successful. Moreover, the estimates for the tender offer 
dummy are all significant (nearly 0.7) and statistically significant in all regression 
models. 
 
Certain control variables are insignificant in the estimation regressions. The estimates for 
the variables Toehold Size, Relative Size, and Poison Pill Dummy are statistically 
insignificant, although some of them are marginal. These findings imply that, to some 
extent, these three factors do not have a considerably large impact on M&A success. 
 
The pseudo-R-squared values for all models are over 0.22 and indicate that our 
cross-sectional logistic analysis provides relatively credible evidence to explain takeover 
outcomes. 
 
3.4.3 Interaction analysis 
From the empirical evidence of the models in Table 3.8, we find that bidder financial 
leverage has a significant impact on the probability of takeover success. In Table 3.9, we 
further examine whether in takeover deals with more than one bidder, which we call 
competing deals, the effect of the bidder’s capital structure is enhanced or weakened. 
Therefore, besides the measure for capital structure, the interaction variable of capital 
structure measures multiplied by the competing deal dummy is added to the regression 
model as an independent variable. The regression model is as following: 
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(3.4) 
 
Consistent with the empirical results in our general analysis section, the estimate for the 
bidder’s leverage deficit measure is negative, which exceeds the -1 and is statistically 
significant at the 1% confidence level. For leverage deficit dummies, the estimates are 
identical to the results in Table 3.8. However, the estimates for the interaction term are 
statistically insignificant as an explanatory variable. This finding implies that the 
influence of the bidder’s capital structure is not significantly different in competing deals 
from that in takeover deals with a single bidder. 
 
Moreover, the estimates for the other control variables are similar to those in Table 3.8. 
The variables for the market-to-book ratio, firm size, bidding firm profitability, and the 
adoption of a tender offer strategy significantly increase the probability of offer success. 
On the contrary, the estimates for the managerial resistance dummy, the unsolicited deal 
dummy, and the stock swap dummy are consistently negative and significant at the 1% 
confidence level. Finally, the Toehold Size, Relative Size, and Poison Pill dummy 
variables are statistically insignificant, as before. 
 
3.4.4 Payment analysis 
This part of the analysis divides the entire sample into three categories according to 
different payment media, namely, pure cash payments, pure stock payments, and mixed 
payments. As Cornu and Isakov (2000) argue, the medium of payment strongly 
determines the outcome of takeover offers. To explore the distortion effect of the medium 
of payment on the relation between bidder capital structure and M&A offer success, the 
empirical results are presented in Table 3.10. 
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Panel A of Table 3.10 shows the logistic analysis results for M&A deals using only cash 
as the offer payment. It shows that though the estimate for the leverage deficit measure is 
negative (-0.4186), it is statistically insignificant in the first model (P-value 0.4443). This 
result suggests that in pure cash deals, the effect of the bidder’s capital structure is weaker 
and even null. But the estimates for the deficit status dummies are significantly different. 
The overleveraged dummy’s coefficient is 0.0232 and insignificant (P-value 0.8925). 
Consistently, the target-leveraged bidder presents a higher possibility of takeover success, 
even in pure cash deals, since its estimate is 0.3185 and significant at the 10% level. 
However, the estimate for the underleveraged dummy is negative (-0.3085) and 
statistically significant (P-value 0.0627). This finding is inconsistent with our statement 
that underleveraged bidders have advantages in pure cash takeovers. The evidence shows 
that the cash reserve of underleveraged bidders is the lowest, on average, compared to the 
other two groups. To contrast, target-leveraged bidders have much higher cash reserves. 
Another potential reason is that the profitability of target-leveraged bidders is much 
greater than that of underleveraged bidders, on average  
 
The results for the other control variables are also slightly different. The estimates for the 
market-to-book ratio become insignificant in all models. Similarly, neither of the 
variables for the log of the market value or the profitability ratio is statistically significant 
as before. These changes are consistent in all four regressions. On the other hand, in 
Panel A of Table 3.10, we find that the estimates for relative size and toehold size are both 
negative and statistically significant. In line with our prediction, the relative size of the 
target to that of the bidder should have a negative impact on takeover success. Contrary to 
our expectations, the variable for toehold size, which is supposed to increase with the 
probability of offer success, presents persistently negative and significant explanatory 
power in the logistic analysis. In contrast, the role of the control variables Managerial 
Resistance dummy, Tender Offer dummy, Unsolicited Deal dummy, and Competing Deal 
dummy do not change from the previous analysis. 
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Panel B of Table 3.10 presents the analysis results for deals using pure stock payments. 
Unlike pure cash deals, the estimate for the bidding firms’ leverage deficit is negative 
(-0.8919) and statistically significant (P-value 0.0549). Although the negative effects are 
slightly weaker compared to the whole-sample results, bidding firm financial leverage 
still plays a remarkably negative role in takeover success for pure stock payment deals. 
The estimates for the status dummies are insignificant for both overleveraged and 
target-leveraged bidders but positive (0.2789) and statistically significant (P-value 0.0804) 
for underleveraged bidders. This result shows that the effect of underleverage in pure 
stock deals is opposite to that in pure cash deals. 
 
In general, the performance of the control variables is close to that in the whole-sample 
analysis. The variables that proxy for bidder firm size and growth opportunity are both 
positively related to the probability of takeover success. On the other hand, competing 
and unsolicited deals has strongly negative effects on final outcome. Our analysis also 
finds that the other control variables do not have significant explanatory power for the 
successful completion of pure stock deals. 
 
Panel C of Table 3.10 shows the empirical findings for M&A offers using mixed 
payments. Similar to the results of the full sample, the coefficient of the bidder’s leverage 
deficit is negative (-1.4467) and highly significant at the 1% confidence level. In 
particular, the effect of bidder financial leverage is the strongest in mixed payment deals 
rather than in deals using other payment media. Furthermore, the performance of leverage 
deficit dummies is also close to that in the full-sample results, but slightly stronger. 
Overleveraged bidders present a much lower probability of success, while 
target-leveraged bidders have a significantly higher probability of success. Two control 
variables, the profitability ratio and the tender offer dummy, become positive and 
significant estimates in the regressions, but the effect of the tender offer dummy is 
marginal (P-value 0.0854). On the contrary, the relative size variable, the managerial 
resistance dummy, the unsolicited deal dummy, and the competing deal dummy all have 
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strongly negative and statistically significant explanatory power for the dependent 
variables in the regression. The estimates for the remaining control variables in Panel C 
are insignificant in the regression results. 
 
3.4.5 Bid premium analysis 
Since we investigate the relation between a bidding firm’s financial leverage and its 
possibility of success in a takeover through different model constructions and subsamples, 
we now explore a potential explanation for the inverse relation of financial leverage with 
the successful completion of M&A deals. In accordance with the theoretical model of 
Morellec and Zhdanov (2008), we generally believe that a bidding firm’s financial 
leverage has a strong impact on the offer premium and consequently influences M&A 
offer success. Therefore, the regression models are constructed so that the bid premium is 
regressed on leverage measures and a group of control variables. To construct the bid 
premium variables, we divide the offer price to target shareholders by the target share 
price four weeks prior to the takeover announcement date. Following previous premium 
study, the bid premium variable is truncated between zero and 200% (Officer, 2003). Our 
control variables include both bidder and M&A deal characteristics. Similar to previous 
logistic analysis, the yearly effects on each regression model are controlled for by a group 
of yearly dummy variables. Following is the regression model: 
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                                     (3.5) 
 
Table 3.11 reports the empirical results for the full sample. Due to the data availability of 
variable bid premiums, the number of observations is 2548, which is much lower than in 
the previous part of the analysis. The reason is that we are able to obtain bid premium 
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data only for deals acquiring public targets. Deals acquiring private or subsidiary targets 
failed to provide bid premium information in the SDC M&A database. 
 
When bidder capital structure is measured by financial deficit, the estimate is negative 
(-8.8835) but marginally insignificant (P-value 0.1749). However, the effect of leverage 
deficit on bid premiums becomes clearer when it is measured by status dummies. 
Specifically, the estimate for the overleveraged bidder dummy is -4.5503 and statistically 
significant at the 1% confidence level. But the estimate for the underleveraged bidder 
dummy is statistically insignificant (P-value 0.8334). On the other hand, the estimate for 
target-leveraged bidders becomes positive (4.8214) and significant (P-value 0.0157). 
Consistent with our prediction, the empirical evidence implies that overleveraged bidders 
pay 4.55% lower bid premiums on average, which may induce them to fail in M&As, 
while target-leveraged bidders pay, on average, 4.82% higher premiums. These findings 
are in line with the negative influence of bidder capital structure on the probability of 
takeover success in the above discussions. Therefore, we conclude that the relation 
between bid premiums and bidder financial leverage is a reliable explanation for our main 
argument. 
 
The bid premiums are also affected by several control variables. Regarding firm 
characteristics, as we predicted, the estimates for the variable market-to-book ratio are 
consistently positive and significant in all four models. This finding suggests that bidders 
with higher growth opportunities will pay higher premiums. In contrast, the estimates for 
firm size are all negative, over -2, and significant at the 1% confidence level. Large 
bidders will pay lower premiums, since they already have other advantages in M&As. 
The effects of bidder profitability and the relative size between the target and bidder are 
insignificant in our regressions. In relation to deal characteristics, although the 
coefficients of both managerial resistance and unsolicited deal dummies are positive, their 
explanatory powers are insignificant. The estimates for toehold size are negative and 
significant. The potential reason may be the same as for firm size: Bidders with large 
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initial shareholdings believe they already have sufficient advantages to complete the deal 
and therefore do not have an incentive to pay higher premiums. Consistent with our 
prediction, the evidence suggests that bid premiums increase remarkably for a tender 
offer strategy and competing bids. Their estimates are highly positive and statistically 
significant. 
 
As the previous section shows, the relation between bidder financial leverage and 
takeover success varies with different payment media. Therefore, we further investigate 
the relation between bid premium and bidder capital structure for different payment 
media. Table 3.12 reports the results based on leverage deficit. In the analysis using the 
pure cash subsample, the result is significantly different from that for the full sample. The 
estimate of the leverage deficit is -4.2221 and statistically insignificant (P-value 0.6809), 
which indicates that the relation between bidder capital structure and bid premiums in 
pure cash deals is insignificant. This finding is in line with previous results, where bidder 
financial leverage has no impact on takeover success in pure cash deals. Moreover, the 
effects of the bidder’s market-to-book ratio and firm size also turn out to be insignificant 
in pure cash deals. However, unlike the full-sample results, the estimate for the bidder’s 
profitability ratio is highly positive (27.728) and statistically significant (P-value 0.0764). 
This change implies that profitable bidders have a strong incentive and ability to pay 
higher premiums to acquire their targets. The performance of the toehold size variable, 
the tender offer dummy, the unsolicited deal dummy, and the competing deal dummy are 
the same as in the full-sample results. 
 
The empirical results of pure stock deals are distinctly different. The estimate for the 
leverage deficit is -27.723 and significant at the 5% confidence level, which suggests that 
bidder capital structure affects the premiums paid to target shareholders strongly. This 
finding could explain our finding that bidders with higher financial deficit are less likely 
to successfully complete their M&A deals. Most of the control variables yield 
insignificant estimations in this model, except for the bidder’s market-to-book ratio and 
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firm size. Consistent with the whole-sample analysis, the bidder’s market-to-book ratio 
generally increases with bid premiums, while firm size decreases. 
 
For mixed payment deals, the bidder’s leverage deficit variable displays very weak 
explanatory power in the regression model (P-value 0.9161). This finding is inconsistent 
with our prediction, since empirical evidence already proves that the bidder’s leverage 
deficit is negatively related to the probability of success in deals using mixed payments. It 
is therefore necessary to further explore the potential explanation for this result. 
 
In conclusion, the empirical evidence suggests a significant relation between bidder 
capital structure and bid premiums to target shareholders. The bidder’s leverage deficit 
level has a significantly negative impact on its offer premiums. Especially in M&A deals 
with pure stock payments, overleveraged bidders pay remarkably lower bid premiums. In 
conjunction with our previous findings, we believe this could be a reliable explanation for 
the negative relation between bidder financial leverage and the probability of success in 
M&A offers. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter analyses the relation between bidding firms capital structure and the 
outcome of takeover deals based on a sample of 19,203 US M&A offers during 
1980–2009. Adopting a measure of the financial leverage (Leverage Deficit) and three 
leverage status dummies (Overleveraged Bidder Dummy, Target-leveraged Bidder 
Dummy and Underleveraged Bidder Dummy), we choose both a Tobit regression model 
and a logistic regression model for analysis. We find strong and consistent evidence that a 
bidder’s financial leverage is negatively correlated with the probability of success in 
M&A offers. We also identify several determinant factors that also provide explanatory 
power for takeover success. This finding suggests that the probability of offer success 
significantly increases with a bidder’s firm size, growth opportunity, profitability, and 
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adoption of a tender offer strategy. On the other hand, bidding firms are less likely to 
successfully complete their deals in the presence of managerial resistance and competing 
bids. If bidders choose to propose unsolicited M&A offers with pure stock swap 
payments, the possibilities of successful completion are also dramatically reduced. By 
including the interaction variable that is the leverage measure multiplied by the 
competing deal dummy in the analysis, we suggest that the negative impact of the bidding 
firm’s capital structure is neither enhanced nor weakened in takeover deals in the 
presence of competing bidders. 
 
We further explore the relation between bidder financial leverage and takeovers in three 
subsamples categorized by different payment media in M&A deals: pure cash payments, 
pure stock payments, and mixed payments. The empirical evidence suggests that the 
effects of bidder capital structure are distinctly different for each subsample. It shows that 
the negative impact from a bidder’s financial leverage level still holds in deals with pure 
stock payments or mixed payments. However, it becomes statistically insignificant in 
deals with pure cash payments, since all three financial leverage measures yield 
insignificant estimates in the analysis. 
 
To investigate the rationale behind this inverse relation, the offer premiums proposed by 
bidding firms are regressed on their financial leverage measures and a group of control 
variables. The empirical results show that leverage deficit has a negative impact on bid 
premiums, although its estimate is statistically insignificant. However, when bidding 
firms are classified by their leverage deficit levels, the results are more explicit. They 
show that the overleveraged bidder dummy presents strong and negative explanatory 
power for bid premiums, while the underleveraged bidder dummy has an insignificant 
estimate. Target-leveraged bidders significantly improve their premiums. These findings 
indicate that the negative relation between leverage deficit and bid premiums is mainly 
driven by overleveraged and target-leveraged bidders rather than by underleveraged 
bidders. Furthermore, the results also suggest that the bid premiums significantly decrease 
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with bidder firm size and toehold size. In contrast, bidders with good growth 
opportunities are willing to pay more premiums to target shareholders in M&A deals with 
tender offers. The existence of competing bids also encourages increases in bid 
premiums. 
 
This chapter’s main contribution is that it provides comprehensive empirical evidence for 
the relation between bidder capital structure and the probability of success in M&A offers. 
Our findings further strengthen the importance of capital structure in M&A research. This 
chapter also provides reliable explanations for the main argument, which is related to bid 
premiums. However, evidence about deals using mixed payments is still inconclusive and 
requires further study. 
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Table 3.1 Sample Selection 
This table presents the sample selection process for research. The Merger & Acquisition data is from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) M&A Database. The 
accounting data is from COMPUSTAT Database. The stock price data is from CRSP database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selection Criteria Size 
Acquirer Nation United States of America 268174 
Date Announced 01/01/1980 to 12/31/2009 243694 
Acquirer Public Status Public 132412 
Deal Value Larger than $1 Million 70780 
Deal Status Completed or Withdraw 52266 
Firm Industry Exclude Finance and Utility Firms 37388 
Deal Type Exclude Other M&A 33319 
Accounting and Share Price Data Availability Exclude Unmatched Deals 19203 
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Table 3.2 Yearly M&A Deals 
This table presents a sample of deals with US Bidders in each year from 1980 to 2009. The number of M&A deals includes both successful and fail deals, 
but excludes pending deals. As the sample includes both US target and Non-US target, this table presents the numbers of domestic deals and foreign deals 
separately. It also reports the sum, mean and median of deal value for all deals. If a deal is paid by 100% cash, it is considered to be pure cash deal, and 
same way for pure stock deal. The percent of pure cash is the percentage of pure cash deals divided by total number of deals in each year, same for percent 
of pure stock deal. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 – Continued from Previous Page 
Year Deal Number Success Deal Fail Deal Domestic Deal Foreign Deal Sum Deal Value Mean Deal Value Median Deal Value Percent of Pure Cash Percent of Pure Stock 
1980 22 20 2 22 0 6909.48 314.07 169.77 13.64 4.55 
1981 125 107 18 125 0 45309.22 362.47 37.50 4.80 2.40 
1982 161 138 23 161 0 15660.78 97.27 15.50 0.00 0.00 
1983 213 194 19 213 0 12810.17 60.14 13.10 0.94 0.00 
1984 239 221 18 236 3 30253.77 126.58 15.00 4.18 0.42 
1985 100 92 8 95 5 24434.07 244.34 50.50 40.00 15.00 
1986 166 148 18 156 10 32728.07 197.16 46.09 27.71 15.06 
1987 138 124 14 124 14 27522.87 199.44 46.00 34.78 10.14 
1988 187 155 32 170 17 49773.05 266.17 50.00 35.29 8.02 
1989 350 313 37 294 56 70546.64 201.56 24.50 28.00 12.57 
1990 358 333 25 307 51 32864.10 91.80 13.00 23.74 14.81 
1991 404 368 36 346 58 22428.51 55.52 12.50 21.29 18.32 
1992 515 482 33 436 79 31123.77 60.43 11.50 20.00 18.45 
1993 628 587 41 558 70 53141.85 84.62 14.69 22.61 19.75 
1994 831 773 58 718 113 84282.45 101.42 15.09 24.07 17.21 
1995 962 894 68 814 148 125696.8 130.66 18.88 21.73 22.56 
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Table 3.2 – Continued from Previous Page 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Deal Number Success Deal Fail Deal Domestic Deal Foreign Deal Sum Deal Value Mean Deal Value Median Deal Value Percent of Pure Cash Percent of Pure Stock 
1996 1144 1086 58 972 172 201272.4 175.94 23.13 20.54% 21.77% 
1997 1449 1373 76 1219 230 260104.2 179.51 20.64 21.05% 17.39% 
1998 1436 1378 58 1174 262 327613.9 228.14 24.00 22.49% 16.64% 
1999 1222 1171 51 991 231 315376.9 258.08 28.95 25.21% 17.10% 
2000 995 945 50 806 189 330284.6 331.94 36.00 25.53% 19.79% 
2001 884 844 40 719 165 230741.8 261.02 33.92 27.04% 16.74% 
2002 813 786 27 667 146 101255.3 124.55 30.00 36.53% 8.12% 
2003 797 769 28 657 140 103506.1 129.87 32.00 33.88% 8.03% 
2004 940 913 27 739 201 307591.9 327.23 39.02 38.94% 6.28% 
2005 933 915 18 730 203 357368.6 383.03 36.53 41.81% 5.04% 
2006 977 946 31 773 204 474877.8 486.06 44.00 43.91% 4.40% 
2007 941 915 26 740 201 348094.8 369.92 45.00 44.42% 2.66% 
2008 729 688 41 574 155 268138.9 367.82 42.00 42.11% 3.98% 
2009 544 526 18 410 134 322701.7 593.20 40.00 38.05% 6.62% 
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Table 3.3 Year Target Type 
This table presents different types of target in each year, including the number of public 
target, private target and subsidiaries. We further present the percentage of each type over 
total number of deals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Deal 
Number 
Public 
Target 
Private 
Target 
Subsidiary 
Target 
Percent of 
Public 
Percent of 
Private 
Percent of 
Subsidiary 
1980 22 7 11 4 31.82% 50.00% 18.18% 
1981 125 42 61 22 33.60% 48.80% 17.60% 
1982 161 44 78 38 27.33% 48.45% 23.60% 
1983 213 36 109 67 16.90% 51.17% 31.46% 
1984 239 52 99 88 21.76% 41.42% 36.82% 
1985 100 48 17 35 48.00% 17.00% 35.00% 
1986 166 53 52 61 31.93% 31.33% 36.75% 
1987 138 60 28 50 43.48% 20.29% 36.23% 
1988 187 83 40 61 44.39% 21.39% 32.62% 
1989 350 99 105 143 28.29% 30.00% 40.86% 
1990 358 75 129 150 20.95% 36.03% 41.90% 
1991 404 80 165 154 19.80% 40.84% 38.12% 
1992 515 81 230 198 15.73% 44.66% 38.45% 
1993 628 100 270 254 15.92% 42.99% 40.45% 
1994 831 158 370 291 19.01% 44.52% 35.02% 
1995 962 218 451 286 22.66% 46.88% 29.73% 
1996 1144 215 551 371 18.79% 48.16% 32.43% 
1997 1449 248 749 438 17.12% 51.69% 30.23% 
1998 1436 273 743 410 19.01% 51.74% 28.55% 
1999 1222 255 593 366 20.87% 48.53% 29.95% 
2000 995 207 480 296 20.81% 48.24% 29.75% 
2001 884 195 362 314 22.06% 40.95% 35.52% 
2002 813 117 380 309 14.39% 46.74% 38.01% 
2003 797 131 367 290 16.44% 46.05% 36.39% 
2004 940 130 509 297 13.83% 54.15% 31.59% 
2005 933 134 478 309 14.36% 51.23% 33.12% 
2006 977 153 506 311 15.66% 51.79% 31.83% 
2007 941 127 514 296 13.50% 54.62% 31.46% 
2008 729 124 371 225 17.01% 50.89% 30.86% 
2009 544 107 247 184 19.67% 45.41% 33.82% 
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Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics for Acquirers 
This table presents firm characteristics for bidders from 1980 to 2009. It includes the results for the full sample and two subsamples which are classified 
by deal status, successful or failed. It reports the number of observation, mean and median value for each variable. The variable Market Value is the 
bidder’s market value of total assets. The Sales is the total sales of given year. The Market-to-Book ratio is the market value divided by the book value of 
total assets. R&D/TA represents expenses in research and development (R&D) over total assets. EBITDA/TA is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over total assets. Tangible Asset/TA is defined as the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment over total assets. 
Interest Coverage is the ratio of EBITDA over yearly interest expense. Cash/AT is the ratio of cash reserves over total assets. Market Leverage is the ratio 
of book debt to market value of assets. This table also presents the results of T-test and Wilcoxon test for the mean and median value of differences. The 
numbers followed by ***, **, * if it is significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Firm Characteristics 
Variable Full Sample Successful Deal Failed Deal Difference (Success - Failed) 
 
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median Mean Median T-test Wilcoxon Test 
Market Value 19203 7943.5 691.26 18204 8108.7 699.79 999 4933.7 513.07 3175.1*** 186.72*** 0.0001 0.0038 
Sales 19203 3299.3 325.50 18204 3339.2 328.28 999 2570.5 272.68 768.80*** 55.600*** 0.0057 0.0021 
Market to Book Ratio 19203 2.9048 2.3624 18204 2.9223 2.3755 999 2.5869 2.1351 0.3353*** 0.2404*** 0.0001 0.0001 
R&D/TA 19203 0.0383 0.0007 18204 0.0386 0.0012 999 0.0322 0.0000 0.0064** 0.0012*** 0.0158 0.0010 
EBITDA/TA 19203 0.1187 0.1340 18204 0.1199 0.1346 999 0.0948 0.1229 0.0251*** 0.0117*** 0.0002 0.0002 
Tangible Asset/AT 19203 0.2689 0.1967 18204 0.2666 0.1942 999 0.3116 0.2485 -0.0450*** -0.0543*** 0.0001 0.0001 
Interest Coverage 16943 77.002 8.0597 16027 80.099 8.2311 916 22.797 5.9409 57.303*** 2.2902*** 0.0001 0.0001 
Selling Expense/Sales 19203 0.3304 0.2176 18204 0.3283 0.2185 999 0.3692 0.1952 -0.0409 0.0233*** 0.4076 0.0025 
Cash/AT 19203 0.1154 0.0588 18204 0.1163 0.0597 999 0.1001 0.0469 0.0163*** 0.0128*** 0.0003 0.0001 
Market Leverage 19203 0.2897 0.2581 18204 0.2863 0.2549 999 0.3517 0.3294 -0.0654*** -0.0745*** 0.0001 0.0001 
Leverage Deficit 19203 -0.0014 -0.0169 18204 -0.003 -0.0181 999 0.0289 0.0114 -0.0319*** -0.0295*** 0.0001 0.0006 
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Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics for Deal 
This table presents deal characteristics from 1980 to 2009. It includes the results for the full sample and two subsamples which are classified by deal status, 
successful or failed. It reports the number of observation, mean and median value for each variable. The variable Deal value is the value recorded in SDC 
Database. Relative Size is the total value of target over acquirers. Toehold Size is the percentage of common shares held by the acquirers before takeover. 
Hostile Deal is the percentage of hostile takeovers in each sample. Tender Offer is the percentage of acquirers using tender offers. Pure Cash is the 
percentage of deals paid 100% by cash. Pure Stock is the percentage of deals paid 100% by stock. Unsolicited Deal is the percentage of deals where 
acquirers make the offer without prior negotiations. Poison Pill is the percentage of targets using poison pill defences. Competing Deal is the percentage of 
deals in which more than one bidder is involved in a target. This table also presents the results of T-test and Wilcoxon test for the mean and median value 
of differences. The numbers followed by ***, **, * if it is significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Deal Characteristics 
Variable Full Sample Successful Deal Failed Deal Difference (Success - Failed) 
 
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median Mean Median T-test Wilcoxon Test 
Deal Value 19203 240.29 27.000 18204 214.56 25.5 999 709.22 70.62 -494.66*** -45.12*** 0.0001 0.0001 
Relative Size 19203 0.1766 0.0471 18204 0.1583 0.0443 999 0.5098 0.1941 -0.3515*** -0.1498*** 0.0001 0.0001 
Toehold Size 630 25.70% 20.00% 548 27.27% 21.73% 82 15.15% 9.12% 12.12%*** 12.61%*** 0.0001 0.0001 
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Mean T-test 
Hostile Deal 172 0.90% 67 0.37% 105 10.51% -10.14%*** 0.0001 
Tender Offer 916 4.77% 802 4.41% 114 11.41% -7.01%*** 0.0001 
Pure Cash 5492 28.60% 5258 28.88% 234 23.42% 5.46%*** 0.0001 
Pure Stock 2487 12.95% 2235 12.28% 252 25.23% -12.95%*** 0.0001 
Unsolicited Deal 257 1.34% 93 0.51% 164 16.42% -15.91%*** 0.0001 
Poison Pill 56 0.29% 22 0.12% 34 3.40% -3.28%*** 0.0001 
Compete Deal 362 1.89% 177 0.97% 185 18.52% -17.55%*** 0.0001 
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Table 3.6 Tobit Model for Target Leverage Estimation 
This table presents the Tobit estimates of target leverage ratio for each bidder. The dependent variable is the market leverage ratio of bidder. The 
independent variable Log of Sales is the natural logarithm of firm’s total sales. The EBITDA/TA is EBITDA over total assets. Tangible Asset/TA is defined 
as the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment over total assets. R&D/TA is the ratio of R&D expense over total assets. R&D Miss Dummy is the 
dummy variable of firm which has no R&D expense in database. Selling Expense/Sales is the ratio of selling expense over total sales. Market to Book 
ratio is the ratio of market value over book value of total assets. Cash/TA is the ratio of cash reserves over total assets. Market Median Leverage is the 
median value of all firms’ market leverage in market in a given year. The numbers followed by ***, **, * if it is significantly different from zero with 1%, 
5%, 10% confidence level. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9/ / / / /MarketLeverage Sale EBITDA TA Tangible TA RD TA RDMiss SE Sale MtB Cash TA MML                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market Leverage 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value 
Intercept 0.2317*** 0.0227 0.0001 
Log of Sales 0.0181*** 0.0006 0.0001 
EBITDA/TA -0.3495*** 0.0091 0.0001 
Tangible Asset/TA 0.0759*** 0.0071 0.0001 
R&D/TA -0.1819*** 0.0197 0.0001 
R&D Miss Dummy 0.0465*** 0.0033 0.0001 
Selling Expense/Sales -0.0079*** 0.0010 0.0001 
Market to Book Ratio -0.0326*** 0.0006 0.0001 
Cash/TA -0.2473*** 0.0090 0.0001 
Market Median Leverage 0.3707*** 0.0192 0.0001 
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Table 3.7 Descriptive Statistics for Leverage Deficit Trisections 
This table shows the mean and median value of variables for each trisection of the full sample grouped by leverage deficit. The results of T-test and 
Wilcoxon test for the difference of mean and median value between Q1 and Q3 are also presented. The variable Leverage Deficit is the deviation of firm’s 
actual leverage from its target leverage level. The variable Market Value is the bidder’s market value of total assets. The Sales is the total sales of given 
year. The Market-to-Book ratio is the market value divided by the book value of total assets. R&D/TA represents expenses in research and development 
(R&D) over total assets. EBITDA/TA is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over total assets. Tangible 
Asset/TA is defined as the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment over total assets. Interest Coverage is the ratio of EBITDA over yearly interest 
expense. Cash/AT is the ratio of cash reserves over total assets. Deal value is the value recorded in SDC Database. Relative Size is the total value of target 
over acquirers. Toehold Size is the percentage of common shares held by the acquirers before takeover. Hostile Deal is the percentage of hostile takeovers 
in each sample. Tender Offer is the percentage of acquirers using tender offers. Pure Cash is the percentage of deals paid 100% by cash. Pure Stock is the 
percentage of deals paid 100% by stock. Unsolicited Deal is the percentage of deals where acquirers make the offer without prior negotiations. Poison Pill 
is the percentage of targets using poison pill defences. Competing Deal is the percentage of deals in which more than one bidder is involved in a target. 
The numbers followed by ***, **, * if it is significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. 
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Table 3.7 – Continued from Previous Page 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Difference (Q1-Q3) 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median T-test Wilcoxon Test 
Leverage Deficit -0.1501 -0.1377 -0.0165 -0.0169 0.1626 0.1301 -0.3127*** -0.2678*** 0.0001 0.0001 
Market Value 8638.6 645.68 8490.6 910.94 6701.5 578.96 1937.1*** 66.720** 0.0023 0.0174 
Sales 3219.8 265.81 3502.7 383.11 3175.3 348.57 44.500 -82.760*** 0.8535 0.0001 
Market to Book Ratio 2.6974 2.4301 3.3139 2.7385 2.7032 1.9044 -0.0058 0.5257*** 0.8571 0.0001 
R&D/TA 0.0338 0.0000 0.0467 0.0147 0.0343 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0000 0.7016 0.1585 
EBITDA/TA 0.1106 0.1436 0.1370 0.1499 0.1084 0.1158 0.0022 0.0278*** 0.4195 0.0001 
Tangible Asset/AT 0.2771 0.2011 0.2514 0.1854 0.2782 0.2067 -0.0011 -0.0056 0.8034 0.3265 
Interest Coverage 135.31 14.604 85.956 9.9891 17.539 4.3784 117.77*** 10.226*** 0.0001 0.0001 
Selling Expense/Sales 0.3441 0.2243 0.3272 0.2417 0.3201 0.1896 0.0240 0.0347*** 0.2895 0.0001 
Cash/AT 0.1031 0.0635 0.1405 0.0761 0.1027 0.0450 0.0004 0.0185*** 0.8962 0.0001 
Deal Value 244.44 26.000 280.16 29.7 196.28 25.530 48.16* 0.47 0.0747 0.6395 
Relative Size 0.1705 0.0448 0.1342 0.0419 0.2251 0.0567 -0.0546* -0.0119*** 0.0957 0.0001 
Toehold Size 26.19% 20.77% 23.89% 16.66% 26.59% 20.00% -0.40% 0.77% 0.8351 0.6725 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean T-test 
Hostile Deal 0.58% 0.83% 1.28% -0.70%*** 0.0001 
Tender Offer 4.17% 4.75% 5.39% -1.22%*** 0.0012 
Pure Cash 29.11% 29.68% 27.01% 2.10%*** 0.0083 
Pure Stock 13.89% 13.75% 11.22% 2.67%*** 0.0001 
Unsolicited Deal 1.06% 1.078% 1.87% -0.81%*** 0.0001 
Compete Deal 1.69% 1.67% 2.30% -0.61%** 0.0137 
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Table 3.8 Logistic Model for Takeover Success 
This table presents the impact of determinant variables on the probability of success in M&A through Logistic analysis. The dependent variable is the 
dummy of deal status. It is set to 1 if the deal successfully complete, otherwise 0. The independent variable Leverage Deficit is the firm’s actual leverage 
minus its target leverage ratio. The Over-leveraged Dummy is the dummy variable for whether the bidder is over-leveraged. The Target-leveraged Dummy 
is the dummy variable for whether the bidder’s leverage is in line with its target leverage level. The Under-leveraged Dummy is the dummy variable for 
whether the bidder is under-leveraged. The Market-to-Book ratio is the market value divided by the book value of total assets. The Log of Market Value is 
the natural logarithm of bidder’s market value. The EBITDA/TA is EBITDA over total assets. Relative Size is the total value of target over acquirers. 
Managerial Resistance is the dummy variable whether the deal is hostile or not. Toehold Size is the percentage of common shares held by the acquirers 
before takeover. Poison Pill is the percentage of targets using poison pill defences. Tender Offer is the percentage of acquirers using tender offers. 
Unsolicited Deal is the percentage of deals where acquirers make the offer without prior negotiations. Stock Swap Dummy is the dummy variable that 
using pure stock payment. Competing Deal is the percentage of deals in which more than one bidder is involved in a target. The numbers followed by ***, 
**, * if it is significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. The following are the models: 
 
Model 1 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12( 1)P Success LeverageDeficit MtB LMV EBITDA RSize MR Toehold PoisonPill Tender Unsoli StockSwap Compete                           
Model 2 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12( 1)P Success OverLeverage MtB LMV EBITDA RSize MR Toehold PoisonPill Tender Unsoli StockSwap Compete                           
Model 3 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12( 1)P Success TarLeverage MtB LMV EBITDA RSize MR Toehold PoisonPill Tender Unsoli StockSwap Compete                           
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Table 3.8 – Continued from Previous Page 
Model 4
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12( 1)P Success UnderLeverage MtB LMV EBITDA RSize MR Toehold PoisonPill Tender Unsoli StockSwap Compete                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P (Success = 1) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept 3.0933*** 0.0001 3.1537*** 0.0001 2.9461*** 0.0001 2.9593*** 0.0001 
Leverage Deficit -1.1076*** 0.0001       
Over-leveraged Bidder Dummy   -0.3006*** 0.0001     
Target-leveraged Bidder Dummy     0.2462*** 0.0028   
Under-leveraged Bidder Dummy       0.0922 0.2306 
Market to Book Ratio 0.0633*** 0.0021 0.0612*** 0.0032 0.0615*** 0.0037 0.0697*** 0.0009 
Log of Market Value 0.0953*** 0.0001 0.0993*** 0.0001 0.1030*** 0.0001 0.1040*** 0.0001 
EBITDA/TA 0.9013*** 0.0001 0.8163*** 0.0001 0.7624*** 0.0002 0.8310*** 0.0001 
Relative Size -0.0129 0.2660 -0.0123 0.2871 -0.0127 0.2679 -0.0130 0.2611 
Managerial Resistance -1.6124*** 0.0001 -1.6206*** 0.0001 -1.6299*** 0.0001 -1.6180*** 0.0001 
Toehold Size -0.0092 0.1060 -0.0095* 0.0976 -0.0098* 0.0872 -0.0099* 0.0820 
Poison Pill Dummy -0.2383 0.5639 -0.2421 0.5571 -0.2377 0.5622 -0.2267 0.5798 
Tender Offer Dummy 0.6908*** 0.0001 0.6890*** 0.0001 0.6661*** 0.0002 0.6802*** 0.0002 
Unsolicited Deal Dummy -2.7024*** 0.0001 -2.6988*** 0.0001 -2.7035*** 0.0001 -2.7191*** 0.0001 
Stock Swap Dummy -0.9862*** 0.0001 -0.9851*** 0.0001 -0.9714*** 0.0001 -0.9682*** 0.0001 
Competing Deal Dummy -2.7693*** 0.0001 -2.76 2*** 0.0001 -2.7574*** 0.0001 -2.7676*** 0.0001 
Observations 19203 19203 19203 19203 
Pseudo R-Square 0.2227 0.2216 0.2205 0.2194 
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Table 3.9 Interaction Analysis 
This table presents the impact of determinant variables on the probability of success in M&A through Logistic analysis. The added variable in these 
models is the interaction variable between financial leverage measures and competing deal dummy. The independent variable Leverage Deficit is the 
firm’s actual leverage minus its target leverage ratio. The Over-leveraged Dummy is the dummy variable for whether the bidder is over-leveraged. The 
Target-leveraged Dummy is the dummy variable for whether the bidder’s leverage is in line with its target leverage level. The Under-leveraged Dummy is 
the dummy variable for whether the bidder is under-leveraged. The Market-to-Book ratio is the market value divided by the book value of total assets. The 
Log of Market Value is the natural logarithm of bidder’s market value. The EBITDA/TA is EBITDA over total assets. Relative Size is the total value of 
target over acquirers. Managerial Resistance is the dummy variable whether the deal is hostile or not. Toehold Size is the percentage of common shares 
held by the acquirers before takeover. Poison Pill is the percentage of targets using poison pill defences. Tender Offer is the percentage of acquirers using 
tender offers. Unsolicited Deal is the percentage of deals where acquirers make the offer without prior negotiations. Stock Swap Dummy is the dummy 
variable that using pure stock payment. Competing Deal is the percentage of deals in which more than one bidder is involved in a target. The numbers 
followed by ***, **, * if it is significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. The following are the models: 
 
Model 1 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13( 1) *P Success LeverageDeficit LD Compete MtB LMV EBITDA RSize MR Toehold PoisonPill Tender Unsoli StockSwap Compete                             
Model 2 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13( 1) *P Success OverLeverage OL Compete MtB LMV EBITDA RSize MR Toehold PoisonPill Tender Unsoli StockSwap Compete                             
Model 3 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13( 1) *P Success TarLeverage TL Compete MtB LMV EBITDA RSize MR Toehold PoisonPill Tender Unsoli StockSwap Compete                             
Model 4 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13( 1) *P Success UnderLeverage UL Compete MtB LMV EBITDA RSize MR Toehold PoisonPill Tender Unsoli StockSwap Compete                             
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Table 3.9 Continued from Previous Page 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P (Success = 1) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept 3.0967*** 0.0001 3.1555*** 0.0001 2.9430*** 0.0001 2.9539*** 0.0001 
Leverage Deficit -1.1653*** 0.0001       
Leverage Deficit * Compete Dummy 0.8678 0.3277       
Over-leveraged Bidder Dummy   -0.3028*** 0.0001     
OLBD * Compete Dummy   0.0295 0.9149     
Target-leveraged Bidder Dummy     0.2377*** 0.0055   
TLBD * Compete Dummy     0.1078 0.7214   
Under-leveraged Bidder Dummy       0.1019 0.2043 
ULBD * Compete Dummy       -0.1231 0.6672 
Market to Book Ratio 0.0630*** 0.0022 0.0612*** 0.0032 0.0616*** 0.0036 0.0698*** 0.0009 
Log of Market Value 0.0953*** 0.0001 0.0993*** 0.0001 0.1030*** 0.0001 0.1041*** 0.0001 
EBITDA/TA 0.9067*** 0.0001 0.8166*** 0.0001 0.7632*** 0.0002 0.8330*** 0.0001 
Relative Size -0.0129 0.2675 -0.0123 0.2874 -0.0127 0.2675 -0.0130 0.2618 
Managerial Resistance -1.6082*** 0.0001 -1.6195*** 0.0001 -1.6308*** 0.0001 -1.6146*** 0.0001 
Toehold Size -0.0093 0.1053 -0.0095* 0.0975 -0.0097* 0.0879 -0.0099* 0.0822 
Poison Pill Dummy -0.2493 0.5455 -0.2434 0.5551 -0.2363 0.5645 -0.2303 0.5734 
Tender Offer Dummy 0.6905*** 0.0001 0.6887*** 0.0001 0.6643*** 0.0002 0.6772*** 0.0002 
Unsolicited Deal Dummy -2.7019*** 0.0001 -2.6988*** 0.0001 -2.7045*** 0.0001 -2.7202*** 0.0001 
Stock Swap Dummy -0.9886*** 0.0001 -0.9853*** 0.0001 -0.9716*** 0.0001 -0.9691*** 0.0001 
Competing Deal Dummy -2.7779*** 0.0001 -2.7728*** 0.0001 -2.7865*** 0.0001 -2.7265*** 0.0001 
Observations 19203 19203 19203 19203 
Pseudo R-Square 0.2228 0.2216 0.2206 0.2195 
 
104 
 
Table 3.10 Payment Analysis 
This table presents the effects of determinant variables on takeover success based on different mediums of payment. Panel A shows the results of the Pure 
Cash sample, Panel B shows the Pure Stock sample, and Panel C shows the Mixed sample. The independent variable Leverage Deficit is the firm’s actual 
leverage minus its target leverage ratio. The Over-leveraged Dummy is the dummy variable for whether the bidder is over-leveraged. The Target-leveraged 
Dummy is the dummy variable for whether the bidder’s leverage is in line with its target leverage level. The Under-leveraged Dummy is the dummy 
variable for whether the bidder is under-leveraged. The Market-to-Book ratio is the market value divided by the book value of total assets. The Log of 
Market Value is the natural logarithm of bidder’s market value. The EBITDA/TA is EBITDA over total assets. Relative Size is the total value of target 
over acquirers. Managerial Resistance is the dummy variable whether the deal is hostile or not. Toehold Size is the percentage of common shares held by 
the acquirers before takeover. Poison Pill is the percentage of targets using poison pill defences. Tender Offer is the percentage of acquirers using tender 
offers. Unsolicited Deal is the percentage of deals where acquirers make the offer without prior negotiations. Competing Deal is the percentage of deals in 
which more than one bidder is involved in a target. The numbers followed by ***, **, * if it is significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% 
confidence level. The following are the models: 
Model 1 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11( 1)P Success LeverageDeficit MtB LMV EBITDA RSize MR Toehold PoisonPill Tender Unsoli Compete                           
Model 2 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11( 1)P Success OverLeverage MtB LMV EBITDA RSize MR Toehold PoisonPill Tender Unsoli Compete                           
Model 3 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11( 1)P Success TarLeverage MtB LMV EBITDA RSize MR Toehold PoisonPill Tender Unsoli Compete                           
Model 4 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11( 1)P Success UnderLeverage MtB LMV EBITDA RSize MR Toehold PoisonPill Tender Unsoli Compete                           
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Table 3.10 Continued from Previous Page 
Panel A Payment = Pure Cash 
 
P (Success = 1) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept 3.5098*** 0.0001 3.4781*** 0.0001 3.4633*** 0.0001 3.6309*** 0.0001 
Leverage Deficit -0.4186 0.4443       
Over-leveraged Bidder Dummy   0.0232 0.8925     
Target-leveraged Bidder Dummy     0.3185* 0.0790   
Under-leveraged Bidder Dummy       -0.3085* 0.0627 
Market to Book Ratio 0.0304 0.5454 0.0294 0.5617 0.0226 0.6553 0.0245 0.6323 
Log of Market Value 0.0607 0.1802 0.0636 0.1604 0.0605 0.1813 0.0648 0.1533 
EBITDA/TA -0.9494 0.2938 -0.8434 0.3421 -0.9909 0.2664 -0.7904 0.3600 
Relative Size -0.2270*** 0.0086 -0.2266*** 0.0089 -0.2242*** 0.0092 -0.2242*** 0.0094 
Managerial Resistance -1.1615*** 0.0075 -1.1578*** 0.0076 -1.1729*** 0.0066 -1.1644*** 0.0071 
Toehold Size -0.0201** 0.0304 -0.0204** 0.0280 -0.0203** 0.0290 -0.0208** 0.0259 
Poison Pill Dummy -0.8930 0.1302 -0.8895 0.1307 -0.8951 0.1272 -0.8819 0.1323 
Tender Offer Dummy 0.9369*** 0.0016 0.9402*** 0.0015 0.9030*** 0.0022 0.9192*** 0.0019 
Unsolicited Deal Dummy -2.8535*** 0.0001 -2.8804*** 0.0001 -2.8455*** 0.0001 2.9094*** 0.0001 
Competing Deal Dummy -3.0934*** 0.0001 -3.0931*** 0.0001 -3.0801*** 0.0001 -3.0910*** 0.0001 
Observations 5492 5492 5492 5492 
Pseudo R-Square 0.3274 0.3271 0.3288 0.3290 
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Table 3.10 Continued from Previous Page 
Panel B Payment = Pure Stock 
 
P (Success = 1) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept 1.5119* 0.0568 1.5081* 0.0574 1.3266* 0.0927 1.3240* 0.0935 
Leverage Deficit -0.8919* 0.0549       
Over-leveraged Bidder Dummy   -0.2424 0.1177     
Target-leveraged Bidder Dummy     -0.0372 0.8158   
Under-leveraged Bidder Dummy       0.2789* 0.0804 
Market to Book Ratio 0.1863*** 0.0001 0.1843*** 0.0001 0.1903*** 0.0001 0.1927*** 0.0001 
Log of Market Value 0.2262*** 0.0001 0.2319*** 0.0001 0.2398*** 0.0001 0.2308*** 0.0001 
EBITDA/TA 0.4316 0.1869 0.3311 0.2951 0.2744 0.3854 0.3949 0.2210 
Relative Size 0.0066 0.6501 0.0069 0.6311 0.0062 0.6678 0.0066 0.6473 
Managerial Resistance -1.5669 0.1031 -1.6010* 0.0966 -1.6389* 0.0879 -1.5887* 0.0964 
Toehold Size -0.0138 0.2095 -0.0137 0.2138 -0.0142 0.1971 -0.0145 0.1883 
Poison Pill Dummy 0.0524 0.9872 0.1474 0.9632 0.1383 0.9636 0.0611 0.9846 
Tender Offer Dummy 0.6819 0.1923 0.6824 0.1933 0.6273 0.2328 0.6557 0.2119 
Unsolicited Deal Dummy -3.7976*** 0.0001 -3.7940*** 0.0001 -3.8102*** 0.0001 -3.8040*** 0.0001 
Competing Deal Dummy -3.0166*** 0.0001 -3.0058*** 0.0001 -3.0178*** 0.0001 -3.0368*** 0.0001 
Observations 2487 2487 2487 2487 
Pseudo R-Square 0.2002 0.1992 0.1974 0.1998 
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Table 3.10 Continued from Previous Page 
Panel C Payment = Mixed 
 
P (Success = 1) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept 3.6813*** 0.0001 3.7785*** 0.0001 3.4807*** 0.0001 3.4914*** 0.0001 
Leverage Deficit -1.4467*** 0.0001       
Over-leveraged Bidder Dummy   -0.4229*** 0.0001     
Target-leveraged Bidder Dummy     0.3403*** 0.0034   
Under-leveraged Bidder Dummy       0.1613 0.1365 
Market to Book Ratio 0.0052 0.8544 0.0031 0.9130 0.0042 0.8856 0.010 0.6052 
Log of Market Value 0.0183 0.4915 0.0219 0.4096 0.0260 0.3276 0.0286 0.2815 
EBITDA/TA 1.2959*** 0.0001 1.1988*** 0.0001 1.1645*** 0.0001 1.2357*** 0.0001 
Relative Size -0.1590*** 0.0012 -0.1550*** 0.0017 -0.1524*** 0.0021 -0.1545*** 0.0016 
Managerial Resistance -2.0473*** 0.0001 -2.0412*** 0.0001 -2.0508*** 0.0001 -2.0341*** 0.0001 
Toehold Size 0.0052 0.5990 0.0050 0.6118 0.0045 0.6480 0.0044 0.6510 
Poison Pill Dummy 0.0110 0.9866 -0.0107 0.9869 -0.0092 0.9887 -0.0018 0.9978 
Tender Offer Dummy 0.4551* 0.0854 0.4591* 0.0840 0.4098 0.1215 0.4139 0.1173 
Unsolicited Deal Dummy -2.8883*** 0.0001 -2.8810*** 0.0001 -2.8504*** 0.0001 -2.8660*** 0.0001 
Competing Deal Dummy -2.5723*** 0.0001 -2.5679*** 0.0001 -2.5700*** 0.0001 -2.5700*** 0.0001 
Observations 11224 11224 11224 11224 
Pseudo R-Square 0.2035 0.2021 0.1999 0.1980 
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Table 3.11 Bid Premium Analysis 
This table presents the analysis of premium determinants. The dependent variable is the premium of the offer price to target stock price four weeks prior to 
the takeover announcement date. The independent variable Leverage Deficit is the firm’s actual leverage minus its target leverage ratio. The 
Over-leveraged Dummy is the dummy variable for whether the bidder is over-leveraged. The Target-leveraged Dummy is the dummy variable for whether 
the bidder’s leverage is in line with its target leverage level. The Under-leveraged Dummy is the dummy variable for whether the bidder is 
under-leveraged. The Market-to-Book ratio is the market value divided by the book value of total assets. The Log of Market Value is the natural logarithm 
of bidder’s market value. The EBITDA/TA is EBITDA over total assets. Relative Size is the total value of target over acquirers. Managerial Resistance is 
the dummy variable whether the deal is hostile or not. Toehold Size is the percentage of common shares held by the acquirers before takeover. Tender 
Offer is the percentage of acquirers using tender offers. Unsolicited Deal is the percentage of deals where acquirers make the offer without prior 
negotiations. Competing Deal is the percentage of deals in which more than one bidder is involved in a target. The numbers followed by ***, **, * if it is 
significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. The following are the models: 
Model 1 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 104WPREMIUM LeverageDeficit MtB LMV EBITDA RSize MR Toehold Tender Unsoli Compete                      
Model 2 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 104WPREMIUM OverLeverage MtB LMV EBITDA RSize MR Toehold Tender Unsoli Compete                        
Model 3 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 104WPREMIUM TarLeverage MtB LMV EBITDA RSize MR Toehold Tender Unsoli Compete                        
Model 4 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 104WPREMIUM UnderLeverage MtB LMV EBITDA RSize MR Toehold Tender Unsoli Compete                        
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Table 3.11 Continued from Previous Page 
 
Bid Premium 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept 52.434*** 0.0001 54.337*** 0.0001 51.388*** 0.0001 52.189*** 0.0001 
Leverage Deficit -8.8835 0.1749       
Over-leveraged Bidder Dummy   -4.5503** 0.0249     
Target-leveraged Bidder Dummy     4.8214** 0.0157   
Under-leveraged Bidder Dummy       -0.4236 0.8334 
 
        
Market to Book Ratio 1.6579*** 0.0009 1.6456*** 0.0010 1.4914*** 0.0029 1.6013*** 0.0014 
Log of Market Value -2.3259*** 0.0001 -2.3598*** 0.0001 -2.3194*** 0.0001 -2.2402*** 0.0001 
EBITDA/TA 6.2127 0.3642 5.5749 0.4147 4.9286 0.4713 5.7229 0.4032 
Relative Size -0.6783 0.6108 -0.7245 0.5864 -0.6793 0.6096 -0.6360 0.6332 
Managerial Resistance 1.4591 0.7808 1.4605 0.7803 1.0894 0.8351 1.2129 0.8170 
Toehold Size -0.3908*** 0.0004 -0.3860*** 0.0005 -0.3901*** 0.0004 -0.3987*** 0.0003 
Tender Offer Dummy 13.205*** 0.0001 13.202*** 0.0001 13.080*** 0.0001 13.136*** 0.0001 
Unsolicited Deal Dummy 4.7993 0.2400 5.0581 0.2156 4.9102 0.2287 4.5638 0.2637 
Competing Deal Dummy 13.349*** 0.0001 13.507*** 0.0001 13.396*** 0.0001 13.233*** 0.0001 
Observations 2548 2548 2548 2548 
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Table 3.12 Bid Premium Analysis based on Different Mediums of Payment 
This table presents the analysis of premium determinants based on different mediums of payment. The dependent variable is the premium of the offer price 
to target stock price four weeks prior to the takeover announcement date. The independent variable Leverage Deficit is the firm’s actual leverage minus its 
target leverage ratio. The Market-to-Book ratio is the market value divided by the book value of total assets. The Log of Market Value is the natural 
logarithm of bidder’s market value. The EBITDA/TA is EBITDA over total assets. Relative Size is the total value of target over acquirers. Managerial 
Resistance is the dummy variable whether the deal is hostile or not. Toehold Size is the percentage of common shares held by the acquirers before 
takeover. Tender Offer is the percentage of acquirers using tender offers. Unsolicited Deal is the percentage of deals where acquirers make the offer 
without prior negotiations. Competing Deal is the percentage of deals in which more than one bidder is involved in a target. The numbers followed by ***, 
**, * if it is significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. The following are the models: 
 
Model: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 104WPREMIUM LeverageDeficit MtB LMV EBITDA RSize MR Toehold Tender Unsoli Compete                        
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Table 3.12 Continued from Previous Page 
 
 
Bid Premium 
 
Pure Cash Pure Stock Mixed 
Variable Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept 36.899*** 0.0001 51.099*** 0.0001 52.857*** 0.0001 
Leverage Deficit -4.2221 0.6809 -27.723** 0.0477 1.1470 0.9161 
     
  
Market to Book Ratio 0.8775 0.2959 2.2829** 0.0186 1.3292 0.1404 
Log of Market Value -1.0873 0.1630 -2.7580** 0.0171 -3.5211*** 0.0001 
EBITDA/TA 27.728* 0.0764 11.252 0.2925 -11.861 0.4385 
Relative Size 0.2854 0.9162 -1.7503 0.6000 0.2456 0.8962 
Managerial Resistance 1.4776 0.8225 21.506 0.2030 -7.2322 0.4045 
Toehold Size -0.6111*** 0.0001 0.0654 0.8190 -0.1265 0.5729 
Tender Offer Dummy 15.621*** 0.0001 8.4349 0.3090 12.239*** 0.0022 
Unsolicited Deal Dummy 1.2388 0.8145 -6.8885 0.6329 12.339* 0.0594 
Competing Deal Dummy 20.379*** 0.0001 -0.4633 0.9557 11.263** 0.0427 
Observations 950 713 885 
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Chapter 4 
4. Leverage-Motivated M&As and Their Stock 
Performance 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter finds that the deviation from a firm’s actual leverage ratio to its 
optimal level is a strong determinant of the successful completion of M&A deals. There is 
a significantly negative relation between the leverage deficit of the acquirer and the 
probability of success in takeovers. However, no study further examines the impact of 
leverage deficit on market reactions to takeover deals and their long-term performance in 
the post-merger period. The financial markets should have different understandings and 
expectations for the deals announced by bidders with different capital structure. Thus 
their reactions to these deals should be dramatically differed with bidder’s capital 
structure. For target-leveraged bidders, the financial market worries about the issue that 
firm’s leverage ratio may deviate from the optimal level, which has negative impact on 
firm’s future prospect. According to this argument, the deals made by target-leveraged 
bidder should present significantly worse stock performance in both short-run and 
long-run. By contrast, deals made by over-leveraged bidders are more favoured from the 
financial market, since the completion of these deals may help them reduce the debt level 
and relief the financial distress. Therefore we predict that the market reactions to these 
deals are dramatically better. Based on this scenario, this chapter examines how the stock 
markets react to deals with different capital structure. Moreover, we plan to further test 
the implications of trade-off theory in M&A activities, since the takeover deals are 
considered as an important and effective approach for capital structure adjustment. 
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Trade-off theory in capital structure argues that every firm has its own target capital 
structure, which is determined by the trade-off between the benefits and costs of 
corporate debt. Traditional static trade-off theory suggests that a firm’s financial leverage 
ratio is always optimal (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Empirical work by Bradley, Jarrell, 
and Kim (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), and Rajan and Zingales (1995) confirms the 
existence of target capital structure and identifies a group of factors that may affect a 
firm’s optimal leverage. Unlike traditional static trade-off theory, dynamic trade-off 
theory indicates that a firm’s leverage ratio is not always at its optimal level but will 
revert to it over time. Fama and French (2002) and Kayhan and Titman (2007) both find 
empirical evidence to indicate that firm capital structure deviates from its target ratio, 
with firms apparently not immediately adjusting them. However, the evidence also shows 
that a firm’s leverage ratio will eventually revert to its optimal level. Research by Leary 
and Roberts (2005) and Flannery and Rangan (2006) further support the arguments of 
dynamic trade-off theory. These authors examine the question of whether firms actively 
rebalance their capital structure towards target ratios. Consistent with the predictions of 
dynamic trade-off theory, their analysis shows that firm actively rebalance their capital 
structure towards their target levels, although these rebalancing activities are infrequent 
when adjustment conditions are costly. 
 
More closely related to our research, Harford, et al. (2009) uses M&A data to examine the 
concept of target capital structure. They find that the deviation of an acquirer’s actual 
leverage ratio from its target level has a significant impact on M&A deals, especially in 
the choices of financing decisions and methods of payment. Overleveraged acquirers are 
more likely to finance deals by issuing new equity rather than issuing debt. Moreover, 
Harford, et al. finds a positive relation between the changes in a merging firm’s actual and 
target leverage ratios induced by M&A deals. Their research provides strong evidence to 
suggest that firms do have target capital structure and actively adjust their financial 
leverage towards target levels. 
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In conclusion from previous research, firms have a target capital structure and M&As are 
an effective approach to rebalancing their actual leverage towards optimal levels in the 
presence of adjustment costs. Therefore, capital structure rebalancing is an important 
motivation for making takeover deals. This chapter extends the research of M&As and 
capital structure by examining the market reactions to these capital structure 
rebalancing-motivated deals, as well as their long-term performance in the post-merger 
period. 
 
Using a sample of 537 large M&A deals made during 1980–2009 whose deal value is 
more than 20% of the acquirer’s firm size, this chapter empirically investigates both the 
short- and long-term performance of M&A deals that are potentially motivated by capital 
structure rebalancing. Following Harford et al. (2009)’s settings, deals with relative size 
less than 0.2 are eliminated from the sample since these deals appear to not have 
significantly large impacts on bidder’s capital structure. Both the bidding and target firms’ 
target leverage ratios are estimated by a Tobit regression model according to earlier 
well-known papers. The financial leverage deficit is calculated as the difference between 
a firm’s actual leverage and its optimal level. To further specify the status of a firm’s 
capital structure, we construct three dummy variables for the amount of leverage deficit: 
an overleveraged firm dummy, a target-leveraged firm dummy, and an overleveraged firm 
dummy. Using these leverage deficit and status dummies, both bidders and targets are 
categorized as an overleveraged bidder (OLB), a target-leveraged bidder (TLB), an 
underleveraged bidder (ULB), an overleveraged target (OLT), a target-leveraged target 
(TLT), or an underleveraged target (ULT).  
 
Second, we examine the interaction between a firm’s leverage deficit and payment 
choices in M&As. The results from a logistic regression model suggest that the 
probability of using a pure cash payment is negatively related to a bidder’s leverage 
deficit level. Overleveraged bidders are less likely to use pure cash since they cannot 
issue more debt. However, underleveraged bidders are more likely to choose pure cash 
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payments because it is helpful in adjusting capital structure to target levels. These 
findings confirm the argument that bidders have strong incentive to rebalance their capital 
structure through M&A activities. 
 
Moreover, empirical evidence from our analyses on bidder announcement CARs suggests 
that the short-term performance of M&A deals differs significantly according to different 
types of bidders, targets, and deals. Stock markets respond differently to deals announced 
by different types of bidders. Deals made by OLBs have the best short-term performance 
compared to the other deals, while deals made by TLBs are the lowest, on average. 
However, deals acquiring different types of targets are not dramatically different from 
each other. The results from multivariate cross-sectional regressions further support these 
arguments. These findings are consistent with our predictions that bidding firm’s 
announcement returns are dramatically varied according to their financial leverage ratios. 
These different stock returns could be attributed to the impact of takeover deals on firm’s 
capital structures. The deals made by TLBs will drive their leverage ratios away from the 
optimal level, which has negative shock on firm’s M&A performance. By contrast, deals 
made by OLBs are more favoured by stock market since it is predicted that the takeover 
deals may help them to resolve the problem of overleverage and reduce the financial 
distress. Bidder’s shareholders may get benefits from these deals. 
 
Our target capital structure research further identifies six types of deals that are related to 
the active rebalancing of target capital structure. For these six types of deals, the bidder’s 
financial leverage ratio presents a potential trend, moving towards its optimal level when 
takeovers are completed. Thus we consider that bidders actively adjust their capital 
structure close to their optimal levels through these deals. Stock market reactions to these 
deals vary dramatically. The short-term announcement CARs for deals with ULBs and 
OLTs are the lowest of all six types of deals, at -4.61%, and statistically significant. In 
contrast, deals with OLBs and ULTs have much better performance, on average. The 
comparison tests reveal a significant difference between these two typical types of deals. 
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Similarly, deals with OLBs and TLTs significantly outperform deals with ULBs and TLTs. 
The regression analysis provides the same conclusion as the results of the univariate 
analysis. 
 
We further examine the 12-month BHARs for all merging firms. The results are slightly 
different from those of the CAR analysis. The BHAR analysis based on different types of 
bidders shows that deals with OLBs have the lowest long-term performance, on average, 
compared to the other two types of bidders, although the differences are not statistically 
significant. Similarly, deals with OLTs also have the lowest long-term performance. 
Furthermore, the empirical results suggest that different types of deals present different 
long-term post-merger stock performance. Deals with an OLB acquiring a TLT have the 
best long-term performance, significantly better than any other deals, on average. 
 
This chapter makes a number of contributions to the literature. This is the first study to 
examine the performance of M&As based on the capital structure of bidders and targets. 
Extending the previous literature on the relation between capital structure and M&A, we 
investigate whether the financial leverage deficit of either the bidder or the target has an 
impact on M&A performance. This chapter finds substantial empirical evidence to 
support the argument that stock markets have different reactions to deals made by bidders 
with different leverage deficit statuses. Our findings provide further understanding in 
M&A performance research. Furthermore, we empirically investigate that how the stock 
market reacts to deals in which bidders adjust their capital structure towards optimal 
levels through M&As. The empirical results suggest that both the short- and long-term 
performance of merging firms vary for different types of deals. These findings provide 
further implications for managers who actively rebalance firm capital structure through 
M&A activities. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 reviews work related to capital structure 
theory and the connection between capital structure and M&A research. Section 4.3 
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briefly introduces the sample and methodology used in our research. Section 4.4 presents 
our empirical results and discussions. Section 4.5 summarizes the chapter and points out 
the main conclusions. 
 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Capital structure theory 
There are three preeminent theories in capital structure: trade-off theory, pecking order 
theory, and market timing theory. Trade-off theory argues that a firm’s capital structure is 
mainly determined by the trade-off between the costs and benefits of corporate debt. In a 
traditional trade-off model, the benefits and costs of debt refer to the tax benefits of debt 
and the costs of bankruptcy, respectively. Thus this model determines a firm’s capital 
structure by the weight of its tax benefits against bankruptcy costs. Several new studies 
extend the area of benefits and costs in other dimensions. Agency cost theory, developed 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976), suggests that the major benefits of debt are that corporate 
debt is able to discipline firm managers and mitigate the problem of agency cost. Agency 
cost is defined as the interest conflict between shareholders and firm managers. The 
existence of debt pressures managers to run firms well and prevents the misuse of free 
cash flow. However, though corporate debt can mitigate the conflicts between 
shareholders and executive managers, it also raises conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and debt holders. As Myers (1977) shows, a potential disadvantage of 
corporate debt is that firms with a high leverage ratio should have the opportunity costs 
for future valuable investment projects. Overleveraged firms may miss potential 
profitable investments since they are not able to afford them. Similarly, other perspectives 
consider that the costs of debt are mainly due to the disruption of corporate business 
operations rather than the direct costs of bankruptcy. 
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Unlike trade-off theory, pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) argues that the trade-off 
between the benefits and costs of debt is not the most important factor for a firm’s capital 
structure. Myers (1984) further argues that a firm’s financing decisions are mainly driven 
by the costs of the adverse selection of choices. The three major ways of raising capital 
are issuing equity, issuing debt, and retaining earnings separately. Pecking order theory 
shows that the costs of adverse selection are the most serious for issuing equity, less 
serious for issuing debt, and non-existent for retained earnings. Therefore, firms prefer 
internal financing first when they face a lack of capital. If firms have to use external 
financing when internal financing is insufficient, the choice of debt financing is more 
likely than equity financing. 
 
Moreover, the basic idea in market timing theory is that firms timing the equity and debt 
issuance according to the valuation conditions of the stock and bond markets. This idea 
suggests that firm managers choose equity financing when stock market valuations are 
high and debt financing when the bond market is hot. If the market valuation is unusually 
high, managers will raise more capital, even if not needed. On the other hand, firms tend 
to use internal financing when both the stock and bond markets are cold and tend to 
repurchase their stocks when the stock market valuation is low. From the cost point of 
view, public firms tend to issue equity when the cost of equity is relatively low and to 
repurchase stocks when the cost of equity is relatively high. 
 
To test these capital structure theories, Graham and Harvey (2001) conduct a 
comprehensive survey of 392 chief financial officers (CFOs) of large public companies. 
Generally, the evidence from the survey moderately supports trade-off theory. CFO 
choices show that the deduction of interest expenses, foreign tax treatment, and the 
maintenance of financial flexibility are all important. Similarly, evidence from the survey 
is also found to support pecking order theory. CFOs are more likely to choose debt 
financing than equity financing when internal funds are insufficient. However, the 
empirical evidence supports market timing theory the best, since almost two-thirds of 
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CFOs argue that the level of undervaluation or overvaluation is an extremely important 
consideration in issuing equity. The analysis of capital structure suggests that both the 
credit rating and financial flexibility are the most important factors affecting a firm’s 
leverage policy. In equity issuance, the most influential factors are a firm’s earning 
performance and stock returns. The degree of stock undervaluation also plays an 
important role in financing decisions. 
 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) examine whether the timing of the stock market affects firm 
capital structure. Since some studies argue that the impact of market timing on capital 
structure is a short-term rather than a long-term effect, Baker and Wurgler further 
investigate whether this effect is persistent. To capture this effect, the authors collect data 
on all public firms involved in an IPO during 1968–1999. The final research sample 
includes 2839 firm observations. The firm’s market valuation is measured by its 
market-to-book ratio. The empirical results suggest that low-leverage firms tend to raise 
capital when their market-to-book ratio is relatively high compared to historical data. The 
estimates from regressions indicate that a firm’s financial leverage is negatively related to 
its past market valuations. When the leverage ratio is measured by either the book or 
market value and various control variables are included, the relation between a firm’s 
capital structure and its historical market valuations is still statistically significant and 
robust. To determine whether this relation is persistent, we construct a three-step test. The 
evidence suggests that past market valuations have persistent influence on a firm’s capital 
structure. A firm’s capital structure in a given year even depends on market valuation 10 
years earlier. These findings are inconsistent with either trade-off theory or pecking order 
theory. To explain them, Baker and Wurgler argue firm capital structure is simply the 
cumulative outcome of previous stock market timings. They conclude that market timing 
is an important consideration in firm financing decisions and thus persistently affect a 
firm’s capital structure in the long term. 
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Welch (2004) also examines the relation between a firm’s capital structure and its stock 
returns. The author investigates how stock price changes affect a firm’s financial leverage 
ratio and whether this effect is persistent by decomposing capital structure changes into 
two main components: The first is caused by corporate financing decisions for issuing 
debt and equity; the other is caused by a firm’s stock price changes. Welch’s research 
sample includes 40,080 firm–year observations covering 1962–2000. The empirical 
evidence indicates that about 40% of changes in capital structure can be explained by 
stock price dynamics. It further implies that stock price changes have a large and 
long-term effect on firm capital structure. The remaining 60% of changes are mainly 
explained by financing issuance activities. The issuance of long-term debt explains a 
large portion of the leverage changes, but the empirical evidence does not provide explain 
the motivation for issuance activities. After stock price effects are controlled for, the 
changes in capital structure are hardly explained by existing well-accepted factors and 
therefore require further investigation. 
 
4.2.2 Target capital structure theory 
Static trade-off theory assumes that firms have their own target capital structure. They 
reach their target leverage levels through the trade-off process between the tax benefits of 
corporate debt and the costs of bankruptcy. However, pecking order theory states that 
firms do not have a target leverage ratio. Bradley, et al. (1984) develops a cross-sectional 
firm-specific model to examine optimal capital structure theory by using 851 firm 
observations during a 20-year period. Their empirical evidence strongly supports static 
trade-off theory, where firms have an optimal leverage level. The authors further specify 
that the expected costs of financial distress and non-debt tax shields are negatively related 
to a firm’s optimal debt level. The variability of earnings also has a significant impact on 
a firm’s target capital structure. The research of Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) further demonstrate the existence of target capital structure and identify 
several new factors that can affect a firm’s optimal leverage level. 
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More directly, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) examine target capital structure theory 
by comparing the predictions of static trade-off theory and pecking order theory. Unlike 
the above-mentioned research on target capital structure, these authors view the two 
theories as contending hypotheses and thus propose an alternative hypothesis based on 
pecking order theory. Their results suggest that a firm’s financing behaviour can be better 
explained by a pecking order model than by a static trade-off model. The authors show 
that pecking order theory, which states that external debt financing is driven by internal 
financial deficits, presents significantly greater explanatory power for time series data. 
There is no evidence to support the prediction that a firm’s leverage ratio will gradually 
move towards its optimal level. 
 
Similarly, Fama and French (2002) examine a group of predictions shared by two 
competing theories, namely, pecking order theory and trade-off theory. Extending 
previous studies, the authors jointly examine a firm’s target leverage level, the mean 
reversion of the leverage ratio, and other related factors by using a significantly larger 
sample that includes more than 3000 firms covering the period 1965–1999. In general, the 
analysis provides strong evidence to support the common assumptions of pecking order 
theory and trade-off theory, but there are two major issues with the two competing 
theories. First, the empirical evidence shows that more profitable firms have less 
corporate debt, which is consistent with pecking order theory but contradicts trade-off 
theory. Second, the regression results suggest that a firm’s leverage ratio gradually reverts 
to the mean value, which is consistent with trade-off theory. However, the evidence of 
mean reversion is not strong enough, since the speed of reversion is questionably slow. 
 
Kayhan and Titman (2007) further prove that a firm’s leverage ratio tends to move 
towards its target level over time. In line with the framework of previous research, the 
authors examine whether a firm’s leverage ratio is mean reverting and identify the factors 
affecting a firm’s target leverage ratio. Using a large sample of firm observations during 
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1960–2003, they find that firms do have a target leverage ratio, though certain realistic 
factors lead to significant deviations from firm target ratios. Consistent with Fama and 
French’s (2002) findings, the reversion tests indicate that firm capital structure moves 
towards target levels but the adjustment speed is questionably slow. A possible reason is 
the considerable level of transaction costs for debt financing. In addition, the empirical 
evidence suggests that a firm’s financial deficit is positively related to the financial 
leverage ratio. Past stock returns also have a significant impact on a firm’s current capital 
structure. In conclusion, this paper provides strong evidence in support of the trade-off 
theory. 
 
To further explain why a firm’s financial leverage moves towards target levels at a slow 
rate, Leary and Roberts (2005) examine how firms rebalance their capital structure in the 
presence of adjustment costs. Since most of the previous capital structure research 
assumes no adjustment costs, firms are able to continuously rebalance their capital 
structure towards optimal levels. However, a firm’s financing choices are affected by 
substantial adjustment costs. Firms may not immediately respond to capital structure 
shocks. As the authors argue, for fixed adjustment costs, the optimal financing choice for 
firms is to make a large adjustment upon reaching a boundary and then return the debt 
ratio to initial levels. For proportional adjustment costs, cost-minimizing firms will make 
very small adjustments upon reaching a recapitalization boundary. Therefore, such firms’ 
leverage adjustments will be highly clustered in time. Moreover, for both fixed and 
weakly convex component adjustments, firms tend to adjust their leverage ratios to return 
to a point between the fixed-costs optimum and the closet boundary. Leary and Roberts 
show that capital structure shocks have a persistent impact if the leverage adjustments are 
costly. In addition, a significant relation exists between the adjustment costs and the speed 
and frequency of firms responding to capital structure shocks. Consistent with the authors’ 
predictions, substantial adjustment costs lead to infrequent but clustered adjustments by 
firms. Most importantly, the authors find that the dynamic rebalancing of financial 
leverage is the major motivation of corporate financing decisions. Firms tend to issue 
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debt when their leverage has been relatively low or decreasing in a recent period. 
Similarly, they are more likely to issue equity when their leverage has been too high or 
increasing in a recent period. These findings imply that firms do have a specific target 
leverage ratio range and rebalance their debt levels around these targets. 
 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) confirm the above finding that firms have long-term target 
capital structure and rebalance their financial leverage ratios towards this long-term target. 
Unlike previous studies, the authors indicate that some typical kinds of firms adjust their 
debt levels rapidly. Their research sample consists of 111,106 firm–year observations for 
12,919 firms during 1965–2001. The partial adjustment model is adopted to explain the 
variation in firm capital structures. The empirical evidence based on the large sample 
strongly supports trade-off theory, where firms present their long-term target capital 
structure as either book leverage or market leverage. This target capital structure depends 
on a group of firm characteristic factors that are well accepted in previous research. When 
the leverage ratio is over or under the optimal level, the firm will adjust it quickly to 
offset the gap between the actual and optimal leverage ratios. Another interesting finding 
is that the speed of adjustment is relatively rapid compared to previous findings. The 
evidence shows that firms offset more than 30% of the leverage gap between the actual 
and optimal ratios each year. A potential explanation is that previous adjustment speed 
research imposes unnecessary assumptions in the empirical models and thus affects the 
estimation results. 
 
Harford, et al. (2009) also investigates whether firms have leverage targets. Unlike 
previous studies that focus on corporate issuing activities, the authors find evidence from 
M&As. First, the logistic analysis of payment choice shows that the deal payments with 
cash versus with equity are negatively related to the acquiring firm’s pre-merger deviation 
from the actual target leverage ratio. In most deals, the cash payment component is 
financed by issuing corporate debt. Thus overleveraged bidders are less likely to use cash 
payments and more likely to pay with equity. Their further analysis shows that acquiring 
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firms are more likely to make M&A deals that will increase their financial leverage after 
deal completion. The potential motive is that the merging firm’s target leverage ratio also 
increases as a result of the takeover deal. The empirical results suggest that more than 65% 
of changes in the merging firm’s new capital structure are already offset by the bidder’s 
merger financing decisions. 
 
To further support the concept of target capital structure and whether firms rebalance their 
debt level towards the target, Harford, et al. (2009) examines how merging firms adjust 
their capital structure in post-merger periods. The evidence shows that if merging firms 
become overleveraged after a merger since issuing new corporate debt, they will 
gradually reduce their financial leverage towards the target ratio in the following years. 
The results indicate that in the first five post-merger years, merging firms rebalance their 
capital structure to move towards their new targets. Therefore the deviation from a 
merging firm’s actual financial leverage to its target ratio, induced by M&A activity, is 
further reduced by these costly adjustments. The research on motives for active 
rebalancing suggests that the capital structure adjustment is an important motivation for 
making takeover deals. The more the leverage ratio deviates from target levels, the more 
likely a bidder is to rebalance capital structure through M&A activities. To further support 
these findings, the empirical evidence shows a significantly positive interaction between 
the bidder’s pre-merger bankruptcy risk and reduction in leverage deviation after mergers. 
In conclusion, this paper finds strong evidence from M&As to support the concept of 
target leverage ratios and active capital structure rebalancing. 
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4.3 Sample and methodology 
4.3.1 Sample selection 
Our sample contains successful M&As in the US takeover market during the period from 
January 1980 to December 2009. The source of M&A data is the SDC Mergers & 
Acquisitions database. The selected time period is driven by the availability of SDC data 
and consistency with the previous chapter. Table 4.1 shows the selection criteria and the 
number of deals remaining after filtering for each criterion. We collect data on all deals 
with US public bidders and US public targets that are announced between 1 January 1980 
and 31 December 2009, for a total of 34,123 deals. Since our research examines the 
capital structure status of both bidders and targets, deals with private or subsidiary targets 
are excluded due to lack of accounting data. Furthermore, based on our research design, 
the sample only contains the successful deals. Deals of unknown deal status or still 
pending are excluded from the sample, which reduces the sample size to 14,345. To 
exclude small and noise deals, deals valued at less than US$1 million are deleted, which 
leaves 12,270 deals. Following previous traditional M&A research, we eliminate deals 
involving firms in the financial or utility industry. Deals identified by the SDC as types of 
privatization, acquisitions of remaining interest, spinoffs, recapitalizations, repurchases, 
and self-tenders are also excluded from the entire sample, resulting in a sample of 4546 
deals. After matching with both the Compustat and CRSP databases, our sample has 1548 
M&A deals. Finally, following Harford, et al. (2009), we remain the deals in which the 
relative size between the target and bidding firms is at least 0.2. These deals are referred 
to as large M&A deals. The explanation for this criterion is that takeovers and target firm 
size should be large enough to have an impact on a merging firm’s capital structure after 
deal completion. Our final research sample has 537 M&A deals. 
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4.3.2 Variable definition 
As introduced in Chapter 3, we use the Tobit regression model to estimate a firm’s 
optimal capital structure, following Kayhan and Titman (2007). As traditional trade-off 
theory suggests, we should identify a group of independent variables that can affect a 
firm’s optimal financial leverage. We describe these determinant variables below and 
introduce their direction of impact on capital structure. 
 
4.3.2.1 Firm size 
Trade-off theory suggests that large firms are normally well diversified and have less 
financial distress and default risk. They also have easier access to the debt-financing 
market, with dramatically lower costs. Thus large firms are expected to have more 
corporate debt and a higher financial leverage ratio. Our research uses the natural 
logarithm of sales to proxy for firm size. 
 
4.3.2.2 Profitability 
Firm profitability is identified as one of the most important indicators of capital structure 
in the literature, which argues that profitable firms may have more free cash flow and less 
financial distress. The tax shield of interest for debt is more valuable for these firms. 
Therefore, traditional trade-off theory, based on corporate tax and bankruptcy costs, 
indicates that profitable firms have higher financial leverage ratios. Moreover, the theory 
based on agency costs also suggests that an important function of corporate debt is to help 
firms avoid free cash problems. As the theory developed by Jensen (1986) shows, 
corporate debt will benefit shareholders through the disciplinary mechanism of debt for 
firm managers. The author suggests that issuing a considerable amount of debt is an 
effective substitute for dividend payouts, which are helpful to resolve free cash flow 
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problems. Corporate debt is able to significantly reduce a firm’s agency costs by reducing 
free cash flows for firm managers. Therefore Jensen (1986) predicts that profitable firms 
will have higher financial leverage. 
 
However, unlike traditional static trade-off models, the dynamic trade-off model indicates 
that a firm’s financial leverage ratio can be negatively related to its profitability. 
Strebulaev (2007) employs a calibrated dynamic trade-off model to examine firm 
cross-sectional capital structure performance. Both the empirical evidence and the 
simulated evidence suggest that the dynamic trade-off model better explains firm capital 
structure paths, compared to traditional static models. Furthermore, the empirical 
evidence shows that a firm’s profitability is negatively related to its leverage level, which 
contradicts the prediction of traditional trade-off theory. A potential explanation is 
straightforward. Under costly adjustment conditions, firms rebalance their capital 
structure infrequently. An increase in a firm’s profitability will significantly reduce its 
leverage ratio by boosting values. Systematic shocks to a firm’s cash flow strengthen the 
negative relation between profitability and leverage. 
 
On the other hand, pecking order theory also predicts that a firm’s profitability is 
inversely related to its debt level. More profitable firms are less dependent on corporate 
debt financing since they have more free cash flow. Thus they prefer internal financing 
over costly external financing and decrease their debt levels. 
 
We use the ratio of Earnings before Interests, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization 
(EBITDA) to Total Assets (TA) to proxy for firm’s profitability. 
 
128 
 
4.3.2.3 Tangibility 
Firm asset tangibility is also an important indicator of capital structure. Previous research 
suggests that firms with more tangible assets are able to more easily use debt financing 
since they have more assets for loan collateral. Therefore we predict that a firm’s 
tangibility is positively related to its debt capacity and debt level. This chapter uses the 
ratio of Net Property, Plant, and Equipment to Total Assets (Tangible/TA) to represent the 
tangibility of firm assets. 
 
4.3.2.4 Product uniqueness 
As Titman (1984) argues, the uniqueness of a firm’s industry and product also has a 
significant impact on firm capital structure. Firms in unique industries or that produce 
specialized products face higher financial distress in general and thus tend to have lower 
debt levels. The previous literature tends to use R&D expenses to represent the 
uniqueness of a firm’s products. Firms with high R&D expenses have larger proportions 
of intangible assets, thus depressing their debt levels. In general, this suggests a negative 
relation between a firm’s financial leverage and product uniqueness. This chapter uses the 
ratio of R&D expenses to sales to proxy for product uniqueness. Since many firms do not 
release their R&D expenses, we further develop a dummy variable to differentiate these 
firm observations. The R&D Miss Dummy variable will take the value one if the firm’s 
R&D expense data are missing and zero otherwise. Furthermore, the ratio of Selling 
Expenses to Sales is also used to represent firm product uniqueness. 
 
4.3.2.5 Growth opportunity 
Growth opportunity is an important determinant of firm capital structure. Static trade-off 
theory predicts a negative relation between a firm’s growth opportunity and financial 
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leverage ratio, because growth firms can incur much higher financial distress costs and 
lower agency costs of free cash flow. Therefore they tend to reduce their financial 
leverage. On the contrary, pecking order theory implies that firms with higher growth 
opportunities make more investments. To finance these investment projects, firms have to 
issue more debt. Thus the relation between a firm’s growth opportunity and financial 
leverage ratio is positive. Numerous variables are considered to proxy for firm growth 
opportunity, such as asset changes and the earnings-to-price ratio. The most common 
proxy for growth opportunity in previous capital structure research is a firm’s 
market-to-book ratio. Adam and Goyal (2008) indicate that the market-to-book ratio is the 
most reliable proxy for growth opportunities. Using a real option approach, they evaluate 
the performance of a group of proxy variables for growth opportunity. They show that the 
market-to-book asset ratio contains the highest information content with respect to firm 
growth. Rajan and Zingales (1995) examine the interaction between firm investment 
opportunities and financial leverage ratios. Empirical evidence from over 8000 firms in 
31 countries shows that investment opportunity is a strong indicator of firm capital 
structure. Consistent with the prediction of trade-off theory, the variable market-to-book 
asset ratio is negatively related to the leverage ratio after controlling for other factors in 
all countries. This finding implies that firms with high growth opportunity tend to use 
equity financing rather than debt financing, since they do not want to pass up future 
profitable investment opportunities. Following previous research, we use Market-to-Book 
Assets ratio to proxy for firm growth opportunity. 
 
4.3.2.6 Cash reserves 
A firm’s cash reserves are also significantly related to the financial leverage ratio. As 
pecking order theory suggests, firms tend to use internal financing rather than external 
debt financing, given sufficient internal funds. Therefore firms with large cash reserves 
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normally have low debt levels. We use the ratio of Cash Reserves to Total Assets 
(CASH/TA) to proxy for the size of internal funds. 
 
4.3.2.7 Industry and market conditions 
Historical data show that the financial leverage of firms in different industries varies 
dramatically. Industry conditions have a significant impact on firm’s target capital 
structure. The previous literature also indicates that the industry effect may involve a 
group of factors common to firms in the same industry. To control for these effects, we 
adopt the 48-industry classification of Fama and French (1997) to develop 48 dummy 
variables for each specific industry. 
 
As Welch (2004) argues, stock returns have substantial explanatory power for a firm’s 
capital structure changes. Therefore firm managers may adjust their financial leverage 
according to market valuation timing. Our research uses the market’s median leverage to 
control for market conditions. 
 
4.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics for both firm and deal characteristics, 
including the number of observations and mean and median values. The left panel of 
Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics for a bidding firm’s characteristics. It covers all 
variables used in this chapter. The results suggest no significant differences between our 
research sample and those of previous studies. The right panel mainly presents the results 
of deal characteristics. Compared to the descriptive results in Chapter 3, it is interesting to 
find that large deals are more likely to use a tender offer strategy. More than 20% of 
bidding firms use tender offers to acquire their targets. The results also show that fewer 
bidders use pure cash payments whereas more bidders choose pure stock payments in 
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large deals. On average, 17.86% of deals choose cash as the medium of payment but 
35.59% of deals choose stock. Moreover, the percentage of unsolicited deals and the 
probability of targets using a poison pill in large deals are also significantly higher than 
for the whole sample. 
 
4.3.4 Methodology 
In this part, we briefly introduce the main steps of the methodology used in this chapter. 
The first step of the methodology is the estimation of target capital structure. Similar to 
the approach used in Chapter 3, we adopt the Tobit regression model in which the 
dependent variable – Firm’s market leverage ratio is censored between 0 and 1. The 
independent variable of this regression is the variables which have determinant effect on 
firm’s capital structure. All these variables are introduced in Section 4.3.2. The estimated 
value of this regression is considered as the optimal leverage ratio and the difference 
between firm’s actual and optimal leverage ratio is defined as the leverage deficit. 
Following that, both the bidders and targets are divided into three groups according to 
their leverage deficit levels, over-leveraged, target-leveraged or under-leveraged. The 
regression model for target capital structure estimation is as following: 
 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9
/ / /
/ /
MarketLeverage Sale EBITDA TA Tangible TA RD TA
RDMiss SE Sale MtB Cash TA MML
    
     
    
     
 
(4.1) 
 
The next step of the research is the analysis on bidder’s payment choices. The logistic 
regression model is adopted for analysis. To indicate firm’s capital structure, both bidder 
and target’s leverage deficit are included into the regression. In addition, six dummy 
variables for different deal types are also used in the second regression model. The 
following two models are the regression model for payment choice: 
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(4.2) 
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(4.3) 
 
Following the payment choice analysis, this chapter provides the analysis on bidder’s 
short term announcement returns and their long term stock performances. This chapter 
uses the five-day [-2, +2] Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) to represent bidder’s 
short term announcement returns. The expected returns are estimated by the Fama-French 
Three factor plus momentum factor model. For long term performance, this chapter 
chooses the 12-monnth Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) in the post-merger 
period. Both univariate and multivariate analysis approach are used. The following is the 
regression models for multivariate analysis: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7[ 2, 2]CAR BLD MLD Premium Profit+ PureCash RelativeSize+ MtB                  
(4.4) 
 
4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1 Estimation of target capital structure 
As introduced above, we use the Tobit regression model to estimate a firm’s target capital 
structure. The firm’s actual market leverage ratio is regressed on a group of determinants 
of capital structure. The predicted value of this regression is chosen as the firm’s optimal 
financial leverage ratio. To avoid a potential endogeneity problem between the financial 
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leverage ratio and these determinant variables, all the independent variables in this 
regression are lagged. 
 
Table 4.3 presents the results of Tobit regression. The estimate for the variable Log of 
Sales is 0.0169 and statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding implies that large 
firms have higher optimal leverage ratios. Similarly, the impact of asset tangibility on 
firm capital structure is also positive (0.0411) and statistically significant at the 5% 
confidence level. Moreover, the estimate for the variables’ median market leverage is 
positive (0.5151) and highly significant (P-value 0.0001). Our finding suggests that a 
firm’s target leverage ratio varies with current market conditions. In contrast, consistent 
with the predictions of dynamic trade-off theory and pecking order theory, the coefficient 
of the profitability ratio in the regression is -0.4137, with a P-value less than 0.0001. The 
lower financial leverage of profitable firms is probably induced by both low debt levels 
and high stock returns. As predicted, the two product uniqueness proxies, the R&D 
expense ratio and the selling expense ratio, both have a negative (-0.2547 and -0.0137) 
and statistically significant influence on a firm’s target capital structures. The positive and 
significant estimate for R&D Miss Dummy further confirms the effect of R&D expenses 
on capital structure. Furthermore, the estimates for a firm’s cash reserve ratio and 
market-to-book ratio are both negative (-0.2313 and -0.0304) and highly significant at the 
1% level. These results suggest that firms with large cash reserves and high growth 
opportunities are more likely to maintain less outstanding debt since they do not want to 
pass up potential profitable investments in the future. 
 
The financial leverage deficit is calculated by the difference between a firm’s actual 
leverage ratio and its optimal level. In line with previous research, we separate both 
bidders and targets into three groups according to their leverage deficit: Overleveraged, 
Target Leveraged, and Underleveraged. We develop three additional dummy variables to 
indicate a firm’s leverage deficit status. 
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4.4.2 Payment choice analysis 
This section adopts a logistic regression model to further investigate the relation between 
the payment choice of the takeover and the capital structure status of both the bidder and 
target. Since Harford, et al. (2009) suggests that a bidding firm’s pre-acquisition leverage 
deficit affects the percentage of cash used in a takeover, we generate two main predictions: 
The first prediction is that a bidder’s financial leverage deficit is inversely related to the 
probability of using a pure cash payment. This implies that overleveraged bidders are less 
likely to use pure cash payments, whereas underleveraged bidders are more likely to pay 
by cash. The second prediction is that deals in which bidders attempt to increase leverage 
deficit are more likely to involve pure cash payments. 
 
Table 4.4 presents the results of the logistic analysis examining the considerations for 
using pure cash payments. The dependent variable in the regression is the dummy 
variable for pure cash payments. We control for several determinants that are able to 
affect payment decisions in a takeover. Following previous studies, the control variables 
are the bidder’s market leverage ratio, market-to-book ratio, cash reserve, and firm size 
and the relative size between the target and bidder. The results for the first regression 
model in Table 4.4 show that a bidder’s financial leverage deficit is negatively related to 
the probability of using a pure cash payment in M&A deals. The estimate for the bidder’s 
leverage deficit is -4.9908 and both statistically and economically significant (P-value 
0.0067). Consistent with our first prediction, the empirical evidence suggests that bidders 
with a substantially positive leverage deficit are less likely to using cash payments. 
Overleveraged bidders do not increase their financial leverage further since they have to 
issue more debt for cash payments. On the other hand, underleveraged bidders are more 
likely to eliminate the level of leverage deficit through takeovers. 
 
The coefficient of the target leverage deficit is 0.9765 but it is statistically insignificant 
(P-value 0.1901). This finding suggests that the target’s capital structure does not affect 
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bidder payment decisions. Moreover, the probability of using cash payments is also 
affected by several control variables. Consistent with the previous literature, the estimate 
for a bidder’s actual financial leverage is positive (4.6885) and significant at the 1% 
confidence level. Similarly, there is a significantly positive relation between a bidder’s 
market-to-book ratio and the probability of using pure cash payments. Bidders with high 
growth opportunities are more likely to choose pure cash payments. Consistent with our 
expectation, the coefficient of a bidder’s cash reserve ratio is positive (1.8479) and 
significant at the 10% level (P-value 0.0970). As pecking order theory suggests, firms 
prefer to use internal financing over external financing. Therefore bidders with substantial 
internal funds are more likely to use cash than other bidders. 
 
The second regression model in Table 4.4 provides evidence on whether the probability of 
choosing pure cash payment is influenced by different deal types. Six dummy variables 
for deal types are added to the regression. These six types of deals could be categorized 
into two major groups, first is the deals bidders tend to increase the leverage deficit and 
the second is the deals bidders tend to reduce the leverage deficit level. The results in the 
second model are very interesting: The estimates for deal types in the first group are all 
positive, at 0.8949, 0.6104, and 0.9749 respectively. However, the estimates for deal 
types in the second group are all negative. The evidence suggests that bidders in the first 
group are more likely to use pure cash payments, while bidders in the second group are 
less likely. The potential explanation is that all bidders in the first group are 
underleveraged and exhibit a leverage deficit-increasing trend. Therefore, they have more 
incentive to use cash payments rather than equity payments. In contrast, all bidders in the 
second group are relatively overleveraged and also willing to reduce their leverage 
deficits through takeovers. Thus they have less incentive to issue additional debt for cash 
payments compared to issuing new equities. 
 
In summary, the results in this section provide further evidence to support the argument 
that firms have target capital structure. They also suggest that some firms tend to 
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rebalance their leverage ratios towards optimal levels through M&A deals. On the basis 
of this consideration, the financing and payment choices of deals are both affected by the 
deviation of a bidder’s actual leverage ratio toward the target level. Overleveraged 
bidders are willing to reduce their deficit levels by acquiring underleveraged or less 
overleveraged targets. They are more likely to use equity as the medium of payment. On 
the other hand, underleveraged bidders also have an incentive to acquire overleveraged 
targets by using cash payments. Consistent with our predictions, the results from the 
logistic regression model suggest that the probability of using pure cash payments is 
negatively related to a bidder’s leverage deficit. 
 
4.4.3 Univariate analysis for announcement CARs 
4.4.3.1 Bidder and target capital structure status classifications 
This section discussed the market reactions to deal announcements with different types of 
bidders and targets. Following previous research, we adopt the Fama–French three-factor 
plus momentum factor model, the most popular and reliable short-term performance 
evaluation model. Table 4.5 reports the five-day (-2, +2) CAR for a bidding firm’s stock 
price with different capital structure statuses. The announcement CAR for the full sample 
is -2.20%, on average, and statistically significant in T-test. This is consistent with the 
statement that M&A is value destroying for bidding firm shareholders. 
 
To determine whether stock markets reactions differ according to firm capital structure, 
we further evaluate the short-term CAR of deals classified by different types of bidder 
and target. The empirical evidence suggests that bidder capital structure has a significant 
impact on announcement CARs. The average CAR for deals announced by OLBs is 0.41% 
and insignificantly different from zero in a T-test. However, the deals announced by TLBs 
and ULBs seem to have much worse stock market reactions, with average CARs of -3.68% 
and -2.74, respectively, both statistically significant (P-values 0.0001 and 0.0044, 
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respectively). These findings suggest that deals made by TLBs have the lowest short-term 
CARs, on average. From the target’s point of view, average CARs for deals acquiring 
OLTs, TLTs, and ULTs are -2.53%, -2.07%, and -1.66% respectively. The CARs of deals 
acquiring different types of targets are not dramatically different from each other. These 
results clearly show that deals announced by bidders with different capital structures 
should have diversified stock performances in short term. These differences could be 
attributed to different expectations of financial market on new merging firms. For deals 
made by target-leveraged bidders, investors may afraid that the capital structure of new 
merging firms will deviate from the optimal level. This deviation should have negative 
impact on firm’s future performance. Therefore the market reactions to these deals are 
deeply negative. By contrast, for over-leveraged bidders, financial market predicts that 
the ongoing deals help them to reduce the debt ratio and relief the financial distress. 
These potential benefits could help them to get better responses from the financial 
markets.    
 
To further support these findings, the right panel of Table 4.5 presents the results of 
comparison tests between different subsamples. As argued, the T-test results indicate that 
the short-term stock performance of deals with OLBs is significantly better than for either 
the full sample or the other subsamples. Deals with OLBs outperform the full sample by 
2.61%, statistically significant at the 1% confidence level (P-value 0.0014). Similarly, 
deals made by OLBs are also significantly better than those made by TLBs or ULBs. The 
huge gaps between these deals are 4.09% and 3.15%, respectively, both statistically 
significant in T-tests (P-values 0.0013 and 0.0208, respectively). In contrast, deals made 
by TLBs significantly underperform the full sample. It is -1.48% on average with a 
P-value of 0.0208. Moreover, the average CARs of deals with ULBs are not significantly 
different from those of deals with both TLBs and the full sample. For deals acquiring 
different types of targets, consistent with our argument, there is no statistically significant 
difference between each group and the full sample. 
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The empirical evidence from comparison tests further confirms our univariate analysis 
findings. We conclude that deals announced by overleveraged bidders performed 
significantly better than other deals. The stock markets believe that the announcement of 
an M&A deal is a positive signal of an overleveraged bidder’s stock price. The bidder’s 
shareholders will benefit from these deals. However, market reactions to deals announced 
by target-leveraged bidders are on the opposite end: They obtain, on average, the lowest 
announcement abnormal returns. A potential explanation is that investors worry that firm 
financial leverage will deviate from optimal levels after takeovers. Thus these deals can 
hurt shareholder interests. 
 
4.4.3.2 Classification by deal type 
As introduced earlier, firm managers may rebalance their capital structure towards target 
levels through M&A activities. After combining the level deficit status of both the bidder 
and target, we further identify six types of deals that can drive the merging firm’s capital 
structure towards its target level after deal completion. As introduced above, these six 
types of deals are classified into two major groups. The following will introduce these 
two groups of deals. 
 
The first group of deals are consisted with three types of deals, in which underleveraged 
bidders acquire overleveraged targets, underleveraged bidders acquire target-leveraged 
targets and more underleveraged bidders acquire less underleveraged targets. On the other 
side, the second group of deals are also consisted with three types of deals, in which 
overleveraged bidders acquire underleveraged targets, overleveraged bidders acquire 
target-leveraged targets and more overleveraged bidders acquire less overleveraged 
targets. 
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After deal completion, the deviation of the acquirer’s actual financial leverage to its 
optimal level is reduced to some extent or even eliminated. This study shows how stock 
markets initially react to such deals around the announcement period. The left panel of 
Table 4.6 presents the five-day (-2, +2) CARs for bidding firms for each type of deal. It 
clearly shows that the short-term performance of bidder stock price changes remarkably 
with deal type. For deals ULB acquire OLT, the bidder’s announcement CAR is the 
lowest (-5.45%), on average, and highly significant. Similarly, the announcement CARs 
for another two types of deal in the first group are also negative (-4.42% and -2.30%, 
respectively) and significant (P-values 0.0038 and 0.0702, respectively). Interestingly, the 
bidders in these two types are underleveraged. The results in Table 4.4 show that the 
average CAR for deals made by underleveraged bidders is -2.74%. Combining these 
results, we find that deals with a ULB acquiring either an OLT or a TLT significantly 
underperform the full sample. In contrast, deals OLB acquire TLT obtain positive (2.84%) 
and statistically significant (P-value 0.0892) abnormal returns during the announcement 
period. This result is also much better than the average CAR of deals made by 
overleveraged bidders in Table 4.5 (0.41%). Their average CARs for another two types of 
deals in the second group are also outperformance. 
 
The results of comparison tests are presented in the right panel of Table 4.6. Consistent 
with the above findings, the empirical evidence suggests deals in the first group 
significantly underperform the full sample However, the market reactions to deals in the 
second group are significantly better than for the full sample.  
 
We further compare the performance of each type of deal in different groups by pair. The 
performance difference between deals ULB acquire OLT and deals OLB acquire ULT is 
-4.35% and significant at the 10% level. This finding implies that deals with an OLB 
acquiring a ULT obtain a more favourable response from the financial market than deals 
with a ULB acquiring an OLT. Similarly, deals OLB acquire TLT outperform deals ULB 
acquire TLT by 7.26%, significant at the 1% confidence level. This difference is even 
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larger than that between the previous pair. Furthermore, the difference between the last 
pair of deals is also negative (-3.61%) and statistically significant (P-value 0.0955). 
 
From these results, we conclude that a bidder’s financial leverage deficit has a large 
impact on stock performance around the announcement period. Deals with overleveraged 
bidders obtain significantly better market reactions compared to deals with other types of 
bidders. For specific types of bidders, the capital structure of the targets also affects the 
short-term performance of M&A deals. Therefore, though the financial leverage ratios of 
bidders in all six types of deals exhibit a potential trend, moving towards optimal levels 
through the takeover, their announcement returns are dramatically different. 
 
4.4.4 Multivariate regression analysis for announcement CARs 
4.4.4.1 Leverage deficit 
The univariate analysis results suggest that the capital structure of both the bidder and 
target is able to influence market reactions to takeover announcements. However, these 
findings do not consider other factors that can affect stock returns. To control for these 
determinants of bidder announcement returns, we adopt a cross-sectional multivariate 
regression model for further analysis. 
 
In the regression model of Table 4.7, the dependent variable is the bidder’s five-day (-2, 
+2) CAR around the announcement period. The first regression model contains only two 
independent variables, the bidder’s leverage deficit and the target’s. Consistent with our 
univariate analysis findings, the estimate for the bidder’s leverage deficit is positive 
(0.0964) and statistically significant (P-value 0.0088). This finding suggests a positive 
relation between the bidder’s leverage deficit and announcement CARs. Bidders with a 
high leverage deficit receive a better response from the financial markets. The estimate of 
a target’s leverage deficit is negative (-0.0277) but statistically insignificant (P-value 
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0.3818). The estimation of the first regression is consistent with the univariate analysis 
results in the preceding section. 
 
We use the second regression model on a group of control variables. These control 
variables cover both deal and firm characteristics and are all considered to have an impact 
on announcement returns. The second column of Table 4.7 shows the estimation results 
after controlling for these variables. The estimate for the bidder’s leverage deficit is still 
positive (0.0688) and statistically significant (P-value 0.0919). This finding indicates that 
the positive relation between bidder capital structure and announcement returns remains 
consistent after the regression controls for other determinants. Moreover, the coefficient 
of the target’s leverage deficit is negative but statistically insignificant. 
 
The estimates for the other control variables are generally consistent with our predictions. 
The bid premium is negatively related to bidder announcement returns. Market concerns 
about the overpaying problem can increase with bid premiums. Thus the estimate for the 
bid premium is -0.0191 (P-value 0.0748). The estimate for the pure cash dummy is 
0.0583 and statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding is consistent with the 
previous finding, that deals paid in cash create value for the bidder’s shareholders. For 
variables relating to firm characteristics, the estimate for bidder’s profitability is 0.0587 
and significant at the 10% level. On the other hand, the coefficient of the market-to-book 
ratio in this regression is -0.0099 and statistically significant (P-value 0.0025). 
 
To further confirm the relation between a bidder’s leverage deficit and announcement 
returns, we adopt three dummy variables to indicate the specific status of a bidder’s 
capital structure. Table 4.8 displays the estimation results based on these three dummies. 
In regression model 1, the estimate for the OLB dummy is 0.0232, with a P-value of 
0.0537. This result further confirms the positive relation between a bidder’s financial 
leverage deficit and announcement returns. However, the estimate for the TLB dummy in 
model 2 is negative (-0.0228) and also statistically significant (P-value 0.0519). For the 
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ULB dummy in model 3, the coefficient is 0.0007 and insignificant. The estimates for the 
other determinant variables remain consistent with the results of previous regressions. 
The coefficients of the bid premium in all three models are negative and statistically 
significant. The bidder’s market-to-book ratio also has a negative impact on stock returns. 
The bidder’s profitability and the dummy variable of pure cash payment are both positive 
and significant. 
 
Integrating our findings with those of the univariate analysis, we conclude that M&A 
deals made by OLBs will significantly increase bidder short-term stock performance 
around the announcement period. A potential explanation is that these OLBs are 
undervalued. In the previous section, on target capital structure estimation, we find that a 
firm’s profitability is negatively related to its optimal leverage ratio, consistent with 
dynamic trade-off theory. This implies that profitable firms may have lower target 
leverage ratios, which can induce them to become overleveraged. As previous research 
shows, deals made by profitable bidders are more likely to obtain better stock 
performance. In contrast, deals announced by TLBs are a significantly negative signal for 
the financial markets. Bidder stock prices fall dramatically following takeover 
announcements. We attribute this poor performance to potential shocks on bidder capital 
structure, which can be modified from optimal levels. The empirical evidence also shows 
that M&A deals announced by ULBs do not significantly affect stock market response. 
 
4.4.4.2 Deal type 
In line with the univariate analysis stage, we also examine the interaction between bidder 
announcement returns and different deal types in a multivariate regression analysis. Table 
4.9 presents the regression results of the analysis based on deal types. The empirical 
evidence shows that half of the six dummy variables for deal type are statistically 
significant but with inverse relations. The estimate for the first dummy is -0.0298, with a 
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P-value of 0.0692. Consistent with the univariate analysis findings, the deals where a 
ULB acquires an OLT significantly underperform other types of deals. However, the 
coefficients of the two dummies in the second group are both positive (0.0578 and 0.0392, 
respectively) and statistically significant (P-values 0.0015 and 0.0206, respectively). For 
the other three types of deals, the estimates are statistically insignificant, which implies 
that these deals do not have a substantial impact on bidder announcement returns. The 
estimates for the control variables are consistent with those in the previous section. 
 
To summarize, we find that a bidding firm’s short-term announcement returns are affected 
by different types of deals. The type of deal is classified by the capital structure status of 
both the bidder and the target. The first type deal, which involving an underleveraged 
bidder acquiring an overleveraged target, has the most significant and most negative 
impacts on bidder’s announcement returns. 
 
On the other hand, both deals where an overleveraged bidder acquires an underleveraged 
target and a more overleveraged bidder acquires a less overleveraged target obtain more 
positive reactions from stock markets. These findings imply that M&A deals in which 
bidders attempt to reduce their overleverage are more favoured than deals increasing the 
leverage deficit. 
 
4.4.5 Univariate analysis of the BHARs 
The analysis of the bidder’s announcement CARs finds strong evidence that both the 
bidder’s and the target’s leverage deficit status affects market reactions to takeover 
announcements. However, since adjustment to a firm’s capital structure also influence 
stock performance in a long period, this section explores merging firms’ long-term stock 
performance. Following the general research on long-term stock returns, we use the 
BHAR methodology to evaluate merging firms’ 12-month post-merger stock 
performance. 
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Table 4.10 reports the BHARs of merging firms classified by leverage deficit status. For 
the full sample, the average 12-month BHAR is -32.71% and significant at the 1% level. 
This finding is consistent with the previous literature, in which shareholders do not 
benefit from M&A deals in the long run. When the sample is categorized by bidder 
leverage deficit, the results for each subsample are slightly different. There is a clear 
increasing trend with the changes in bidder’s leverage deficit. The CARs for OLB, TLB 
and ULB are -38.26%, -33.26% and -26.85%, respectively. We find that the differences in 
the BHARs between these three subsamples are significantly different from those 
between short-term CARs. Deals made by overleveraged bidders have the best stock 
performance in the short run but the worst in the long run. Similarly, deals classified by 
target firm’s leverage deficit also have inconsistent long-term performance with their 
short-term stock returns. Deals that acquire a target-leveraged target significantly 
outperform deals acquiring an overleveraged target by 16.20% and are -24.86% and 
-41.06%, respectively. 
 
When we analyse the stock performance of merging firms in specific deal types, the 
results are even more significant. Table 4.11 displays merging firms’ long-term BHAR 
classified by different deal types. The 12-month average BHAR for under-leveraged 
bidders acquiring over-leveraged targets is -21.95%, while it is -48.54% for 
over-leveraged bidders acquiring under-leveraged targets. The comparison analysis shows 
that there is a 26.59% performance gap between these two types of deals on average, 
although it is statistically insignificant (P-value 0.1957). However, in short-term CAR 
analysis, the results from comparison tests are exactly different. However, in the long run, 
type 1 deals substantially outperform type 2 deals. The long-term performance of deals 
ULB acquiring OLT and OLB acquiring ULT is also significantly different. The average 
12-month BHARs for these two types of deals are -39.07% and -15.98%, respectively. 
There is a negative (-23.09%) and statistically significant (P-value 0.0978) difference 
between these two types.  
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The empirical evidence from the long-term BHAR analysis suggests that merging firms’ 
long-term stock performance may not be in line with short-term abnormal returns around 
the announcement period. Especially for the first group deals in which an underleveraged 
bidder acquires an overleveraged target, long term post-merger performance is much 
better than for other types of deals, although these deals significantly underperform in the 
announcement period. Deals OLB acquiring TLT significantly outperform the other deals 
in both short-term CARs and long-term BHARs, on average. They obtain significantly 
positive (2.84%) abnormal returns in a five-day window around the announcement period. 
Though their average 12-month BHAR is negative (-15.98%), it is dramatically less 
negative than the average for the full sample (-32.71%). Therefore, we argue that 
acquisition of a target-leveraged target is a favourable choice for overleveraged firms. 
 
4.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter investigates how bidders’ financial leverage deficits affect their M&A 
decisions. Traditional trade-off theory predicts that firms modify their own target capital 
structure based on the trade-off between the benefits and costs of corporate debt. The 
deviation from a firm’s actual financial leverage to its target level is the leverage deficit. 
Previous literature suggests that some firms actively adjust their capital structure through 
M&A activities. This chapter confirms this argument by analysing the interaction between 
the leverage deficit and payment decisions in takeovers. The empirical evidence suggests 
that the relation between a bidder’s leverage deficit and the probability of using a pure 
cash payment is significantly negative. Consistent with our predictions, overleveraged 
bidders are less likely to choose pure cash payments, while underleveraged bidders are 
more likely. These findings further support the argument that capital structure rebalancing 
is potential motivation for takeovers. 
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Furthermore, this chapter examines how the stock market reacts to deals classified by the 
bidder’s and target’s leverage deficit levels. Our analysis classifies both bidders and 
targets by their leverage deficit status. The results from univariate analyses show that 
deals with overleveraged bidders perform better than deals with other types of bidders, 
with an average five-day CAR of 0.41% around the announcement period. This could be 
attributed to the undervaluation of bidder stock prices. In contrast, market reactions to 
deals with target-leveraged bidders are significantly lower. Investors may be afraid that 
takeover deals will drive their leverage ratios away from optimal levels. From the target 
point of view, the leverage deficit status for targets does not display a significant impact 
on market reactions to announced deals. The evidence from cross-sectional multivariate 
regressions further confirms these findings. After controlling for several determinants, the 
regression yields a positive and statistically significant estimate for the bidder’s leverage 
deficit variable. In addition, the estimates for the leverage deficit dummies are consistent 
with our predictions.  
 
We also examine bidder announcement CARs by deal type, based on different 
combinations of bidders and targets. Deals with underleveraged bidders and 
overleveraged targets underperform the worst, on average. However, deals in which 
overleveraged bidders acquire target-leveraged targets obtain significantly positive 
(2.84%) reactions from the stock markets. The multivariate analysis evidence further 
demonstrates these relations. The estimate for the dummy variable of first type of deals is 
negative and significant at the 10% level. For dummies of second group of deals, the 
estimates are both positive and statistically significant after controlling for other 
determinant factors. The results of the analysis on merging firms’ long-term stock 
performance differ dramatically from their short-term announcement returns. Deals made 
by overleveraged bidders have worse long-term performance than other deals. Though 
first type deals obtain the lowest announcement returns in the short run, their long-term 
BHARs are relatively higher. Overall, deals in which overleveraged bidders acquire 
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target-leverage targets perform better than other types of deals in both the short and long 
run. 
 
This chapter’s main contribution is further empirical evidence for the concept of target 
capital structure. Our findings strongly support the argument that firm managers actively 
rebalance their capital structure through M&As. We clearly show the interaction between 
a firm’s leverage deficit and M&A payment choices. Moreover, this chapter sheds further 
light on merging firms’ short- and long-term stock performance. 
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Table 4.1 Sample Selection 
This table presents the sample selection process for the research of this chapter. The M&A data are from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) M&A 
Database. The accounting data is from COMPUSTAT Database. The stock price data is from CRSP Database. 
 
Selection Criteria Size 
Acquirer Nation United States of America 274248 
Target Nation United States of America 234574 
Acquirer and Target Public Status Public 36749 
Date Announced 01/01/1980 to 12/31/2009 34123 
Deal Status Completed 14345 
Deal Value Larger Than $1 Million 12270 
Firm Industry Exclude Finance and Utility Firms 7625 
Deal Type Exclude Other M&A 4546 
Accounting and Share Price Data Availability Exclude Unmatched Deals 1548 
Large Deal Selection Relative Size > 20% 537 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the firm and deal characteristics for deals from 1980 and 2009. It reports the number of observation, mean and median value for each 
variable. The variable Market Value is the bidder’s market value of total assets. The Log of Sales is the natural logarithm of sales in given year. The 
Market-to-Book ratio is the market value divided by the book value of total assets. R&D/TA represents expenses in research and development (R&D) over 
total assets. EBITDA/TA is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over total assets. Tangible Asset/TA is 
defined as the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment over total assets. Selling Expense/Sales is the ratio of firm’s total selling expense over total sales. 
Cash/AT is the ratio of cash reserves over total assets. Market Leverage is the ratio of book debt to market value of assets. The Leverage Deficit is the 
difference between firm’s actual leverage and its target level. The variable Deal value is the value recorded in SDC Database. Relative Size is the total 
value of target over acquirers. Toehold Size is the percentage of common shares held by the acquirers before takeover. Hostile Deal is the percentage of 
hostile takeovers in each sample. Tender Offer is the percentage of acquirers using tender offers. Pure Cash is the percentage of deals paid 100% by cash. 
Pure Stock is the percentage of deals paid 100% by stock. Unsolicited Deal is the percentage of deals where acquirers make the offer without prior 
negotiations. Poison Pill is the percentage of targets using poison pill defences. 
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Table 4.2 Continued from Previous Page 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Firm Characteristics Deal Characteristics 
 
Obs. Mean Median  Obs. Mean Median 
Market Value 537 4270.10 671.49 Deal Value 537 1910.92 244.55 
Log of Sales 537 5.9208 5.9256 Relative Size 537 0.6766 0.4673 
Market to Book Ratio 537 2.5447 1.9997 Toehold Size 33 22.99% 17.83% 
R&D/TA 537 0.0490 0.0035  Obs. Mean 
EBITDA/TA 537 0.1055 0.1339 Hostile Deal 537 3.35% 
Tangible Asset/AT 537 0.2821 0.2031 Tender Offer 537 20.48% 
Selling Expense/Sales 537 0.4006 0.1933 Pure Cash 537 16.01% 
Cash/AT 537 0.1173 0.0574 Pure Stock 537 35.75% 
Acquirer Market Leverage 537 0.3088 0.2810 Unsolicited Deal 537 5.40% 
Acquirer Leverage Deficit 537 -0.0017 -0.0056 Poison Pill 537 1.49% 
Target Market Leverage 537 0.3692 0.3482    
Target Leverage Deficit 537 0.0107 -0.0137    
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Table 4.3 Target Capital Structure Estimation 
This table presents the Tobit estimates of target leverage ratio for each bidder. The dependent variable is the market leverage ratio of bidder. The 
independent variable Log of Sales is the natural logarithm of firm’s total sales. The EBITDA/TA is EBITDA over total assets. Tangible Asset/TA is defined 
as the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment over total assets. R&D/TA is the ratio of R&D expense over total assets. Selling Expense/Sales is the 
ratio of selling expense over total sales. Market to Book ratio is the ratio of market value over book value of total assets. Cash/TA is the ratio of cash 
reserves over total assets. Market Median Leverage is the median value of all firms’ market leverage. The numbers are followed by ***, **, * if it is 
significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9/ / / / /MarketLeverage Sale EBITDA TA Tangible TA RD TA RDMiss SE Sale MtB Cash TA MML                      
 
Market Leverage 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value 
Intercept 0.2259*** 0.0751 0.0026 
Log of Sales 0.0169*** 0.0015 0.0001 
EBITDA/TA -0.4137*** 0.0252 0.0001 
Tangible Asset/TA 0.0411** 0.0193 0.0332 
R&D/TA -0.2547*** 0.0427 0.0001 
R&D Miss Dummy 0.0603*** 0.0086 0.0001 
Selling Expense/Sales -0.0137*** 0.0028 0.0001 
Market to Book Ratio -0.0304*** 0.0016 0.0001 
Cash/TA -0.2313*** 0.0249 0.0001 
Market Median Leverage 0.5151*** 0.0484 0.0001 
Observations 537 
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Table 4.4 Payment Choice Analysis 
This table presents the results of Logistic regression for using pure cash payment. The dependent variable is the dummy variable for whether using pure 
cash payment. The independent variable Bidder Leverage Deficit is the difference between bidder’s actual leverage ratio and its optimal level. Target 
Leverage Deficit is the difference between target’s actual leverage ratio and its optimal level. The deal type 1 is the deals in which under-leveraged bidders 
acquiring over-leveraged targets. The deal type 2 is the deals in which over-leveraged bidders acquiring under-leveraged targets. The deal type 3 is the 
deals in which under-leveraged bidders acquiring target-leveraged targets. The deal type 4 is the deals in which over-leveraged bidders acquiring 
target-leveraged targets. The deal type 5 is the deals in which more under-leveraged bidders acquiring less under-leveraged targets. The deal type 6 is the 
deals in which more over-leveraged bidders acquiring less over-leveraged targets. The variable Market Leverage is bidder’s market leverage ratio. The 
variable Market-to-Book ratio is the ratio of market value over book value of total assets. Cash/TA is the ratio of cash reserves over total assets. Log of 
Sales is the natural logarithm of firm’s total sales. Relative Size is the ratio of target’s total assets over bidder’s total assets. The numbers are followed by 
***, **, * if it is significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. The following are the models: 
Model 1 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7( 1)P PureCash BLD TLD BML MtB Cash Sales RSize                   
Model 2 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11( 1) 1 2 3 4 5 6P PureCash TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE BML MtB Cash Sales RSize                         
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Table 4.4 Continued from Previous Page 
Logistic Analysis for Payment Selection 
 P (Pure Cash = 1) 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Variable Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept -1.0003 0.2340 -0.6422 0.3598 
Bidder Leverage Deficit -4.9908*** 0.0067   
Target Leverage Deficit 0.9765 0.1901   
ULB Buy OLT   0.8949* 0.0755 
ULB Buy TLT   0.6104 0.0295 
More ULB Buy Less ULT   0.9749** 0.2107 
OLB Buy ULT   -0.9904** 0.1904 
OLB Buy TLT   -0.5733 0.0391 
More OLB Buy Less OLT   -0.0897 0.8452 
Market Leverage 4.6885*** 0.0056 3.2645*** 0.0035 
Market-to-Book ratio 0.4967*** 0.0001 0.4417*** 0.0001 
Cash/TA 1.8479* 0.0970 1.4394 0.1734 
Log of Sales -0.0573 0.4041 -0.0260 0.6978 
Relative Size  0.2772 0.2308 0.2638 0.2427 
   
Pseudo R-Square 0.0690 0.0863 
Observations 537 537 
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Table 4.5 Bidder’s Announcement Returns Classified by Firm Capital Structure Status 
This table shows short-term cumulative abnormal returns for all bidding firms around the takeover announcement. In left panel, the full sample is 
classified by the leverage deficit status of bidder and target. The CAR [-2, +2] denotes the five-day cumulative abnormal return measured by Fama-French 
three-factor plus momentum factor model. The estimate period is [-346, -91]. The right panel of this table presents the results of difference tests which are 
based on T-tests for mean values. The numbers are followed by ***, **, * if it is significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. 
 
Bidder’s [-2 ,+2] Cumulative Announcement Abnormal Returns 
Sample Selection Obs. Mean P-Value  T-Test for Difference  Mean P-Value 
Full Sample 536 -2.20%*** 0.0001  O-L Bidder – U-L Bidder 3.15%** 0.0208 
     O-L Bidder – T-L Bidder 4.09%*** 0.0013 
Deals with Over-Leveraged Bidder 167 0.41% 0.6711  T-L Bidder – U-L Bidder -0.95% 0.4479 
Deals with Target-Leveraged Bidder 186 -3.68%*** 0.0001  O-L Bidder – Full Sample 2.61%*** 0.0014 
Deals with Under-Leveraged Bidder 183 -2.74%*** 0.0044  T-L Bidder – Full Sample -1.48%** 0.0208 
     U-L Bidder – Full Sample -0.54% 0.3736 
Deals with Over-Leveraged Target 177 -2.53%*** 0.0046  O-L Target – U-L Target -0.87% 0.4767 
Deals with Target-Leveraged Target 177 -2.07%** 0.0407  O-L Target – T-L Target -0.46% 0.7323 
Deals with Under-Leveraged Target 182 -1.66%* 0.0535  T-L Target – U-L Target -0.42% 0.7530 
     O-L Target – Full Sample -0.33% 0.5516 
     T-L Target – Full Sample 0.13% 0.9893 
     U-L Target – Full Sample 0.54% 0.5633 
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Table 4.6 Bidder’s Announcement Returns Classified by Deal Type 
This table shows short-term cumulative abnormal returns for all bidding firms around the takeover announcement. In left panel, the full sample is 
classified by different types of M&A. Deal Type 1 is the deals Under-Leveraged Bidder acquiring Over-Leveraged Target. Deal Type 2 is the deals 
Over-Leveraged Bidder acquiring Under-Leveraged Target. Deal Type 3 is the deals Under-Leveraged Bidder acquiring Target-Leveraged Target. Deal 
Type 4 is the deals Over-Leveraged Bidder acquiring Target-Leveraged Target. Deal Type 5 is the deals More Under-Leveraged Bidder acquiring Less 
Under-Leveraged Target. Deal Type 6 is the deals More Over-Leveraged Bidder acquiring Less Over-Leveraged Target. The CAR [-2, +2] denotes the 
five-day cumulative abnormal return measured by Fama-French three-factor plus momentum factor model. The estimate period is [-346, -91]. The right 
panel of this table presents the results of difference tests which are based on T-tests for mean values. The numbers are followed by ***, **, * if it is 
significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. 
 
Bidder’s [-2 ,+2] Cumulative Announcement Abnormal Returns 
Sample Selection Obs. Mean P-Value  T-Test for Difference  Mean P-Value 
Full Sample 536 -2.20%*** 0.0001  ULB Buy OLT – OLB Buy ULT -4.35%* 0.0678 
     ULB Buy OLT – Full Sample -3.25%* 0.0591 
ULB Buy OLT 47 -5.45%** 0.0144  OLB Buy ULT – Full Sample 1.10% 0.5713 
OLB Buy ULT 38 -1.10% 0.5328     
     ULB Buy TLT – OLB Buy TLT -7.26%*** 0.0061 
ULB Buy TLT 59 -4.42%*** 0.0038  ULB Buy TLT – Full Sample -2.22%* 0.0955 
OLB Buy TLT 53 2.84%* 0.0892  OLB Buy TLT – Full Sample 5.04%** 0.0137 
        
More ULB Buy Less ULT 73 -2.30%* 0.0702  MULB Buy LULT – MOLB Buy LOLT -3.61%* 0.0955 
More OLB Buy Less OLT 63 1.32% 0.4907  MULB Buy LULT – Full Sample -0.10% 0.9335 
     MOLB Buy LOLT – Full Sample 3.51%** 0.0475 
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Table 4.7 Cross-sectional Regression for CARs based on Leverage Deficit 
This table shows the results of cross-sectional multivariate regressions for which the dependent variable is bidder’s five-day [-2, +2] cumulative abnormal 
returns. The estimates and P-Values are both reported for each variable. The variable Bidder Leverage Deficit is the difference between bidder’s actual 
leverage and its optimal level. Target Leverage Deficit is the difference between target’s actual leverage and its optimal level. Premium is the four week 
premiums of each deal recorded by SDC database. Profit is the ratio of EBITDA over total asset. Pure Cash is a dummy variable indicating whether deals 
are paid by 100 percent cash. Relative Size is the total value of the target over acquirers. Market-to-Book ratio is the ratio of firm’s market value of assets 
over the book value of assets. The numbers are followed by ***, **, * if it is significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. The 
following is the regression models: 
 
Model 1 
0 1 2[ 2, 2]CAR BLD TLD           
 
Model 2 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7[ 2, 2]CAR BLD MLD Premium Profit+ PureCash RelativeSize+ MtB                    
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Table 4.7 Continued from Previous Page 
 
Regression for CAR 
 CAR [-2,+2] 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Variable Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept -0.0204*** 0.0001 -0.0101 0.4508 
Bidder Leverage Deficit 0.0964*** 0.0088 0.0688* 0.0919 
Target Leverage Deficit -0.0277 0.3818 -0.0469 0.1697 
Premium   -0.0191* 0.0748 
Profit   0.0587* 0.0860 
Pure Cash   0.0583*** 0.0001 
Relative Size   0.0021 0.8072 
Market to Book    -0.0099*** 0.0025 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0130 0.0869 
Observations 536 469 
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Table 4.8 Cross-sectional Regression for CARs based on Leverage Deficit Dummy 
This table shows the results of cross-sectional multivariate regressions for which the dependent variable is bidder’s five-day [-2, +2] cumulative abnormal 
returns. The estimates and P-Values are both reported for each variable. The variable Over-Leveraged Bidder is the dummy variable for over-leveraged 
bidders. Target-Leveraged Bidder is the dummy variable for target-leveraged bidders. Under-Leveraged Bidder is the dummy variable for under-leveraged 
bidders. Premium is the four week premiums of each deal recorded by SDC database. Profit is the ratio of EBITDA over total asset. Pure Cash is a dummy 
variable indicating whether deals are paid by 100 percent cash. Relative Size is the total value of the target over acquirers. Market-to-Book ratio is the 
ratio of firm’s market value of assets over the book value of assets. The numbers are followed by ***, **, * if it is significantly different from zero with 
1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. The following is the regression models: 
 
Model 1 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6[ 2, 2]CAR OLB Premium Profit+ PureCash RelativeSize+ MtB                
 
Model 2 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6[ 2, 2]CAR TLB Premium Profit+ PureCash RelativeSize+ MtB                
 
Model 3 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6[ 2, 2]CAR ULB Premium Profit+ PureCash RelativeSize+ MtB                
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Table 4.8 Continued from Previous Page 
 
Regression for CAR 
 CAR [-2,+2] 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Variable Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept -0.0199 0.1528 -0.0063 0.6431 -0.0121 0.3921 
Over-Leveraged Bidder 0.0232* 0.0537     
Target-Leveraged Bidder   -0.0228* 0.0519   
Under-Leveraged Bidder     0.0007 0.9497 
Premium -0.0198* 0.0637 -0.0203* 0.0579 -0.0206* 0.0549 
Profit 0.0640* 0.0576 0.0789** 0.0202 0.0699** 0.0431 
Pure Cash 0.0596*** 0.0001 0.0598*** 0.0001 0.0593*** 0.0001 
Relative Size 0.0002 0.9831 -0.0004 0.9593 0.0014 0.8735 
Market to Book  -0.0088*** 0.0067 -0.0086*** 0.0081 -0.0096*** 0.0030 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0866 0.0867 0.0792 
Observations 469 469 469 
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Table 4.9 Cross-sectional Regression for CARs based on Deal Type 
This table shows the results of cross-sectional multivariate regressions for which the dependent variable is bidder’s five-day [-2, +2] cumulative abnormal 
returns. The estimates and P-Values are both reported for each variable. The variable Deal Type is the dummy variable for six types of deals. Premium is 
the four week premiums of each deal recorded by SDC database. Profit is the ratio of EBITDA over total asset. Pure Cash is a dummy variable indicating 
whether deals are paid by 100 percent cash. Relative Size is the total value of the target over acquirers. Market-to-Book ratio is the ratio of firm’s market 
value of assets over the book value of assets. The numbers are followed by ***, **, * if it is significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% 
confidence level. The following is the regression models: 
Model 1 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6[ 2, 2] 1CAR TYPE Premium Profit+ PureCash RelativeSize+ MtB                
Model 2 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6[ 2, 2] 2CAR TYPE Premium Profit+ PureCash RelativeSize+ MtB                
Model 3 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6[ 2, 2] 3CAR TYPE Premium Profit+ PureCash RelativeSize+ MtB                
Model 4 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6[ 2, 2] 4CAR TYPE Premium Profit+ PureCash RelativeSize+ MtB                
Model 5 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6[ 2, 2] 5CAR TYPE Premium Profit+ PureCash RelativeSize+ MtB                
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Table 4.9 Continued from Previous Page 
Model 6 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6[ 2, 2] 6CAR TYPE Premium Profit+ PureCash RelativeSize+ MtB                
 
Regression for CAR  
 CAR [-2,+2]  
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)  
Variable Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value  
Intercept -0.0090 0.5037 -0.0106 0.4329 -0.0105 0.4370 -0.0138 0.2971 -0.0141 0.3049 -0.0161 0.2296  
ULB Buy OLT -0.0298* 0.0692            
OLB Buy ULT   -0.0159 0.4649          
ULB Buy TLT     -0.0133 0.4487        
OLB Buy TLT       0.0578*** 0.0015      
MULB Buy LULT         0.0115 0.4804    
MOLB Buy LOLT           0.0392** 0.0206  
Premium -0.0193* 0.0728 -0.0207* 0.0532 -0.0202* 0.0602 -0.0211** 0.0472 -0.0201* 0.0608 -0.0195* 0.0673  
Profit 0.0619* 0.0684 0.0702** 0.0373 0.0680** 0.0440 0.0592* 0.0771 0.0731** 0.0321 0.0666** 0.0471  
Pure Cash 0.0593*** 0.0001 0.0601*** 0.0001 0.0589*** 0.0001 0.0588*** 0.0001 0.0598*** 0.0001 0.0601*** 0.0001  
Relative Size 0.0023 0.7940 0.0012 0.8886 0.0016 0.8528 -0.0014 0.8688 0.0014 0.8682 -0.0012 0.8914  
Market to Book  -0.0098*** 0.0023 -0.0097*** 0.0027 -0.0096*** 0.0029 -0.0098*** 0.0021 -0.0096*** 0.0029 -0.0092*** 0.0041  
Adjusted R-Square 0.0839 0.0802 0.0803 0.0990 0.0802 0.0898  
Observations 469 469 469 469 469 469  
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Table 4.10 Bidder’s 12-month Post-Merger BHARs Classified by Firm Capital Structure Status 
This table shows long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns for all merging firms in post-merger period. In left panel, the full sample is classified by the 
leverage deficit status of bidder and target. The 12-month BHAR denotes the 12 months buy and hold abnormal returns measured by Fama-French 
three-factor plus momentum factor model. The right panel of this table presents the results of difference tests which are based on T-tests for mean values. 
The numbers are followed by ***, **, * if it is significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. 
 
Bidder’s 12-month Post-Merger BHARs 
Sample Selection Obs. Mean P-Value  T-Test for Difference  Mean P-Value 
Full Sample 524 -32.71%*** 0.0001  O-L Bidder – U-L Bidder -11.41% 0.2381 
     O-L Bidder – T-L Bidder -4.90% 0.6097 
Deals with Over-Leveraged Bidder 165 -38.26%*** 0.0001  T-L Bidder – U-L Bidder -6.50% 0.5318 
Deals with Target-Leveraged Bidder 182 -33.36%*** 0.0001  O-L Bidder – Full Sample -5.55% 0.3172 
Deals with Under-Leveraged Bidder 177 -26.85% 0.0004  T-L Bidder – Full Sample -0.65% 0.9067 
     U-L Bidder – Full Sample 5.86% 0.3038 
Deals with Over-Leveraged Target 173 -41.06%*** 0.0001  O-L Target – U-L Target -8.85% 0.3994 
Deals with Target-Leveraged Target 173 -24.86%*** 0.0001  O-L Target – T-L Target -16.20%* 0.0798 
Deals with Under-Leveraged Target 178 -32.21%*** 0.0001  T-L Target – U-L Target 7.35% 0.4623 
     O-L Target – Full Sample -12.47% 0.1487 
     T-L Target – Full Sample 11.71% 0.1469 
     U-L Target – Full Sample 0.75% 0.9345 
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Table 4.11 Bidder’s 12-month Post-Merger BHARs Classified by Deal Type 
This table shows long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns for all merging firms in post-merger period. In left panel, the full sample is classified by 
different types of M&A deals. The 12-month BHAR denotes the 12 months buy and hold abnormal returns measured by Fama-French three-factor plus 
momentum factor model. The right panel of this table presents the results of difference tests which are based on T-tests for mean values. The numbers are 
followed by ***, **, * if it is significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. 
 
 Bidder’s 12-month Post-Merger BHARs  
Sample Selection Obs. Mean P-Value  T-Test for Difference  Mean P-Value 
Full Sample 524 -32.71%*** 0.0001  ULB Buy OLT – OLB Buy ULT 26.59% 0.1957 
     ULB Buy OLT – Full Sample 10.75% 0.4118 
ULB Buy OLT 46 -21.95% 0.1547  OLB Buy ULT – Full Sample -15.83% 0.2758 
OLB Buy ULT 38 -48.54%*** 0.0006     
     ULB Buy TLT – OLB Buy TLT -23.09%* 0.0978 
ULB Buy TLT 57 -39.07%*** 0.0002  ULB Buy TLT – Full Sample -6.36% 0.5101 
OLB Buy TLT 53 -15.98% 0.1259  OLB Buy TLT – Full Sample 16.73%* 0.0998 
        
More ULB Buy Less ULT 70 -48.78%*** 0.0001  MULB Buy LULT – MOLB Buy LOLT -7.81% 0.6306 
More OLB Buy Less OLT 63 -40.97%*** 0.0016  MULB Buy LULT – Full Sample -16.07%* 0.0976 
     MOLB Buy LOLT – Full Sample -8.26% 0.4521 
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Chapter 5 
5. M&As and Financial Media 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the relation between stock market reactions to M&As and 
quantitative media information. It is generally believed that financial newspapers play an 
important role in disseminating information to financial market participants. These 
newspapers have a direct impact on investor sentiment concerning either the whole 
market or individual stocks. Their impact significantly affects the future movement of 
stock prices. There are few studies on media’s relation with the financial market. As 
Tetlock (2007) shows, the content of news is able to predict future movements of the 
whole stock market. More specifically, Tetlock, et al. (2008) suggests that media reports 
can predict an individual firm’s stock returns. On the other hand, previous media studies 
also show that the media can report a firm’s unreleased fundamental information and have 
predictability for the firm’s future performance. The new information released by news 
will naturally affect stock market valuations. 
 
However, a significant gap exists in the research. The literature shows that the financial 
media have a strong influence on firm stock performance. To our knowledge, however, 
only a few papers examine the relation between the financial media and corporate events 
such as M&As. Therefore, the original motivation of this chapter is to examine the 
potential interaction between financial media and M&A deals. Based on previous findings 
on the relation between financial media and the financial market, we expect M&A deals 
to interact with the financial media through two major channels. First, according to 
previous M&A papers, the stock market’s reaction to a takeover announcement is an 
indispensable research object. It is generally believed that stock market reactions to a 
takeover announcement mainly reflect investor recognition of this corporate event. Since 
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investor recognition can vary with the news released by the financial media, we expect to 
observe a significant relation between financial news and the acquirer’s abnormal returns 
around takeover announcements. In addition, Tetlock et al. (2008) proves that the 
fundamental information transmitted by the financial news is able to resolve the problem 
of information asymmetry. This news provides additional information for investors to 
adjust their prospects in M&A deals and long-term valuations. Thus we expect an 
acquirer’s long-term post-merger performance to be affected by media reports. Based on 
these two channels, this chapter develops three major research questions. The first 
research question is that whether news released in pre-merger period affects the market 
reactions to takeover announcement. The analysis for this question would improve our 
understandings on bidder’s announcement effects. The second research question is that 
whether financial media could predict new merging firm’s long term stock performance. 
Moreover, it is also necessary to explore the reliable explanation for above two questions. 
 
Using a sample of US M&A deals during 2000–2009, this chapter examines the market 
reactions to M&A events based on different levels of media coverage and media attitude. 
In contrast to the previous literature, which focuses on the relation between financial 
media and the entire stock market, we shed light on one of the most representative 
corporate events, the M&A, to further investigate the effect of media news on financial 
markets. 
 
To conduct our research, we construct a unique and comprehensive data set that contains 
478,830 financial news articles, as well as data on 288 M&A deals. The M&A deals are 
split into subsamples according to the level of relative media coverage and attitude, 
respectively. To evaluate the performance of M&A deals, both short-term CARs and 
long-term BHARs are calculated for each firm. Comparing the average CARs of the two 
subsamples, we show that the market appears to have a more favoured response to 
takeover deals announced by firms with relatively better media attitudes. However, the 
announcement returns of firms with different levels of media attitude are not dramatically 
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different. The regression results further support these findings. After controlling for 
variables that have an impact on bidder short-term stock returns, the empirical results 
show that there is a statistically significant relation between CARs and the media attitude 
measure. For robustness, we study a group of CARs with different time windows to 
further validate this relation. The results from these complementary models also suggest 
that media attitude should significantly affect a bidding firm’s short-term performance, 
especially its announcement abnormal returns. For long-term BHARs, we find evidence 
that media attitude around the takeover event can partially predict a bidder’s post-merger 
performance. We also find that the premiums paid by bidders are related to both media 
attitude and coverage before takeover announcements. 
 
Our research makes several contributions to the literature. This study is the first to 
investigate the relation between financial media and M&As based on stock market 
performance. Extending previous literature on the interaction between financial media 
and stock market movements, this chapter refines the research window. Our research time 
window is specified by the most important corporate event, M&A activities. This chapter 
finds substantial empirical evidence that news from popular and powerful financial 
newspapers has a large impact on stock market reactions to takeover announcements. The 
research particularly focuses on short-term reactions to takeover announcements. These 
important findings promote a better understanding of acquirer’s short-term abnormal 
returns around an M&A deal announcement and subsequent reversion to 
pre-announcement levels in the following days. Moreover, we classify news stories into 
two data sets, by media attitude and media coverage. The empirical evidence suggests 
that media attitude has a more significant impact on short-term returns than media 
coverage. This conclusion has further implications for investor sentiment research and 
suggests that media attitude could be considered an effective proxy for investor 
sentiment. 
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the related literature. Section 5.3 
presents the main hypotheses. Section 5.4 introduces the sample selection and descriptive 
statistics. Section 5.5 presents the empirical results and related discussions. Section 5.6 
concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2 Literature review 
5.2.1 Media content and the financial market 
Few studies examine media’s relation with the financial market. The interaction between 
financial media and the stock market is considered linked to investor psychology and 
sociology, but the direction of causality is still debatable. Tetlock’s (2007) study 
determines whether the financial media news induces, amplifies, or simply reflects the 
interpretations of financial market performance. It is the first paper to examine the 
relation between the content of financial media and future stock market activities. To 
quantitatively measure the content of the influential column ‘Abreast of the Market’ in 
The Wall Street Journal during 1984–1999, Tetlock uses the famous quantitative content 
analysis program General Inquirer and generates a measure of media pessimism. The 
author then uses vector autoregression to estimate the interaction between the media 
pessimism factor and the stock market. The empirical results suggest that a high level of 
media pessimism is able to predict future downward pressure on the stock market. But 
this pattern is also followed by a reversion to fundamental values, which implies that the 
influence of media news is temporary. Moreover, this finding shows that media 
pessimism also has an impact on market trading volume. High market trading volume is 
attributed to unexpected high or low values of the media pessimism factor. On the other 
hand, low market returns also induce high media pessimism. Tetlock’s findings suggest 
that the content of financial media would be a reliable proxy for investor sentiment. 
However, the empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis that media news 
contains additional information about a firm’s fundamental values. 
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Tetlock, et al. (2008) refines their research target from the whole stock market to 
individual firms. They quantify the content of financial news in an effort to forecast 
individual firm stock returns and accounting earnings. The media source is not limited to 
‘Abreast of the Market’ in The Wall Street Journal and extends to all news stories in The 
Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones News Service about individual Standard & Poor’s 500 
firms during 1980–2004. Similar to Tetlock, the authors calculate the fraction of negative 
words to the total number of words as the media pessimism factor. 
 
Tetlock, et al. (2008) points out two significant advantages to using a content analysis 
framework to examine the interaction between media news and individual firm stock 
returns. First, by quantifying the content of news, they can select all types of corporate 
events and not just one particular event type. The more complete set of events provides a 
clearer pattern with which to investigate the impact of financial media on stock returns. 
Second, it is believed that a news story published by financial media is a potentially 
important source of firm fundamental information. In addition to traditional main sources 
of firm fundamental information, such as analyst forecasts and firms’ public disclosures, 
firm-specific news may provide incremental explanatory power for a firm’s future stock 
returns and accounting earnings. 
 
As Tetlock, et al. (2008) argue, the evidence shows that the negative information 
delivered by financial news is before stock analysts’ forecasts. This result suggests that 
the financial media are considered a reliable supplemental source of fundamental 
information. Furthermore, it shows that firm stock prices respond to information 
embedded in the financial news with a one-day delay. However, a trading strategy based 
on exploring this small delay is not profitable since a reasonable trading cost must be 
considered. In addition, the results suggest that the news relating to firm fundamentals is 
able to more effectively predict a firm’s future stock returns and accounting earnings. 
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To further test the results of the previous study (Tetlock et al, 2008), Tetlock (2010) 
examines how the financial media resolve the problem of information asymmetry. The 
author uses a uniquely comprehensive media data set to test the hypotheses from the 
asymmetric information model. This media set contains more than 2.2 million financial 
news items covering the 29-year period from 1979 to 2007. Tetlock proposes that public 
financial news is able to eliminate the information asymmetry between informed and 
uninformed investors. There are four major hypotheses in the author’s analysis: (1) firm 
abnormal returns on the news day are positively related to stock returns on following days, 
(2) news days with higher trading volume have more predictive power than days with 
lower trading volume, (3) financial news increases the correlation between a firm’s 
trading volume and stock returns, and (4) the trading behaviour of informed investors has 
less of an impact on stock prices since financial news reduces information asymmetry. 
The author uses daily cross-sectional regressions to examine the stock returns and trading 
volume on both news days and non-news days. Consistent with predictions, the empirical 
results suggest that the reversals of abnormal returns on news days are significantly lower 
than on non-news days. Moreover, they show that the cross-sectional correlation between 
a firm’s abnormal returns and abnormal trading volumes is 35% higher on news days than 
on non-news days. The impact of order flow on stock prices is also temporarily 3.3% 
lower on news days. This evidence shows that financial news releases new information to 
uninformed investors, whereas informed investors have already acted on this information. 
 
The relation between financial news and the reduced reversal of abnormal returns also 
varies according to different characteristics. The effect of financial news is much stronger 
for small and illiquid firm stocks than others, since it resolves more information 
asymmetry. The content of financial news also affects its impact on return reversals and 
trading volumes. News with newswire and earnings-related information has a 
significantly larger impact than other types of news. 
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To further investigate the effect of financial news on resolving information asymmetry, 
Tetlock (2011) tests whether investors distinguish between old and new information from 
the content of financial news. The author adopts a variable for staleness to evaluate how 
much new information is included in the financial news. Staleness is measured by 
average textual similarity to the 10 previous news items relating to the same stock. After 
examining the cross-sectional stock returns and trading volumes of firms on news days, 
the author shows that the staleness of news has a significant impact on market reactions. 
Both the stock returns and trading volumes on news days with low average staleness 
significantly exceed those for news days with high staleness financial news. The results 
further suggest that the staleness of news is an effective predictor of future stock returns. 
There is a significant and negative relation between the staleness of financial news and 
the future returns of related stocks. Furthermore, the empirical results show that 
institutional investors are less likely to react to stale news than individual investors. 
 
5.2.2 Media coverage and the financial market 
For researchers, the media news normally involves two sets of information: media content 
and media coverage. Tetlock’s (2007, 2010, 2011) papers mainly employ a content 
analysis methodology to evaluate the general attitude of financial news. In contrast, Fang 
and Peress (2009) use media coverage to investigate the relation between the media and 
the financial market. They examine the cross-sectional relation between mass media 
coverage and stock returns during the period 1993–2002. The empirical evidence shows a 
significant return premium for firms with no or less media coverage compared to firms 
with massive media coverage. After controlling for financial market, firm size, 
book-to-market, momentum, and liquidity factors, the authors show that a portfolio of 
stocks with no media coverage has a 3% higher annual return than a portfolio of stocks 
with high media coverage. The differences of abnormal returns between the two 
portfolios are particularly large for small firms and firms with low analyst coverage, high 
individual ownership, or high idiosyncratic volatility. The authors propose two 
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explanations for these differences. The first one is the liquidity-related hypothesis: 
Mispricing for stocks with no media coverage persists only because market friction is too 
high to exploit it. Another explanation is the investor recognition hypothesis: Firms with 
low media coverage are naturally associated with low investor recognition. These firms 
should provide additional returns to compensate for imperfect diversification. 
 
The empirical evidence supports both hypotheses. Consistent with the liquitidy-related 
hypothesis, the impact of media coverage is much stronger among small firms with high 
bid–ask spreads. According to the investor recognition hypothesis, firms with a high 
percentage of individual ownership, low levels of analyst coverage, or high idiosyncratic 
volatility present higher premiums for the lack of media coverage. However, the 
illiquidity hypothesis is only able to explain the persistence of media effect and not the 
cause. Thus Fang and Peress (2009) conclude that the return premium of media coverage 
mainly reflects different levels of investor recognition and the illiquidity of stocks helps 
perpetuate this phenomenon. 
 
Engelberg and Parsons (2009) also investigate the causal relation between media 
coverage and stock market reactions. Specifically, they focus on whether media coverage 
can affect investor response to financial events. To exploit the geographic variation of 
local newspapers, they identify 19 local financial markets covering major US cities, using 
retail brokerage data and a major information source for each market. The empirical 
results mainly suggest that the presence of local media coverage has a strong impact on 
the trading activity of local financial markets. After controlling for several factors, the 
authors show that the interaction between local media coverage and local trading 
activities remains strong for both local and non-local firms. Evidence from examining the 
effect of exogenous shocks further supports their conclusions: It shows that if the normal 
delivery of local media is disrupted for exogenous reasons, the relation between media 
coverage and the local financial market is temporary broken. The evidence also shows 
that trading activity patterns depend strongly on local media coverage. 
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Not only are the trading activities of local financial markets affected by media coverage, 
but Fang, et al. (2009) indicates that mutual fund trading activities are also related to 
stock media coverage. The authors examine whether mutual fund manager decisions are 
influenced by media coverage. They believe that media coverage can draw fund managers’ 
attention to specific firms. Using unique media coverage data from 1993 to 2002, the 
authors analyse the relation between a mutual fund’s trading propensity and media 
coverage. The empirical results suggest that mutual funds generally present a high 
intensity of trading for high media coverage firms. Furthermore, mutual funds tend to buy 
more high media coverage stocks than sell them. However, not all funds trade with media 
coverage. The evidence indicates that the attitudes of mutual funds with media coverage 
differ substantially, on average, from those without media coverage. On the other hand, 
the cross-sectional variation in trade with media coverage (PTMC) has a large impact on 
mutual fund performance. When the mutual funds are sorted into PTMC-based quintiles, 
there is a significantly negative relation between PTMC and fund alpha values. Thus 
TPMC measures can be used to partially predict a fund’s future performance. 
 
5.2.3 The media and corporate events 
The relation between financial media and a firm’s corporate events is also an interesting 
and popular research field. Bhattacharya et al. (2009) investigate the role of the media in 
the Internet IPO bubble. They construct a sample of 458 Internet IPOs between 1996 and 
2000 and a matching sample of 458 non-Internet IPOs with related financial news. Each 
news report is classified as good, neutral, or bad news according to the news content. 
Overall media sentiment for each IPO is measured by the number of good news items 
minus the number of bad news items. The descriptive results show that Internet IPOs had 
significantly higher media coverage than non-Internet IPOs in both the bubble and 
post-bubble periods. In the bubble period, the average sentiment of news for Internet 
IPOs was more positive than for matching-sample IPOs. On the contrary, in the 
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post-bubble period, average media sentiment for Internet IPO fell dramatically and 
became even more negative than for non-Internet IPOs. After controlling for several 
factors, the results consistently suggest that the interaction between stock returns and 
media sentiment was more positive in the bubble period and more negative in the 
post-bubble period. Overall, these empirical results strongly support the argument that the 
media played an important role in the Internet IPO bubble. 
 
The empirical evidence of Bhattacharya et al. (2009) also suggests that the marginal 
effects of the media on stock returns are distinctly different between Internet and 
non-Internet IPOs. The impact of news sentiment on risk-adjusted returns is much lower 
for Internet IPOs than for non-Internet IPOs in both the bubble and post-bubble periods. 
However, media coverage is not a significant factor for the Internet bubble and only 
explains 2.9% of the difference in stock returns between Internet and non-Internet firms. 
 
More generally, Liu, et al. (2013) examines the long-term role of the media in US IPOs. 
They argue that media coverage in the pre-IPO period significantly relates to long-term 
measures of investor attention and firm valuations. The measure of media coverage is the 
total number of news items related to IPO firms during the filing period. The empirical 
evidence suggests that the pre-IPO media coverage is positively related to a firm’s 
long-term stock performance, which is measured by the price-to-earnings before interest 
and taxes ratio and the price-to-sales ratio. Moreover, media coverage also has a 
significant impact on firm liquidity, institutional ownership, and analyst coverage in the 
years following an IPO. Both these findings support Merton’s investor recognition theory 
and clearly define media’s long-term role in IPOs. 
 
For M&As, Buehlmaier (2013) first determine that whether the media can predict 
takeover outcome. The author develops a theoretical model to explain how the financial 
media affects takeover outcome and empirically demonstrates that. The model uses a 
naïve Bayes framework to quantify the content of financial news. It shows that the 
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information released by the media is able to mitigate the information asymmetry between 
the shareholders of both acquirers and targets. Target shareholders especially receive 
more fundamental information about the future valuation of merging firms, which may 
encourage them to approve the deal. Therefore the model predicts that positive media 
content increases the probability of takeover success. Using a logistic model, the 
empirical evidence strongly supports the argument that positive media predict takeover 
success. After controlling for several deal and firm characteristics that may affect 
takeover success, the estimate for the media attitude measure is highly significant and 
positive. The media attitude measure also significantly increases the regression’s 
goodness of fit. Therefore, the author concludes that media content about the acquirer is 
the most important explanatory variable in predicting takeover success in terms of 
significance, goodness of fit and marginal effects. 
 
In addition, Ahern and Sosyura (2012) investigate whether a firm actively manages media 
coverage to influence takeover outcome by examining the acquirer’s corporate press 
releases during the M&A period. Most importantly, the authors collect a unique and novel 
data set on merger negotiations and a comprehensive media coverage data set. The results 
show that in stock mergers, acquirers release significantly more news during the 
negotiation period. The average attitude of the media news also turns out to be more 
positive, since the number of news items with negative information falls dramatically. 
Increases in media coverage and attitude would boost stock prices in the short run and 
provide substantial advantages in merger negotiations. The authors further argue that this 
phenomenon cannot be explained by such hypotheses as merger timing, passive media 
management, and merger rumours. The only reliable explanation is that acquirers have an 
incentive to influence their stock prices by actively managing news releases during 
merger negotiations. 
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5.3 Hypothesis 
As stated previously, acquirer stock returns around the announcement day is a major topic 
in M&A research. The literature identifies numerous factors that can affect acquirer 
announcement returns. Both deal and firm characteristics can affect stock returns in M&A 
deals. 
 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Moeller, et al. (2007) both suggest a relation between 
methods of payment for takeovers and acquirer abnormal returns, in terms of either 
short-term CARs or long-term post-merger returns. In addition, Luo (2005) argues that 
experience is also an important factor that influences M&A gains. The author suggests 
that multiple bidders have the ability to learn from previous deals they made and to 
improve their gains in subsequent transactions. 
 
Moreover, Baker and Savasoglu (2002) document that the limits of arbitrage can produce 
higher stock returns in M&A deals. Chang (1998) shows that both types of target and 
methods of payment have an impact on stock market reactions. The stock market presents 
a more favoured response to deals with private targets than with public targets. From 
another point of view, Moeller, et al. (2004) find that different acquirer types exhibit 
different levels of performance in M&As. Small acquirers perform significantly better 
than large acquirers. 
 
Based on above findings, this chapter examines whether the financial media are able to 
influence takeover gains. As Tetlock (2007, 2010) and Fang and Peress (2009) show, both 
the attitude and coverage of financial media have a significant impact on the stock market 
in different ways, as in affecting investor sentiment or resolving information asymmetry. 
This finding suggests that when a takeover announcement is made, previous news stories 
released by the financial media are able to partially influence market reactions to bidder 
stock prices in the short term. More specifically, favourite news will drive bidder stock 
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prices up. This chapter evaluates media attitude by the fraction of negative words to the 
total number of words, called the media pessimism factor. Thus the greater a bidder’s 
media pessimism is, the lower its short-term abnormal returns around the takeover 
announcement period. This intuition is formalized in the following hypothesis. 
 
H1: There is a significantly negative interaction between media pessimism and market 
response to takeover announcements. 
 
However, bidder announcement abnormal returns represent only the market’s initial 
opinions to each M&A deal. Generally, merging firms’ long-term post-merger stock 
returns are used to assess the deal’s real performance. As previous papers argue, the 
content of news stories released by the financial media can contain unrealized 
fundamental information that helps resolve information asymmetry between different 
groups of investors. Consequently, the financial media have the ability to predict a firm’s 
future stock performance. Based on this argument, we believe that news relating to 
takeover deals also has the ability to forecast bidder post-merger performance. Following 
previous studies, news stories reported between the deal announcement day and the day 
before the effective day are considered the most relevant news for M&A deals. These 
relevant news items should focus on the takeover deal and the disclosure of both the 
bidder’s and the target’s fundamental information. This information mechanism provides 
a clear prospect of merging firms for the financial market and individual investors and 
helps them better understand and adjust the valuations for the merging firms. This leads 
to the following hypothesis. 
 
H2: The news relating to takeover deals can partially predict the merging firm’s 
post-merger long term performance. 
 
In conclusion, we believe that the financial media have two functional aspects for stock 
market and firm M&A events. First, the news stories released by the financial media will 
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partially bias market and investor sentiment. This effect is quickly reflected in the firm’s 
stock price movements. This function is generally effective in the short term rather than 
the long term. Thus H1 examines whether this function is still valid in the announcement 
returns of M&A deals. On the contrary, H2 concerns more the relation between merging 
firms’ long-term post-merger performance and the financial media. As we know, the 
merging firms’ post-merger stock performance is an important criterion for judging the 
success of takeover deals. The second function of the financial media is the disclosure of 
unreleased information and resolution of potential information asymmetry. Our second 
hypothesis assumes that the news stories during a specific event window are able to 
predict a merging firm’s future stock performance. 
 
5.4 Data and Methodology 
5.4.1 Sample selection criteria 
Our M&A data are from the SDC Mergers & Acquisitions database. They include all 
successful deals during the period from January 2000 to December 2008. Table 5.1 shows 
the selection criteria used and the number of deals remained after filtering by each 
criterion. We collect the data on all deals in which both the acquirer and target firms are 
US public listed companies, for a total of 133,067 deals. Deals involving firms in the 
financial and utility industries are deleted from the sample, which reduces the sample to 
88,492 deals. Moreover, only deals announced between January 2000 and December 
2008 and successfully completed are included in our sample, for a total of 20,177 deals. 
Deals identified by the SDC as types of privatization, acquisitions of remaining interest, 
spinoffs, recapitalizations, repurchases, and self-tenders are also excluded, leaving a 
sample with 19,566 deals. Furthermore, takeover deals of less than US$100 million are 
deleted, leaving a sample with 2793 deals. The basic motivation for deleting small deals 
is that large deals are generally more attractive than small deals from the financial 
media’s point of view. These deals will receive more media coverage, which can be 
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helpful in eliminating potential sample bias. Based on the same reasons, our research 
includes only public acquirers and targets. Finally, after matching with both the 
accounting data from Compustat and the stock price data in the CRSP databases and 
combining these with the media data, our final initial sample contains 288 M&A deals. 
 
5.4.2 Media Construction Methodology 
The primary source of media data is the Dow Jones’ Factiva database. The financial news 
articles come from two major US financial media, the Dow Jones News Service and The 
Wall Street Journal (WSJ). For each acquirer, the news three years before and three years 
after the takeover announcement is collected, for a total of 478,830 news articles. We use 
the number of news articles about acquirers to proxy for media coverage. For our media 
content analysis, following the framework of Tetlock (2007) and Tetlock, et al. (2008), we 
choose the ratio of negative words to the total number of words to represent media 
attitude. Similar to previous literature, each single word in the document-term matrix was 
categorized into two groups, using positive and negative word categories. Unlike previous 
studies that use the Harvard IV-4 Psychosocial Dictionary, this chapter uses Loughran 
and McDonald’s (2011) alternative financial word list. The general motivation for this 
choice is applicability. A well-known, commonly used source for word classification, the 
Harvard IV-4 Psychosocial Dictionary was originally developed for psychology and 
sociology contexts. It is doubtful whether it applies well to the realm of finance. As a 
result, Loughran and McDonald (2011) provide evidence that the Harvard IV-4 list 
substantially misclassifies words when used in financial applications. As a result they 
created a new word category list that typically has negative implications in a financial 
sense. 
 
/MediaPessimism NegativeWords TotalWords                          (5.1) 
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As indicated previously, our primary measure of media attitude is the fraction of negative 
words in each news story. We use the media pessimism factor to represent the media’s 
negative emotion in news that could directly influence investor sentiment. This 
measurement is widely used in the previous literature, for example, by Tetlock (2007), 
Tetlock, et al. (2008), and Loughran and McDonald (2011). Those measures combine the 
frequencies of positive (P) and negative (N) words, as in (P – N)/Total number of words. 
However, consistent with previous studies, using measures integrating positive words 
produces weaker results. As Tetlock’s (2007) study shows, negative words summarizes 
common variations better than any other single category of words, including positive 
words. The negative words present a stronger correlation with stock market performance 
than the other categories. The main explanation is that negative information has more of 
an impact than positive information, as a large body of the psychology literature indicates 
(Baumeister et al., 2001). When processing within a wide range of contexts, negative 
information attracts more public attention and inducesm stronger reactions (Rozin and 
Royzman, 2001). Another potential explanation is that either the Harvard IV-4 list or 
Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) financial words list has a tendency for negative words. 
The word count in the positive list is significantly smaller than for the negative list, which 
creates potential bias when used in content analysis. 
 
Another consideration for a single negative measure is that reporting the empirical 
evidence based on multiple measures of media attitude can mitigate the potential problem 
of data mining. Based on the reasons described at the beginning of this chapter, we 
choose the ratio of negative words to total words in the news as the measure of media 
content. The steps for processing financial news in our sample are as follows: 
 
(1) Use content analysis programming to obtain the fraction of negative words for each 
news story, Negative Fraction = Number of negative words/Number of total words. 
(2) Identify and group all related qualifying news items for each single deal in a given 
time window. 
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(3) Calculate the mean values of the media pessimism factor for all available deals. These 
mean values are considered to be representative of the media attitude for each bidder. 
 
5.4.3 Sample description 
Table 5.2 presents the annual description of M&A characteristics for the whole sample 
from 2000 to 2008, covering the period of the Internet bubble until the financial crisis. 
Since the Internet bubble broke in 2000, the sum of deal value decreased from US$155.94 
trillion in 2000 to US$28.23 trillion in 2003. The new merger wave starts in 2004 and is 
stopped by the financial crisis in 2008. Both the mean and median deal values move in a 
similar trend with the sum value. Interestingly, the percentage of deals paid in pure cash 
exhibits a continuing increasing trend, from only 12.31% in 2000 to 68.75% in 2008; on 
the other hand, the percentage of deals paid in pure stock decreased from 38.46% to 6.25% 
during the same period. 
 
The summary statistics for all qualifying news stories are reported in Table 5.3. We 
summarize the length and counts of positive and negative words in the news titles and 
content for each news story. The last variable is a measure for media attitude: the number 
of negative words over the total number of words. A comparison of the mean and median 
values for each variable suggests that there is no substantial skewness caused by outliers. 
The average frequency of negative words to total words is 1.74% and 1.47% in the 
median. These results are similar to that of Loughran and McDonald (2011), 1.39%, and 
significantly lower than the results using the Harvard IV-4 word criterion. A reasonable 
explanation is that Loughran and McDonald’s Financial Negative List has only about half 
as many words as the Harvard IV-4 Negative List. As discussed above, a comparison 
between the frequencies of positive and negative words easily shows that negative words 
appear more often in news stories than positive words. This finding is consistent with 
those of previous studies. 
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Furthermore, Table 5.4 provides descriptive statistics for both firm and deal 
characteristics and subsamples categorized by media data. The subsamples in Panel A are 
categorized by the media pessimism factor. We use the natural logarithm of the market 
value to represent firm size. The significant difference in market value between the two 
subsamples indicates that large acquirers are more likely to receive pessimistic news 
stories. Another variable that differs significantly between the two subsamples is the ratio 
of a firm’s R&D expenses over total assets. This ratio is a proxy for a firm’s product 
uniqueness. However, there is no significant difference between the two subsamples for 
most acquirer characteristics, in either a T-test for the mean value or a Wilcoxon test for 
the median value. The market-to-book ratio variable represents a firm’s growth 
opportunity. The ratio EBITDA/TA is a proxy for profitability. These results imply that 
there is no potential self-selection bias in the financial media with new, differentiated 
pessimism factors. The comparisons for deal characteristics present similar results. For 
the deal value variable, there is no significant difference in either the mean or median test 
between the two subsamples. The T-test for the mean value of the relative size ratio is 
statistically significant but turns out to be insignificant in the Wilcoxon median test. The 
percentage of hostile deals and unsolicited deals between the two subsamples is also very 
similar. On average, the payment media between the positive and negative subsamples 
also differ insignificantly. 
 
In Panel B of Table 5.4, the subsamples are categorized by different levels of media 
coverage. Unlike the results in Panel A, more variables show significant differences in the 
statistical tests. First, as Fang and Peress (2009) and Buehlmaier (2013) show, financial 
news released by the media normally focuses on large listed firms. The market value of 
acquirers under high media coverage is much higher than for those with low media 
coverage, in terms of either the mean or the median value. The average firm size of the 
high media coverage subsample is more than six times that of the low media coverage 
subsample. Large acquirers prefer larger targets than small acquirers. Therefore, the 
average deal value made by the high media coverage subsample is significantly higher 
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than that for acquirers with low media coverage. However, comparison of the variable 
Relative Size reveals an opposing trend. The differences in capital structure between high 
and low media coverage acquirers are also distinctive. We use the market leverage ratio 
and the interest coverage ratio to represent a firm’s capital structure. The empirical results 
show that both measures differ significantly between the T-test and Wilcoxon test. In 
terms of deal characteristics, the percentages of hostile deals, tender offers, and 
unsolicited deals are all insignificantly different from zero. In addition, there is no 
significant difference between the payment media used by acquirers with high and low 
media coverage. 
 
5.5 Empirical results 
5.5.1 Univariate analysis for short-term announcement returns 
Table 5.5 reports the five-day (-2, +2) CAR for acquirers’ stock prices classified by 
different types of media reports and payment media. We adopt the Fama–French 
three-factor plus momentum factor model to evaluate the market reactions to bidding 
firms when takeover announcements are made. As discussed above, this chapter selects 
financial news released in the time window (-60, -3) to represent the pre-merger media. 
As previous media research shows, there is a dual causality relation between the media 
and the financial market. The financial news affects the reactions of the financial market, 
but firm stock performance is also able to influence the financial media. To solve the 
potential endogeneity problem between firm stock returns and media reports, our 
pre-merger time window ends three days prior to the takeover announcement, since the 
time window of the CAR is (-2, +2). Thus we avoid overlap between the time windows of 
the pre-merger media and CARs. 
 
Panel A of Table 5.5 reports the CARs for the full sample of acquirers and two 
subsamples classified by different attitudes of pre-merger media, positive and negative. 
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Generally, the CAR is negative (-1.79%) and statistically significant for all 288 deals 
(P-value 0.0015). When we differentiate the returns on the basis of pre-merger media 
attitude, the performances of the two subsamples are dramatically different. Compared to 
the full-sample CARs, the average CAR for acquirers with positive media attitude is less 
negative (-0.95%) and statistically insignificant (P-value 0.3088). The average CAR for 
acquirers in the negative subsample displays an opposite trend that is more negative 
(-2.61%) and highly significant (P-value 0.0003). The comparison between the positive 
and negative subsamples shows a notable difference: Acquirer announcement abnormal 
returns in the positive group are 1.66% higher than those in the negative group, on 
average. The T-test for the mean value yields a P-value of 0.0688 to support this argument. 
This finding is consistent with our first hypothesis, that financial media do have a large 
influence on the announcement effect of acquirer stock price during M&As. The stock 
market responds differently to acquirers with positive and negative attitudes in the 
pre-merger financial news. The potential reason is that the news released in pre-merger 
period has direct impact on investor’s sentiment. This effect will magnify the market 
reactions to the announcement of M&A deals. Positive news has a positive shock on 
bidder’s announcement returns and negative news has an opposite shock.  
 
To determine whether the announcement CAR of acquirers differs widely for different 
methods of payment in M&As (Loughran and Vijh, 1997 and Moeller, et al., 2007), we 
divide our original sample into three subsamples according to deal payments: pure cash 
payments, pure stock payments, and mixed payments. Generally, the results show that the 
CAR for pure cash payment deals is negative (-0.66%) but statistically insignificant 
(P-value 0.1477). Consistent with previous studies (Fishman, 1989, Moeller, et al., 2004), 
our empirical evidence shows no abnormal announcement return for deals buying a 
public target with pure cash. This finding implies that the financial market responds better 
to cash deals, on average. The CARs of subsamples with positive and negative media 
attitude are very close to those for the whole pure cash sample and insignificantly 
different from each other, at -0.63% and -0.69%, respectively, both statistically 
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insignificant. Thus, in summary, in pure cash takeovers the CARs during the 
announcement period are relatively small and insignificant. The attitudes of pre-merger 
media reports do not have an obvious impact on such deals. 
 
On the other hand, when we examine deals using pure stock payments, the evidence may 
be different. Travlos (1987) and Martin (1996) both show that the announcement 
abnormal returns for pure stock deals are significantly negative. Consistent with their 
findings, our results show that the average CARs for all pure stock takeovers are negative 
(-4.24%) and significant at the 1% level (P-value 0.0042). The comparison between the 
two subsamples indicates that acquirers with positive media attitude have 1.66% less 
negative CARs than negative media acquirers, which have CARS of -3.49% and -5.15%, 
respectively. However, the T-test results suggest that this difference is not statistically 
significant. 
 
Moreover, the results of mixed payment deals are very similar to the results of the full 
sample. The average CAR for all mixed payment deals is -1.77% and statistically 
significant (P-value 0.0267). For acquirers with positive attitude news, the CAR is 
slightly positive (0.25%) but insignificantly different from zero (P-value 0.8154). In 
contrast, the average CAR of acquirers with bad news is highly negative (-3.75%) and 
also statistically significant at the 1% level (P-value 0.0014). This finding shows that 
there is a 4.00% gap between the abnormal announcement returns of the two groups of 
acquirers, which is also statistically significant in T-tests. 
 
Panel B of Table 5.5 presents the CARs for acquirers classified by level of media 
coverage and payment media. For all deals, the CARs for the both high and low coverage 
subsamples are all negative (-1.28% and -2.24%, respectively) and significant (P-values 
0.0153 and 0.0024, respectively). The difference between the two subsamples is 0.96%, 
but it is statistically insignificant (P-value 0.2825). Following previous analysis, we take 
the payment media into account. For pure cash deals, there is no significant difference 
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between the acquirers in the high and low media coverage groups. The CARs for the two 
groups are -0.57% and -0.77%, respectively, and both are insignificant. The results of the 
T-test in the return difference also confirm this finding. Moreover, the announcement 
abnormal returns for acquirers using either pure stock or mixed payments are negative 
and statistically significant. However, the announcement effects between the high and low 
media coverage groups are not dramatically different. For pure stock payments, the 
announcement abnormal returns for acquirers in the high and low coverage groups are 
-3.35% and -4.77%, respectively. There is a 1.42% difference between the two groups, 
but it is statistically insignificant in T-tests. Similarly, the difference between the two 
groups using mixed payments is 0.74% and also insignificant (P-value 0.6272). 
Compared with the T-test results in Panel A, these results easily show that the difference 
between acquirers with high and low media coverage is insignificant, regardless of the 
medium of payment. This finding implies that the pre-merger media coverage does not 
affect acquirer announcement returns. 
 
5.5.2 Regression analysis 
The univariate analysis in Table 5.5 suggests that the general attitude of the financial 
media during the pre-merger period is able to influence market reactions to takeover 
announcement, although the media coverage does not display any impact on 
announcement returns. However, the results of univariate analysis do not consider that the 
findings are driven by other factors. To control for other determinants of acquirer 
announcement returns, this chapter adopts multivariate regressions and controls for a 
group of firm and deal variables. The regression models are as following: 
 
0 1 2[ 2, 2]CAR MediaAttitude MediaCoverage                        (5.2) 
\ 
186 
 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8
[ 2, 2]CAR MediaAttitude MediaCoverage Premium
+ InterestCoverage Profit + PureCash RelativeSize+ MtB
   
     
     
  
   (5.3) 
 
In the regression models of Table 5.6, we choose acquirer five-day (-2, +2) CARs around 
the takeover announcement as the dependent variable. The first regression model includes 
only two independent variables: media attitude and media coverage. Consistent with our 
prediction, the estimate for media attitude is negative (-0.9362) and statistically 
significant (P-value 0.0545). This finding suggests a negative relation between the 
announcement CARs and the acquirer’s pre-merger media attitude measure and it is 
statistically and economically significant. In detail, the CARs around takeover 
announcements decrease when the media pessimism factor rises. For the media coverage 
variable, the estimate is positive (0.0054) but statistically insignificant (P-value 0.1299). 
The estimation result from the first regression is consistent with those from the univariate 
analysis in the previous section. The market reactions to the takeover announcements will 
vary according to pre-merger media attitude but this is irrelevant with pre-merger media 
coverage. 
 
The second regression model uses a group of control variables. These control variables 
cover both deal and firm characteristics that are identified as influencing announcement 
returns in previous studies. Roll’s (1986) hubris hypothesis predicts that acquirer 
managers are overconfident and have an incentive to overpay in takeovers. Malmendier 
and Tate (2005, 2008) find further evidence to support this argument and show that these 
overpaid takeovers have significantly lower announcement abnormal returns. To control 
for this effect, the variable bid premium is included in the regression model. A group of 
studies also shows that the medium of payment is the dominant factor in acquirer’s 
announcement abnormal returns. Travlos (1987) and others indicate that acquisitions of 
public targets paid in pure cash are accompanied by higher announcement returns. A 
dummy variable for pure cash deals should be included in the model to control for the 
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effect of payment method. This dummy variable will be set to one for deals using pure 
cash payments and to zero for stock and mixed payments. 
 
For the control variables relating to firm characteristics, Maloney, et al. (1993) finds that 
bidders with higher leverage have higher announcement returns. Our regression model 
uses the variable Interest Coverage to proxy for the acquirer’s capital structure. Lang, et 
al. (1991) and Servaes (1991) both reveal a positive relation between the acquirer’s 
market-to-book ratio and announcement returns. The variable market-to-book ratio is 
calculated as the ratio of the firm’s market value of assets over the book value. It is 
normally used to proxy for a firm’s future growth opportunity. Furthermore, the relative 
size between the target and the acquirer is also an indispensable control variable in 
previous M&A studies (Asquith, et al, 1983; Travlos 1987). Thus both the market-to-book 
ratio and Relative Size are controlled for in this regression. 
 
The second column of Table 5.6 shows the regression results after controlling these 
variables. The results suggest that the correlation between the announcement CARs and 
media attitude is still valid. The estimate for the media pessimism factor is -1.5047 and 
statistically significant at the 1% level (P-value 0.0048). Moreover, the estimate for the 
variable Media Coverage is still insignificant (P-value 0.8089). 
 
Consistent with our prediction, the estimate for the bid premium is negative (-0.0224) but 
marginally insignificant (P-value 0.1430). The response of the stock market to takeover 
announcements may decrease as the bid premium increases. Because investors believe 
that takeover deals with a high premium are probably made by overconfident managers, 
firm value is destroyed. The estimate for the pure cash dummy is 0.0047 and insignificant 
(P-value 0.6652). On the contrary, the estimates for the variables Interest Coverage and 
Relative Size are both statistically significant. As predicted, the relation between 
announcement returns and relative size is negative (-0.0686) but relate positively to the 
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acquirer capital structure measure (0.0949). Finally, the estimate for the market-to-book 
ratio is only 0.0003 and insignificant (P-value 0.8896). 
 
To summarize, the empirical results from our univariate and multivariate regression 
analyses indicate that the media attitude of news released in the pre-merger period has a 
large impact on the reaction of the financial market. This evidence strongly supports the 
first hypothesis of this chapter. After controlling for various effects, we find a statistically 
significant and negative relation between bidding firms’ five-day (-2, +2) CARs and the 
media pessimism factor. We also find that the variable for media coverage in the 
pre-merger period does not affect acquirer stock performance. 
 
5.5.3 Univariate analysis for long-term post-merger performance 
So far, this chapter has investigated the interaction between the pre-merger media and 
acquirer announcement returns. We find significant and reliable evidence to support the 
first hypothesis of this chapter. This section explores the relation between the media 
during the event window and acquirer post-merger performance and tests whether the 
second hypothesis is supported by empirical results. We choose the BHAR methodology 
to evaluate merging firms’ long0term stock performance in the post-merger period. The 
time window of the BHARs is 12 months. 
 
Table 5.7 reports acquirers’ 12-month BHARs classified by different types of media and 
payment media. Similar to the CAR analysis, the entire sample is split into two 
subsamples on the basis of media attitude and coverage, respectively, in Panels A and B. 
First, for the whole sample, the average BHARs for all acquirers is negative (-14.59%) 
and statistically significantly different from zero (P-value 0.0001). This finding is 
consistent with Loughran and Vijh’s (1997) argument that firms buying public targets 
suffer substantial losses on future stock performance. When taking into account the 
different payment media, the results change. For deals using pure cash payment, acquirer 
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long-term performance, with a mean of -6.62%, is much better than that of other 
payments. For pure stock deals, acquirers have much more negative (-22.46%) and 
statistically significant (P-value 0.0056) long-term average BHARs. The average BHAR 
of mixed payment deals is -19.76% and significant at the 1% level (P-value 0.0005). 
 
When the full sample is differentiated on the basis of media attitude in the event window, 
acquirer long-term performances show great differences. A comparison between the two 
subsamples shows that acquirers with good event window news have relatively better 
performance than acquirers with bad news (-12.20% versus -17.93%). Although the T-test 
results show that the difference between the two groups is statistically insignificant 
(P-value 0.3570), the outperformance is considerable. The results from different payment 
samples also support this conclusion. In pure cash deals, the average BHAR for acquirers 
with good news is -0.08% and insignificantly different from zero (P-value 0.9893). For 
acquirers with bad news, the average BHAR is -13.33% and significant at the 1% level 
(P-value 0.0074). The gap is 13.24% and statistically significant (P-value 0.0885) 
regarding media attitude. For pure stock and mixed payment deals, the long-term 
performance of merging firms with positive and negative media reports also differs 
dramatically. Generally, firms with positive news in the event window period outperform 
firms with negative news. 
 
We also report the results of BHARs based on the media coverage classification in Panel 
B of Table 5.7. Similar to the findings of the short-term CAR analysis, differentiation of 
BHARs between merging firms with high and low media coverage is diversified and 
insignificantly different from zero. 
 
To sum up, consistent with previous research, we find that merging firms obtain negative 
abnormal returns, on average, in the long-term post-merger period. Takeover deals paid 
100% in cash have much better future stock performance than deals paid 100% in stocks. 
The comparison analysis indicates that the general attitude of news released in the event 
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window period is able to predict merging firms’ long-term stock returns. Nevertheless, the 
predictive power does not seem to be very strong, since the differences are statistically 
insignificant under certain conditions. A potential explanation can be attributed to the 
analysis methodology. Since merging firms’ long-term stock returns depend on various 
factors, the results from univariate analysis do not control for these effects. Therefore, the 
next section presents the results of a cross-sectional multivariate analysis after controlling 
for those factors. 
 
5.5.4 Regression analysis for long-term BHARs 
We use multivariate regression analysis to further investigate the relation between 
financial media and merging firms’ long-term stock performance. Table 5.8 presents the 
results of these tests. The dependent variables for the two regression models are the six- 
and 12-month merging firms’ BHARs, respectively. Consistent with the CAR regression 
model, the regression model controls for the bid premium, the pure cash dummy variable 
for deal characteristics, and interest coverage, profitability, relative size, and the 
market-to-book ratio for firm characteristics. The followings are the regression models: 
 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8
[ 25, 126]BHAR MediaAttitude MediaCoverage Premium
+ InterestCoverage Profit + PureCash RelativeSize+ MtB
   
     
     
  
 (5.4) 
 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8
[ 25, 252]BHAR MediaAttitude MediaCoverage Premium
+ InterestCoverage Profit + PureCash RelativeSize+ MtB
   
     
     
  
 (5.5) 
 
The estimates for the media attitude variable in the two models are both negative (-5.0076 
and -10.884, respectively) and significant at the 10% level (P-values 0.0842 and 0.0717, 
respectively). However, the estimates for the media coverage variable are statistically 
insignificant in Table 5.8. This finding suggests that a merging firm’s post-merger 
performance decreases with the media pessimism factor. This finding provides further 
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evidence for the argument that the attitude of news released in the event-window period 
can partially predict a merging firm’s future stock performance after controlling for 
various influential factors noted by previous research. On the other hand, there is no 
evidence to support the argument that media coverage affects a merging firm’s 
post-merger long-term performance. 
 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests that the effect of deal characteristics on 
merging firms’ long-term performance seems to be weaker than the effect on short-term 
abnormal returns. The estimates for the bid premium in the two regression models are all 
insignificant. Only the estimate for the pure cash dummy in the second regression model 
is positive (0.1437) and statistically significant (P-value 0.0941). Compared to deal 
characteristics, variables relating to a firm’s fundamental information exhibit a much 
stronger influence. The variable market-to-book ratio consistently achieves negative 
(-0.0123 and -0.067, respectively) and significant (P-values 0.0825 and 0.0001) estimates 
in both regression models. In addition, the estimate for variable profitability is positive 
(1.0599) and significant at the 5% level (P-value 0.0421) in the second model. 
 
In conclusion, the above analysis shows that merging firms’ long-term BHARs are 
affected by financial news released during the event-window period. The event window is 
specified here as the number of days since the takeover announcement day to the day 
before the effective day. It supposes that news released in this time window should 
closely follow related takeover deals. As Tetlock, et al. (2008) argue, financial media are 
able to forecast a firm’s future earnings and stock returns. This predictability is 
demonstrated in the news that relates to a firm’s fundamental information. In the case of 
M&As, the news released during the period from the announcement day to the effective 
day will naturally focus on the topic of ongoing takeovers. Thus such news stories are 
supposed to have strong predictability for determining whether these takeover deals 
benefit merging firms’ shareholders in the long term. Our empirical evidence partially 
supports this hypothesis. The increase in the media pessimism factor predicts 
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significantly lower stock returns in the post-merger period. However, the financial media 
coverage in this period does not affect the future performance of merging firms. 
 
5.5.5 Premium analysis 
Our research on acquirer short-term abnormal returns and long-term stock performance 
demonstrates the interaction between financial media and M&As. This section further 
examines the relation between the pre-merger media and bid premiums. The research 
made by Buehlmaier (2013) shows that the media can mitigate the information 
asymmetry between target shareholders and bidding firms. As the author argues, good 
news improves acquirer ratings by target shareholders and promotes them to accept 
takeover offers. Thus positive media can predict takeover success. Taking into account 
the effect of bid premiums, we predict a negative relation between the pre-merger 
financial media and bid premiums in the takeover. A potential explanation is that 
acquirers with good news have less incentive to overpay for their targets. Since the 
positive media already predict the future success of M&A offers, it does not seem 
necessary to offer a high premium bid for target shareholders to ensure offer success. On 
the other hand, the bad news released before takeover announcements will force bidder 
managers to increase their offer prices to compensate for the negative effect caused by the 
financial media. Otherwise target shareholders are more likely to reject the M&A offer 
and these deals will eventually fail. To capture this phenomenon, we regress bid 
premiums on the measures for media attitude and media coverage, as well as a group of 
control variables. The regression model is as following: 
 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
Premium MediaAttitude MediaCoverage TenderOffer
PureStock CompeteDeal Profit + MtB
   
    
   
   
      (5.6) 
 
Table 5.9 describes the results of a cross-sectional regression for the above settings. The 
dependent variable of the two models is the premium paid by acquirers for target shares 
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in each deal. The first regression model includes only the measures for media attitude and 
coverage, without control variables. The estimate of the media attitude variable is positive 
(3.3359) and statistically significant (P-value 0.0978). The estimate of media attitude in 
the second regression model further supports this finding, with a value of 3.8314 and 
significant at the 10% level (P-value 0.0773). Consistent with our prediction, the 
empirical evidence indicates a positive relation between the bid premium and media 
pessimism factors. This result implies that the bidding firm’s managers have to improve 
their bid prices to offset the media’s negative influence. The role of media coverage on 
bid premium is similar to that of media attitude and it yields positive (0.0290 and 0.0343) 
and statistically significant (P-values 0.0523 and 0.0337) estimates in both regression 
models. In the second regression model, we further control for certain common effects for 
takeover premiums. Only the estimate for the tender offer dummy is significant (P-value 
0.0001) and positive (0.2460). 
 
In conclusion, the analysis of bid premiums shows that the financial news released in the 
pre-merger period has a significant impact on the premiums paid by bidding firms to 
target shareholders. The empirical results suggest that, generally, bid premiums are 
negatively related to media attitude but positively related to media coverage. Combining 
these findings with those on acquirer CARs shows a clear, rational route from financial 
media to announcement returns. Since good news in the pre-merger period has a positive 
impact on the financial market and target shareholder sentiment and recognition, it also 
significantly improves the probability of takeover success. Therefore, acquirers do not 
necessarily need to offer a higher premium to promote the success of their M&A deals. 
They pay significantly lower premiums than others, on average. This advantage 
significantly reduces the probability of overpaying for bidding firms. Finally, the stock 
market reacts much better to these deals and bidding firm stock performs better in the 
announcement period. 
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5.6 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter examines the interaction between the financial media and market reactions 
to M&As. The previous literature shows that either media attitude or media coverage 
affects firm stock performance. However, this finding has not been applied to M&A 
research. This chapter addresses the issue of whether the financial media affect or predict 
takeover returns in the short and long term. 
 
First, this chapter provides empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that the general 
attitude of financial news released during the pre-announcement period strongly affects 
the reactions of the financial market to takeover deals. It shows that the increasing level 
of media pessimism in the pre-announcement time window significantly reduces the 
acquirer’s five-day announcement abnormal returns (-2.61% compared to -0.95%). This 
hypothesis is still holds in a cross-sectional multivariate analysis after controlling for 
various known factors. Furthermore, the study on bid premium shows that not only the 
announcement returns but also the bid premiums are affected by financial news released 
in the pre-announcement period. Acquirers’ managers have to boost their bid price to 
compensate for previous pessimistic news stories. The general causality route is that the 
pre-merger media affects both the financial market’s rating of the acquirer and the 
premium paid to target shareholders, which affects the acquirer’s stock performance 
during the takeover announcement period. 
 
This chapter also investigates the potential relation between acquirer post-merger 
long-term stock performance and the financial media. Previous studies determine that the 
media are able to report unreleased fundamental information to resolve the problem of 
information asymmetry between different groups of investors. We expect financial news 
stories on the topic of takeover deals to have predictive power for merging firms’ 
long-term stock returns. Both the univariate and multivariate analysis provide quantitative 
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results to support our hypothesis that financial news during the M&A event period 
influences merging firms’ future stock performance. 
 
This chapter’s main contribution to the literature is to provide a comprehensive study on 
the financial media’s role in M&As. It is an effective supplement to media research. 
However, the relation between the media and M&As provides some implications for 
future research. For instance, the diversity of media attitudes between various news 
stories is a potential proxy for the diversity of opinions in the stock market. Moreover, 
our research does not control for the effect of stale news. 
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Table 5.1 Sample Selection 
This table presents the sample selection process for research. The Merger & Acquisition data is from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) M&A Database. 
The accounting data is from COMPUSTAT Database. The stock price data is from CRSP Database. The source of media data is from FACTIVA Database. 
 
 
Selection Criteria Size 
Acquirer Nation United States of America 257376 
Target Nation United States of America 220726 
Acquirer and Target Public Status Public 133067 
Firm Industry Exclude Finance and Utility Firms 88492 
Date Announced 01/01/2000 to 12/31/2008 28323 
Deal Status Completed 20177 
Deal Type Exclude Other M&A 19566 
Deal Value Larger Than $100 Million 2793 
Accounting, Share Price and Media Data Availability Exclude Unmatched Deals 288 
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Table 5.2 Yearly M&A Deals 
This table presents the sample of M&A deals used in this chapter in each year from 2000 to 2009. This table presents the number of deals, the sum, mean 
and median values of deal value for all deals. It also presents the percentage of pure cash deals, pure stock deals and the average bid premiums.  
 
Year Deal Number Sum Deal Value Mean Deal Value Median Deal Value Percent of Cash Percent of Stock Bid Premium 
2000 65 155940.3 2399.1 794.21 12.31% 38.46% 56.36% 
2001 30 82927.3 2764.2 777.09 16.67% 36.67% 44.49% 
2002 30 82482.8 2749.4 434.29 40.00% 23.33% 36.33% 
2003 26 28225.7 1085.6 502.36 46.15% 7.69% 43.14% 
2004 20 69925.1 3496.3 908.89 55.00% 25.00% 38.01% 
2005 38 199882.9 5260.1 1418.5 55.26% 7.89% 35.19% 
2006 31 105990.6 3419.1 1458.8 64.52% 9.68% 32.01% 
2007 32 67482.5 2108.8 1298.1 71.88% 3.13% 40.64% 
2008 16 60377.2 3773.6 1003.6 68.75% 6.25% 77.82% 
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Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics for Media Data 
This table shows descriptive statistics for all 478830 media data. Variable News Length is the number of total words in the content of news. Variables Title 
Positive and Title Negative are the number of positive and negative words in news title respectively. Content Positive and Content Negative are the 
number of positive and negative words in news content. Variable Media Pessimism is the major measure in this paper. It is the ratio of negative words over 
news length. 
 
 
Variables Mean Median SD 10 percentile 90 percentile 
News Length 629.29 525 461.92 185 1164 
Title Positive 0.1386 0 0.3792 0 1 
Title Negative 0.3029 0 0.5915 0 1 
Content Positive 5.3203 4 5.6692 0 13 
Content Negative 10.9852 8 12.0129 1 25 
Media Pessimism 0.0174 0.0147 0.0138 0.0026 0.0348 
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Table 5.4 Descriptive Statistics of Deal and Acquirers characteristics 
This table presents firm and M&A deal characteristics for acquiring firms from 2000 to 2008. Panel A includes the descriptive statistics for the full sample 
and two subsamples that are classified by media attitude. Panel B reports the results classified by media coverage. The variable Market Value is bidder’s 
market value. The Market-to-Book ratio is the ratio of firm’s market value divided by its book value. R&D/TA represents expenses in research and 
development (R&D) over total assets; EBITDA/TA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) over total assets (TA); 
Tangible asset/TA is defined as net property, plant, and equipment over total assets; Market Leverage is the ratio of book debt to market value; Interest 
Coverage is the ratio of interest expense over EBIT; Operating Cash Flow is the ratio of sales minus the cost of goods sold, sales and general 
administration, and working capital change then over total assets. Deal Value, as recorded in SDC database, is the total amount paid by acquirers. Relative 
Size is the total value of the target over acquirers; Toehold Size is the percentage of common shares outstanding held by the acquirer as of the 
announcement date; Pure Cash is the percentage of deals paid 100% in cash in each sample; Pure Stock is the percentage of deals paid 100% in stock in 
each sample; Unsolicited Deals is the percentage of deals where acquirers make an offer for a target without prior negotiations. This table also provides 
results of T-test for the difference of mean value, Wilcoxon-test for the difference of median value between two subsamples. The numbers are followed by 
***, **, * if it is significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. 
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Table 5.4 Continued from Previous Page 
Panel A 
 
                    Whole Sample Positive Attitude Negative Attitude T-Test Wilcoxon Test 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median Diff P-Value P-Value 
Market Value 255 54750.8 17228.0 124 39194.5 15891.5 131 69475.8 24798.5 -30281.3*** 0.0061 0.0524 
Market-to-Book Ratio 255 3.192 2.100 124 3.479 2.154 131 2.921 2.092 0.558 0.3695 0.7559 
R&D/TA 288 0.048 0.035 142 0.040 0.020 146 0.056 0.050 -0.016*** 0.0077 0.0096 
EBITDA/TA 286 0.156 0.159 141 0.153 0.168 145 0.158 0.153 -0.005 0.6456 0.1940 
Tangible Asset/TA 288 0.224 0.159 142 0.247 0.168 146 0.202 0.151 0.045** 0.0425 0.3466 
Market Leverage 255 0.244 0.221 124 0.243 0.223 131 0.245 0.220 -0.002 0.9433 0.7559 
Interest Coverage 263 0.091 0.057 124 0.095 0.065 139 0.087 0.049 0.008 0.5214 0.1227 
Operating Cash Flow 286 0.123 0.123 141 0.118 0.124 145 0.127 0.120 -0.009 0.3489 0.5550 
Deal Value 288 2962.6 887.7 142 2798.2 976.3 146 3122.5 864.3 -324.3 0.6811 0.4802 
Relative Size 255 0.191 0.080 124 0.227 0.083 131 0.157 0.073 0.070* 0.0572 0.7559 
Toehold Size 288 2.18% 0.00% 142 1.81% 0.00% 146 2.54% 0.00% -0.74% 0.5905 0.5483 
 Mean Mean Mean T-test 
Hostile Deal 0.97% 0.70% 2.05% 0.3275    
Pure Cash 38.80% 40.14% 45.21% 0.3850 
Pure Stock 22.78% 22.54% 17.81% 0.3173 
Tender Offer 25.10% 27.46% 29.45% 0.7087 
Unsolicited Deal 5.02% 4.23% 6.85% 0.3311 
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Table 5.4 Continued from Previous Page 
Panel B 
 
Whole Sample Low Media Coverage High Media Coverage T-Test Wilcoxon Test 
 Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median Diff P-Value P-Value 
Market Value 134 15152.2 6817.0 121 98603.7 62272.8 -83451.5***  0.0001 0.0001 
Market-to-Book Ratio 134 2.875 1.738 121 3.544 2.329 -0.669 0.2822 0.0006 
R&D/TA 154 0.044 0.018 134 0.053 0.050 -0.009 0.1114 0.0004 
EBITDA/TA 152 0.146 0.152 134 0.166 0.165 -0.020* 0.0627 0.1558 
Tangible Asset/TA 154 0.238 0.163 134 0.208 0.150 0.030 0.1697 0.4792 
Market Leverage 134 0.264 0.243 121 0.221 0.183 0.043** 0.0347 0.0691 
Interest Coverage 139 0.113 0.077 124 0.066 0.045 0.047*** 0.0002 0.0004 
Operating Cash Flow 152 0.114 0.122 134 0.133 0.131 -0.021** 0.0431 0.6361 
Deal Value 154 1958.6 793.6 134 4116.5 1090.3 -2157.9*** 0.0095 0.1570 
Relative Size 134 0.266 0.144 121 0.107 0.027 0.159*** 0.0001 0.0001 
Toehold Size 154 2.49% 0.00% 134 1.83% 0.00% 0.66% 0.6183 0.7898 
 Mean Mean T-test  
Hostile Deal 0.65% 2.24% 0.2503 
Pure Cash 35.71% 50.75% 0.0101 
Pure Stock 23.38% 16.42% 0.1419 
Tender Offer 29.87% 26.87% 0.5731 
Unsolicited Deal 3.90% 7.46% 0.1875 
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Table 5.5 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
This table shows short-term cumulative abnormal returns for all bidding firms around takeover announcement. Panel A the full sample is classified by 
media attitude. The classification criterion is the value media pessimism factor of news relating to bidders. The full sample is divided into two equal 
groups according the media pessimism factor, named as Positive Media Attitude and Negative Media Attitude. Panel B is classified by media coverage. 
The classification criterion is the total number of news relating to bidders in pre-merger period. The full sample is also divided into two equal groups, 
named as High Media Coverage and Low Media Coverage. The CAR [-2, +2] denotes the five-day cumulative abnormal return measured using 
Fama-French three factor plus momentum factor model. The estimate period is [-346, -91]. Pure Cash is the subsample that deals paid by 100 percentage 
of cash. Pure Stock is the subsample in which paid by 100 percentage of stocks. Mixed is the deals neither paid by pure cash or pure stock. The difference 
tests are based on T-tests for equality in means. The numbers are followed by ***, **, * if it is significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% 
confidence level. 
Panel A 
CAR [-2, +2] Obs. All Acquirers Positive Media Attitude Negative Media Attitude Differences  
  Mean Median P-Value Mean Median P-Value Mean Median P-Value Mean P-Value 
All Deals 288 -1.79%*** -0.43% 0.0015 -0.95% -0.29% 0.3088 -2.61%*** -0.96% 0.0003 1.66%* 0.0688 
Pure Cash 123 -0.66% -0.12% 0.1477 -0.63% -0.15% 0.7807 -0.69% 0.13% 0.4533 0.06% 0.9509 
Pure Stock 58 -4.24%*** -3.86% 0.0042 -3.49%* -3.22% 0.0751 -5.15%*** -4.20% 0.0040 1.66% 0.5659 
Mixed 107 -1.77%** -0.61% 0.0267 0.25% 0.07% 0.8154 -3.75%*** -2.74% 0.0014 4.00%** 0.0105 
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Table 5.5 Continued from Previous Page 
Panel B 
 
CAR [-2, +2] Obs. All Acquirers High Media Coverage Low Media Coverage Differences  
  Mean Median P-Value Mean Median P-Value Mean Median P-Value Mean P-Value 
All Deals 288 -1.79%*** -0.43% 0.0015 -1.28%** -0.34% 0.0153 -2.24%*** -0.61% 0.0024 0.96% 0.2825 
Pure Cash 123 -0.66% -0.12% 0.1477 -0.57% -0.25% 0.3252 -0.77% 0.49% 0.2936 0.20% 0.8281 
Pure Stock 58 -4.24%*** -3.86% 0.0042 -3.35%* -2.23% 0.0646 -4.77%** -6.24% 0.0253 1.42% 0.5969 
Mixed 107 -1.77%** -0.61% 0.0267 -1.34% 0.36% 0.1804 -2.07%* -2.73% 0.0772 0.74% 0.6272 
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Table 5.6 Cross-sectional regression analysis of announcement abnormal returns 
This table shows cross-sectional regressions for which the dependent variable is the five-day [-2, +2] cumulative abnormal returns. The estimates and 
P-values are both reported for each variable. The variable Media Attitude is the average media pessimism factor for all news reported in time window [-60, 
-3] for each acquirer. The Media Coverage is the average number of news reported in time window [-60, -3] for each acquirer. Premium is the four week 
premiums of each deal recorded by SDC database. Interest Coverage is the ratio of firm’s EBITDA over its interest expense. Profit is the ratio of EBITDA 
over total asset. Pure Cash is a dummy variable indicating whether deals are paid by 100 percent cash. Relative Size is the total value of the target over 
acquirers. Market-to-Book ratio is the ratio of firm’s market value of assets over its book value. The numbers are followed by ***, **, * if it is 
significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. The following is the regression models: 
 
Model 1 
0 1 2[ 2, 2]CAR MediaAttitude MediaCoverage          
Model 2 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8[ 2, 2]CAR MediaAttitude MediaCoverage Premium+ InterestCoverage Profit+ PureCash RelativeSize+ MtB                   
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Table 5.6 Continued from Previous Page 
 
Regression for CAR 
 CAR [-2,+2] 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Variable Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept -0.0121 0.2435 0.0101 0.6235 
Media Attitude -0.9362* 0.0545 -1.5047*** 0.0048 
Media Coverage 0.0054 0.1299 0.0010 0.8089 
Premium   -0.0224 0.1430 
Interest Coverage   0.0949* 0.0789 
Profit   0.0593 0.3702 
Pure Cash   0.0047 0.6652 
Relative Size   -0.0844*** 0.0001 
Market-to-Book Ratio   0.0003 0.8896 
Adjusted R-Square 288 226 
Obs. 0.0125 0.0942 
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Table 5.7 Buy-Hold Abnormal Returns 
This table shows long-term Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns for all bidding firms after deal completed. In Panel A the full sample is classified by media 
attitude. The classification criterion is the value media pessimism factor of news relating to bidders. The full sample is divided into two equal groups 
according the media pessimism factor, named as Positive Media Attitude and Negative Media Attitude. Panel B is classified by media coverage. The 
classification criterion is the total number of news relating to bidders, named as High Media Coverage and Low Media Coverage The full sample is also 
divided into two equal groups. Panel B is classified by media coverage. The BHAR [+25, +252] denotes the 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal return 
measured using Fama-French three factor plus momentum factor model. Pure Cash is the subsample that deals paid by 100 percent cash. Pure Stock is the 
subsample in which paid by 100 percent stocks. Mixed is the deals neither paid by pure cash or pure stock. The difference tests are based on T-tests for 
equality in means. P-value has been adjusted by bootstrapping. The numbers are followed by ***, **, * if it is significantly different from zero with 1%, 
5%, 10% confidence level. 
Panel A 
BHAR Obs. All Acquirers Positive Media Attitude Negative Media Attitude Differences  
  Mean Median P-Value Mean Median P-Value Mean Median P-Value Mean P-Value 
All Deals 284 -14.59%*** -12.86% 0.0001 -12.20%*** -8.50% 0.0081 -17.93%*** -16.86% 0.0001 5.73% 0.3570 
Pure Cash 123 -6.62%* -7.55% 0.0836 -0.08% -3.23% 0.9893 -13.33%*** -12.71% 0.0074 13.24%* 0.0885 
Pure Stock 54 -22.46%*** -25.25% 0.0056 -17.46% -0.59% 0.1370 -30.25%*** -31.83% 0.0096 12.79% 0.4245 
Mixed 107 -19.76%*** -17.34% 0.0005 -21.21%*** -16.20% 0.0059 -18.00%** -17.93% 0.0433 -3.21% 0.7770 
 
207 
 
Table 5.7 Continued from Previous Page 
Panel B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BHAR Obs. All Acquirers High Media Coverage Low Media Coverage Differences  
  Mean Median P-Value Mean Median P-Value Mean Median P-Value Mean P-Value 
All Deals 288 -14.59%*** -12.86% 0.0001 -12.62%*** -12.46% 0.0009 -17.38%*** -14.06% 0.0006 4.76% 0.4438 
Cash 123 -6.62%* -7.55% 0.0836 -8.36% -12.46% 0.1159 -6.00% -5.50% 0.3049 -2.36% 0.7622 
Stock 54 -22.46%*** -25.25% 0.0056 -25.11%* -23.09% 0.0589 -21.93%** -29.24% 0.0409 -3.18% 0.8446 
Mixed 107 -19.76%*** -17.34% 0.0005 -12.58%** -7.60% 0.0209 -26.94%*** -28.95% 0.0087 14.35% 0.2033 
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Table 5.8 Cross-sectional regression analysis of BHAR 
This table shows cross-sectional regressions for which the dependent variable is the 6-month and 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns respectively. 
The estimates and P-values are both reported for each variable. The variable Media Attitude is the average media pessimism factor for all news reported 
between announcement day and the day before effective day [DA, DE-1] for each acquirer. The Media Coverage is the average number of news reported 
between announcement day and the day before effective day [DA, DE-1] for each acquirer. Premium is the four week premiums of each deal recorded by 
SDC database. Interest Coverage is the ratio of firm’s EBITDA over its interest expense. Profit is the ratio of EBITDA over total asset. Pure Cash is a 
dummy variable indicating whether deals are paid by 100 percent cash. Relative Size is the total value of the target over acquirers. Market-to-Book Ratio 
is the ratio of firm’s market value of assets over its book value. The numbers are followed by ***, **, * if it is significantly different from zero with 1%, 
5%, 10% confidence level. The following is the regression models: 
 
Model 1 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8[ 25, 126]BHAR MediaAttitude MediaCoverage Premium+ InterestCoverage Profit+ PureCash RelativeSize+ MtB                 
Model 2 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8[ 25, 252]BHAR MediaAttitude MediaCoverage Premium+ InterestCoverage Profit+ PureCash RelativeSize+ MtB                   
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Table 5.8 Continued from Previous Page 
 
Regression for BHAR 
 [+25, +126] [+25, +252] 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Variable Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept 0.0333 0.6993 -0.1049 0.5596 
Media Attitude -5.0076* 0.0842 -10.884* 0.0717 
Media Coverage -0.0119 0.4121 0.0465 0.1230 
Premium 0.0732 0.2032 -0.0378 0.7516 
Interest Coverage -0.3295 0.1297 0.7156 0.1143 
Profit 0.2102 0.3993 1.0599** 0.0421 
Pure Cash 0.0532 0.1961 0.1437* 0.0941 
Relative Size 0.0344 0.6416 -0.0446 0.7721 
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0123* 0.0826 -0.0670*** 0.0001 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0229 0.1061 
Obs. 221 221 
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Table 5.9 Cross-sectional regression analysis for bid premium 
This table presents cross-sectional regressions for which the dependent variable is four-week bid premium. The estimates and P-values are both reported 
for each variable. The variable Media Attitude is the average media pessimism factor for all news reported in time window [-60, -3] for each acquirer. The 
Media Coverage is the average number of news reported in time window [-60, -3] for each acquirer. Pure Cash is a dummy variable indicating whether 
deals are paid by 100 percent cash. Tender Offer is a dummy variable which indicates whether acquirers provide tender offer to target shareholders. 
Compete Deal is a dummy variable indicating existence of competing deal. Profit is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA) over total assets (TA). Market-to-Book Ratio is the ratio of firm’s market value divided by its book value. The numbers are 
followed by ***, **, * if it is significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. The regression models are as following: 
 
Model 1 
0 1 2Premium MediaAttitude MediaCoverage        
Model 2 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Premium MediaAttitude MediaCoverage TenderOffer PureStock CompeteDeal Profit+ MtB                 
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Table 5.9 Continued from Previous Page 
 
Regression for Premium 
 Premium 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Variable Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept 0.2683*** 0.0001 0.1320** 0.0298 
Media Attitude 3.3359* 0.0978 3.8314* 0.0773 
Media Coverage 0.0290* 0.0523 0.0343** 0.0337 
Tender Offer   0.2460*** 0.0001 
Pure Stock   0.0403 0.4534 
Compete Deal   -0.0803 0.3268 
Profit   0.2886 0.1851 
Market-to-Book Ratio   0.0003 0.9437 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0183 0.1240 
Obs. 278 246 
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Chapter 6 
6. Conclusion 
6.1 Summary and conclusion 
This thesis focuses on two aspects of M&As: factors affecting takeover success and the 
determinants of M&A performance. We extend previous M&A research to two important 
fields of financial research: capital structure and the financial media. Evidence on the 
interaction between firm capital structure and M&A activity is bidirectional. From M&A 
to capital structure, the results indicate that M&As are an effective approach to adjust 
firm capital structure. Under costly adjustment conditions, the previous literature shows 
that firms do not continuously adjust the capital structure to tally with their target levels. 
Therefore M&A deals can help firms greatly adjust their leverage ratios, which is 
consistent with the prediction of dynamic trade-off theory. In line with the previous 
literature, this thesis confirms that the consideration of capital structure is a reliable 
explanation for the motivation of M&A activity. Furthermore, this thesis indicates that 
firm capital structure also has a strong impact on takeover success and deal performance. 
In general, this thesis resolves several empirical issues concerning the relation between 
capital structure and M&As. 
 
First, this thesis documents empirical evidence of the interaction between bidder capital 
structure and the probability of success in takeovers. Using a large and comprehensive 
M&A data set that contains 19,203 successful and failed deals during 1980--2009, our 
logistic regression results indicate a strongly negative relation between a bidder’s 
leverage deficit and the probability of successful deal completion. By adopting three 
dummy variables to proxy for a bidder’s leverage deficit levels, we further show that 
overleveraged bidders have a lower success rate, while target-leveraged bidders have the 
highest. More specifically, we show that the relation between capital structure and 
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takeover success is also dramatically different for different payment media. Moreover, to 
determine a reliable and convincing explanation for our findings, we explore the potential 
relation between bidder capital structure and offer premiums. Consistent with the findings 
for takeover success, the empirical evidence suggests that overleveraged bidders are 
unable to offer high premiums, which can reduce their success rates. In contrast, 
target-leveraged firms can significantly improve offer premiums to achieve success in 
M&As. In addition to the leverage deficit variable, our studies in Chapter 3 identify 
several determinant factors that also have explanatory power for takeover success. The 
bidder’s firm size, growth opportunity, profitability, and adoption of a tender offer all 
have significantly positive effects on takeover success. On the negative side, these 
findings suggest that the probability of success in M&As decreases in the presence of 
managerial resistance or competing offers. 
 
As the thesis shows, Chapter 3 focuses on examining the interaction between bidder 
capital structure and the probability of success based on the concept of leverage deficit. 
We obtain strong evidence to support the prediction that overleveraged bidders are less 
likely to be successful in M&As. To further explore the relation between the theory of 
target capital structure and M&As, Chapter 4 examines the influence of bidder capital 
structure on M&A decisions and deal performance. The empirical evidence shows that the 
leverage deficit level can affect bidder decisions on deal payments. Bidders with high 
deficit levels are more likely to use pure stock payments, while underleveraged bidders 
tend to use cash payments. This finding implies that overleveraged bidders have a strong 
incentive to reduce their leverage deficit by acquiring other firms with equity. The 
findings in Chapter 4 provide reliable evidence to support the concept of target capital 
structure and more clearly illustrate the connection between capital structure and M&A 
activity. 
 
The influence of firm capital structure on M&A performance is also demonstrated in 
Chapter 4. In general, consistent with the previous literature, M&A deals are value 
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destroying for shareholders, on average. However, their performance differs dramatically 
with the bidder’s pre-merger leverage deficit and the targets chosen. In terms of 
short-term announcement returns, deals made by overleveraged bidders outperform those 
made by other types of bidders. In contrast, the announcement returns of deals made by 
target-leveraged bidders are significantly lower. We attribute these performance 
differences to potential shocks of M&A activities to the firm’s capital structure.  
 
Besides the univariate analyses, the Chapter 4 also uses cross-sectional multivariate 
regressions to examine the determinant effect of the leverage deficit on bidder 
announcement returns. Consistent with the univariate analysis findings, after controlling 
for several well-known factors, the regression results strongly confirm the significant 
interaction between the bidder’s leverage deficit and short-term stock returns around the 
announcement period. Deal types, based on different combination of bidders and targets, 
also have a large impact on deal performance. In particular, deals in which an 
overleveraged bidder acquires a target-leveraged target obtain significantly positive 
abnormal returns. However, the analysis on merging firms’ BHARs suggests that the 
long-term performances of new merging firms may not reflect their short-term abnormal 
returns. 
 
Since Chapter 4 shows that a firm’s leverage deficit significantly affects both short- and 
long-term stock performance in M&As, we identify more factors that may also determine 
M&A performance. Chapter 5 investigates the potential interaction between the financial 
media and M&A performance. The empirical evidence from both univariate analysis and 
multivariate regression suggests that the attitude of news released in the 
pre-announcement period is an important determinant of bidder announcement returns. 
Bidders with positive media attitude in the pre-announcement period may have 
significantly better stock returns during the announcement period. This result is still holds 
in cross-sectional multivariate regressions after controlling for a group of determinant 
variables. Moreover, it also shows that the pre-announcement media attitude is negatively 
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related to bid premiums that bidders offered to target shareholders. Based on these 
findings, we conclude that bidders with positive media attitude do not necessarily have to 
offer high premiums for takeover success. Thus these bidders effectively avoid the 
overpayment problem in M&As and obtain better reactions from the financial markets. 
 
In addition to examining bidder announcement returns in the short run, Chapter 5 
discusses the predictive power of the financial media on merging firms’ post-merger 
long-term performance. The evidence from univariate analysis and multivariate 
regression consistently suggests that merging firms’ long-term BHARs are differ 
dramatically with the content of news released during the takeover period. Both the 
coverage and attitude of related news can partially predict the long-term BHARs of 
merging firms. We attribute the media’s predictive power to unreleased information in the 
financial news. This previously unreleased information can help individual investors and 
the whole market obtain plain prospects for M&A deals under way. 
 
Generally, the studies in this thesis contribute to a deeper understanding of how M&A 
deals become successful and how they perform in the future. We mainly identify that 
bidder capital structure has a large impact on the probability of success in takeovers after 
controlling for a group of determinant variables, both statistically and economically 
significant. Furthermore, this thesis argues that bidder capital structure and the 
pre-merger media news are very important factors for determining M&A performance, in 
both the short and long run. 
 
6.2 Potential implications 
This thesis has potential implications for investors as well as firm managers. First, it 
shows that a bidder’s leverage deficit is a major determinant of takeover success. Using 
the models in our research, investors could predict the final outcome of M&A proposals 
more precisely. Since the success or failure of deals should have entirely different impacts 
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on both bidders’ and targets’ stock prices, investors could modify their investment 
strategies in advance. In addition, this thesis determines that both the bidder’s leverage 
deficit and the pre-merger media have great explanatory power for merging firms’ stock 
performance, both statistically and economically significant. Since the stock performance 
of M&A deals changes dramatically with these factors, our research may help investors 
find profitable investment strategies that are based on M&A events. They could 
potentially buy outperform bidders and short-sell underperforming bidders following the 
guidance of determinant factors. 
 
Our studies also have potential implications for corporate managers. As we show above, 
M&As are an effective way to adjust firm capital structure. More specifically, under 
costly adjustment conditions, M&As can be considered a relatively cheap and fast 
approach to rebalance a firm’s financial leverage towards target levels. Therefore our 
study sheds additional light on firm capital structure decisions. Moreover, in addition to 
the potential implications for capital structure decisions, the research in this thesis is also 
helpful for M&A decisions. Firm managers could consider actively reducing leverage 
deficit levels in the pre-announcement period to receive advantages in takeover success. 
In addition, our analyses show that M&A deals with different combinations of bidder and 
target have significantly different performance in both the short and long run. Based on 
our findings and various well-known determinant factors, the corporate managers of 
bidding firms should carefully select appropriate targets and takeover strategies. Both 
firm managers and shareholders may then obtain gains from M&A deals. To summarize, 
this thesis suggests that both capital structure decisions and M&A decisions should 
consider the leverage deficit and media factors. 
 
6.3 Proposal for future research 
While our research makes several contributions to the literature, it also raises a set of 
interesting issues for future research. Addressing these issues in future investigations can 
be valuable. Chapter 2 finds that the relation between a bidder’s leverage deficit and the 
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probability of takeover success is significantly negative. This relation is explained by the 
effect of bid premiums in our research. However, due to the limitation of bid premium 
data availability, the sample of bid premiums for analysis is dramatically smaller than the 
full sample. Therefore it is very important to further explore the interaction between 
leverage deficit and takeover success. Welch (2004) argues that changes in a firm’s 
financial leverage could be mainly explained by the firm’s issuing activities and stock 
price volatilities. Therefore our future research will focus on how these two factors affect 
firm target capital structure and subsequently influence M&As. 
 
There are still numerous questions about the impact of capital structure on M&A 
performance. The results in Chapter 4 especially indicate that there are significant 
diversifications between short- and long-run stock returns in specific types of M&A deals. 
It would be interesting to explore the potential reasons for these performance differences. 
It would also significantly improve our understanding of capital structure theory and 
M&A activities. 
 
Although research on the financial media has become popular in recent years, numerous 
areas remain for future study. Financial media research mainly focuses on two aspects. 
The first aspect is the media source. In line with previous media studies, this thesis 
collects news from traditional financial newspapers considered professional and 
influential by the financial markets. However, due to the rapid development of the 
Internet and communication websites, Internet-based financial news is becoming 
increasingly important and influential. Thus, the diversification of media sources is an 
important area for financial media research. Information from Google searches, Twitter, 
and personal blogs should be potential sources of media data. Furthermore, in existing 
media papers, evaluations of media content are relatively simple. Chapter 5 uses a media 
pessimism factor to evaluate the content of financial news. The media pessimism factor is 
calculated as the ratio of negative words to the total number of words and is the most 
popular estimation for media attitude in recent papers. However, the content of news is 
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too complicated to be evaluated by a simple ratio. Recently, certain studies have started to 
consider the staleness of content in financial news. They argue that stale news should 
have a significantly smaller impact compared to news with fresh information. Therefore, 
to represent the attitude of news more precisely, financial media research should adopt a 
more content analysis-driven approach. 
 
In conclusion, the aspects of M&A research discussed in this thesis are potentially 
popular topics for future studies. They remain largely unexplored by the previous 
literature. 
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